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ABSTRACT
Where’s the Caucus? A Study of Minority Agenda Setting Behavior
by
LaShonda Brenson
Chairs: Professor Richard Hall and Professor Vincent Hutchings
Are Black and Latino members of Congress (MCs) effective in representing the
interest of their constituents? What role, if any, do minority congressional caucuses
play in assisting its members in representing the interest of African American and
Latino constituents via agenda-setting?
Scholars have theorized that the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) and Con-
gressional Hispanic Caucus (CHC) matter, but only to the extent that they are able
to vote cohesively on a bill, which implies that the CBC and CHC are just labels for
MCs with liked-preferences. This dissertation argues against this claim and provide
qualitative and quantitative evidence that minority caucuses, as institutions, matter.
One way I demonstrate the added value of the CBC and CHC is by illustrating that
when caucus members serve as caucus leaders they introduce more bills because of
their staff capacity.
The CBC and CHC also matter as agenda-setters. Previous literature have the-
orized that the CBC and CHC are ineffective in representing the interest of racial
and ethnic minorities because these caucus members fail to pass ubiquitous legisla-
xiii
tion alleviating racial and ethnic disparities (e.g. Singh, 1998). This dissertation
investigates a different mechanism of caucus influence. My primary area of inquiry
is the role of members of minority congressional caucuses in articulating and attain-
ing agenda status for their policy priorities. In particular, this dissertation broadens
the definition of agenda-setting for members of minority congressional caucuses by
considering their ability to assist White MCs in advancing minority interest legis-
lation through the endorsement of this legislation via cosponsorship, which I refer
to as caucus influence. By studying the influence of minority caucuses via caucus
leadership, I demonstrate that these caucuses play a more influential role in political
representation than we might expect.
xiv
CHAPTER I
Introduction
Since the inception of Congress as an institution, its members have met informally
on the basis of their common interests and goals (Stevens, Mulhollan and Rundquist,
1981). The decentralization of Congress allows for institutions such as congressional
caucuses to emerge and perform a myriad of relevant functions for its members.
Distinct from political parties and committees, congressional caucuses are well-suited
to assist legislators in representing their constituents. Caucuses are informal networks
in which like-minded members of Congress (MCs) coalesce with one another under
unofficial rules and powers (Hammond, 1998). Few studies have examined how these
voluntary legislative institutions shape the behavior and effectiveness of its members.1
This dissertation expands the discourse on minority legislative behavior by exam-
ining MCs who operate collectively in race and ethnic-based caucuses in the United
States House of Representatives.2 To date, much of the literature on race, ethnic-
ity, and political representation examines the relationship between descriptive and
substantive representation. Pitkin (1967) and other representation scholars define
descriptive representation as the degree to which the legislature mirrors the demo-
graphic characteristics of the population that it represents (e.g. gender, race, or
1Miler (2011), and Hammond (1998) represent exceptions to this rule.
2Race scholars consider historically underrepresented groups in U.S. Congress to be women,
African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans (Tate, 2004). However, this dissertation refers to
only African Americans and Latinos when discussing underrepresented groups in Congress.
1
religion). A significant body of literature outlines the benefits of descriptive repre-
sentation for underrepresented groups (Canon, 1999; Mansbridge, 1999; Tate, 2004).3
These scholars argue that in most circumstances, the “best way” for African Amer-
icans and Latinos to receive substantive representation is by achieving descriptive
representation.4 However, Swain (1993) argues that Black faces are not necessary for
the substantive representation of Blacks. As an alternative to descriptive representa-
tion, Swain advocates for Blacks in Congress to forge relationships with like-minded
representatives from different racial and ethnic backgrounds.
The aforementioned studies present conflicting evidence as to whether the race or
ethnicity of a MC matters in legislative politics. Part of this confusion stems from the
fact that most scholars study minority representation through the lens of roll call data.
As several other scholars have concluded, this narrow focus on roll call data neglects
the fact that MCs are engaged in a plethora of activities outside of floor votes (Grose,
2011; Hall, 1996; Hall and Heflin, 1994). While some recent studies have examine race
and representation “beyond the vote” (Grose, 2011; Hall, 1996; Minta, 2011), most
of these studies only examine representation from a dyadic perspective and do not
consider the collective influence of minority congressional caucuses. Put differently,
minority representation scholars typically treat minority MCs as individuals, when
they are, in fact, operating as a part of a networked caucus.
This dissertation argues that an important missing variable in the study of race
and political representation are minority congressional caucuses. As one of the
founders of the CBC, William Lacy Clay, Sr. put it, the CBC is the “single most
3These studies also study descriptive representation as it relates to substantive representation,
which is “color-blind” and can be measured by indicators such as roll call voting and casework
(Swain, 1993).
4Sinclair-Chapman (2003) finds that Black constituents derive a number of symbolic benefits
from descriptive representation. Black constituents who are represented by black MCs are more
likely to assess their representatives favorably, to perceive their representative as “responsive,” and
(in some cases) experience higher levels of political efficacy (Gay, 2001; Tate, 2004). Hence, many of
the arguments for descriptive representation are based on the claim that an increase in descriptive
representation will lead to an increase in substantive representation.
2
effective political entity we have had in articulating, representing, protecting, and ad-
vancing the interest of [B]lack people in the past twenty years” (Clay, 1993, p. 352).
Notwithstanding the significance of minority caucuses, the CBC and CHC do not
supplant the importance of other institutions in Congress such as political parties or
committees. Rather, the CBC, CHC, and their staffs supplement the efforts of their
members and provide CBC and CHC members another way to express their policy
interests. For instance, in addition to their regular responsibilities as MCs, CBC and
CHC members are expected to chair a caucus task force addressing a specific policy
area (Singh, 1998).
These positions generally coincide with members’ committee assignments, but
not always. For those members who have a task force assignment that does not
overlap with their committee work, this responsibility can help them learn about
new policy areas, and perhaps, gain policy influence on that legislative issue. In
addition to running task forces, CBC and CHC members attend weekly one and
half to two-hour caucus lunches where members discuss upcoming legislation and
spend a substantial amount of time on other caucus-related activities. The caucus
staff members are primarily responsible for facilitating the efforts of the task forces
and the caucus meetings among other caucus-related activities. Hence, a study of
minority representation must not only include the CBC and CHC, but the efforts of
their caucus staff members.
1.1 Congressional Caucuses
In order to make the argument for the importance of minority congressional cau-
cuses, it is necessary to understand how caucuses shape policy and how their staffs
subsidizes their efforts. Caucuses were initially created to respond to changing de-
mands in Congress (e.g. the growing number and complexity of issues facing Congress;
the rise in constituent pleas for responsiveness to legislative issues) that could not be
3
easily addressed through the committee system (Hammond, 1998). Legislatively,
caucus staff members serve multiple purposes. They gather information about topics
of interest and make that material available to their members and others outside
the caucus (Stevens, Mulhollan and Rundquist, 1981). Caucuses sometimes identify
potential solutions to problems as they provide leadership in setting the legislative
agenda of Congress (Hammond, 1998). The caucus staff helps members to spread
their ideas, testify at hearings, make floor statements, hold informal meetings and
seminars, and lobby committees and subcommittees to produce favorable legislative
outcomes for the caucus members and their constituencies (Hammond, 1998; Stevens,
Mulhollan and Rundquist, 1981). While minority MCs can perform these legislative
activities in the absence of caucus staff members, minority caucuses facilitate these
activities via the caucus personnel and generally, assist with the exchange of infor-
mation between caucus members, particularly as it relates to the interests of African
Americans and Latinos.
Congressional caucuses have generated little interest to the majority of researchers.
The CBC, for a majority of its existence, was written off as weak and ineffective, ex-
isting as only a peripheral entity within Congress. Despite the varied roles that
caucuses can play in legislative politics, the literature on caucuses has primarily fo-
cused on voting cohesion–the extent to which groups display homogeneity in their
voting patterns (Gile and Jones, 1995; Hammond, 1998; Levy and Stoudinger, 1976;
Miller, 1990; Pinney and Serra, 2002; Singh, 1998; Swain, 1993) or their legislative
effectiveness–which has primarily focused on their ability to pass legislation alleviat-
ing racial disparities (Barnett, 1975; Levy and Stoudinger, 1976; Singh, 1998; Vega,
1993). In the following section, I discuss the significance of these studies and how this
dissertation contributes to the extant literature on minority congressional caucuses.
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1.2 Legislative Effectiveness
Throughout their history, CBC and CHC members have wrestled with the dilemma
of balancing their positions as MCs with the goal of representing the interests of the
African American and Latino communities. That is, are CBC or CHC members pri-
marily elected officials who are beholden to congressional norms? If so, does this
compromise the interest of Black and Latino constituents? Or is the CBC and CHC
primarily a Black and Latino leadership organization that uses the legislative process
to win substantive benefits for its national constituencies? Scholars studying the CBC
and CHC have acknowledged this tension, but have made different conclusions about
the role of these legislators (Barnett, 1975; Champagne and Rieselbach, 1995; Singh,
1998).
Because of these countervailing forces, a prominent question in the literature is:
do the CBC and CHC provide substantive or symbolic representation for African
Americans and Latinos? Some argue that the CBC and CHC has been unsuccessful
in obtaining concrete policy benefits for African Americans and Latinos (Hero and
Tolbert, 1995; Levy and Stoudinger, 1976; Singh, 1998; Smith, 1996; Swain, 1993;
Welch and Hibbing, 1984) and typically play a symbolic role in politics. These studies
contend that the voices of racial and ethnic minorities in a majoritarian institution,
such as Congress, are often muted (Guinier, 1994). Thus, resulting in a “triumph of
tokenism,” whereby these MCs, who represent mostly racial and ethnic minorities,
will find it difficult to gain widespread support on their central issues (Guinier, 1994;
Singh, 1998).
Moreover, one of the biggest critics of the CBC, Singh (1998), proposes three
reasons for why the CBC has been ineffective in passing legislation that would improve
the conditions for African Americans: the failure of the CBC leadership; the CBC’s
ideological incompatibility with their Congressional colleagues; and, the structural
limitations of America’s political environment; especially as it relates to representing
5
the interest of marginalize groups. Cohen (1999)and Smith (1996) also critic the
CBC’s ability to provide substantive representation on matters of concern to Blacks.
The criticisms of minority congressional caucuses presented by Cohen (1999),
Smith (1996), and Singh (1998) are vital, and I reviewed them here to specify some
of the claims I want to challenge. This dissertation sets out to understand how the
CBC and CHC use their caucus leadership in promoting their own, or the caucus’s,
priorities by virtue of their staff capacity. In addition, I argue for a different metric
in measuring the effectiveness of minority congressional caucuses. That is, I posit
that the effectiveness of the CBC and CHC is embedded in their ability to assist
in advancing minority interest legislation generated by some other actor (who is not
a member of their caucus) thereby asserting caucus influence. Hence, I weigh the
caucus’s ability to assert caucus influence against claims that the CBC is largely in-
effective (Cohen, 1999; Levy and Stoudinger, 1976; Singh, 1998; Smith, 1996; Swain,
1993) and conclude that the CBC as well as the CHC can be effective in representing
the interest of racial and ethnic minorities. Moreover, I conclude that studies that
place the importance of members’ participation in the CBC and CHC against indi-
vidual behavior (Singh, 1998) present a false dichotomy that overlooks the chance of
combined strategies that reflect the CBC’s and CHC’s political maturity (Barnett,
1975).
In summary, outside of their symbolic importance, the aforementioned studies
largely view minority caucuses as ineffective and non-pivotal, which is mostly due
to their size and presumed ideological homogeneity. However, none of these studies
present any definitive evidence of minority caucuses’ lack of influence or effectiveness.
For instance, one study contends that the CBC is vital because of their possession of
a particular national constituency–African Americans–with its unique racial history
and distinct policy beliefs, powerfully distinguished the CBC from other caucuses, and
ensures it continued prominence in national politics, even in the absence of material
6
policy achievements (Singh, 1998). This dissertation argues that the CBC and CHC,
because of its staff and pooled resources, can be effective in representing the interests
of their constituents.
1.3 Voting Cohesion
An alternative perspective on minority congressional caucuses contends that they
can be influential largely as a result of their ability to cajole members to vote as a bloc
(Bositis, 1998; Canon, 1999; Gile and Jones, 1995; Levy and Stoudinger, 1976). The
underlying assumption in this line of research is that a voting bloc would convey that
CBC or CHC members work together to achieve common legislative goals that benefit
African Americans or Latinos. Additionally, a cohesive voting bloc would presumably
increase the influence of CBC and CHC members who could use the threat of their
collective vote to form alliances that could further the issues they champion. However,
previous scholars have merely asserted that the cohesion of the CBC and CHC leads
to various policy victories, but few studies actually test this assertion.
Initial efforts to document this influence found that the CBC’s cohesive voting
patterns in its formative years revealed that although a high degree of cohesion was
demonstrated in the 92nd Congress (1971- 1973), in terms of substantive accomplish-
ments, the caucus was essentially ineffective (Levy and Stoudinger, 1976). However,
subsequent researchers sought to examine the voting cohesion within the caucus over
a longer period of time. Building on the work of Levy and Stoudinger (1976), Jones
(1987) examined the extent to which the CBC exhibited voting cohesion from 1975
to 1980–which includes the 94th through 96th Congresses–by examining the voting
patterns of the CBC members across five different issue areas (i.e. general legis-
lation, social issues, monetary issues, external affairs (defense), and miscellaneous
legislation). Jones (1987) determined that the CBC’s degree of voting cohesion was
high–especially on social issues–and that cohesiveness was critical to their ability to
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operate as an effective force in Congress. Moreover, Jones (1987) concluded that the
“bond of blackness,” strengthened by a shared history of oppression, served to moti-
vate the caucus’s cohesive behavior. A more exhaustive study conducted by Gile and
Jones (1995) offers an examination of the CBC’s voting cohesion from 1971 through
1990. The results suggested that the CBC voted more cohesive than other regional
and gender caucuses. In fact, CBC voted as a cohesive voting unit, with the exception
of only one occasion (Gile and Jones, 1995).
Following the 1992 elections and the start of the 103rd Congress, there was a lot
of speculation as to whether CBC members would continue to vote cohesively, or
whether the large influx of freshmen, women, and southern members might create
dissension in the caucus as a voting bloc. The research on the CBC in the mid-1990s
found that the CBC continued to vote cohesively with few exceptions (Bositis, 1998;
Canon, 1999; Gile and Jones, 1995). Canon (1999) examined the impact of the new
Black majority-minority districts of the 1990s on the power of the CBC and how
the nature of Black representation operated in those districts. He concluded that
the new size of the CBC has substantially increased its political clout, as they used
their numbers to bloc and pass key legislation (Swain, 1993; Canon, 1999). Overall,
Canon’s research was consistent with previous research pertaining to CBC cohesion.
While much of the previous research argues that the CBC is cohesive in their
voting patterns, few studies demonstrate how the CBC can use its cohesiveness to
their advantage. The influx of minority legislators in the 1990s sparked an interest
in assessing the CBC’s influence over the passage or rejection of legislation (Canon,
1999; Swain, 1993). As Kweisi Mfume, chair of the CBC in the 103rd Congress
(1993- 1995), put it: “No longer are we going to be looked at as an addendum to
the Democratic agenda. We are going to be taken seriously. Anything short of
partnership could prompt us to respond in kind. If that means killing an important
piece of legislation, then that will be the case” (Lusane, 1994, p. 20). In the 103rd
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Congress, the CBC played a pivotal role in shaping and then passing legislation on the
budget, the space station, crime, and campaign finance reform (Canon, 1999; Swain,
1993). The CBC demanded increased funding for inner cities, the earned-income tax
credit, food stamps, and mandatory immunization for poor children (Canon, 1999).
While the budget proposal was not amended to include all of the CBC’s demands,
caucus members viewed the final budget as a substantial improvement over recent
budgets, as there was an increase in programs particularly relevant to racial and
ethnic minorities (Canon, 1999).
In summary, this stream of research posits that although the CBC is numerically
small, their presence as a cohesive voting bloc, at times, compensates for their lack
of numbers (Bositis, 1998; Canon, 1999; Gile and Jones, 1995; Jones, 1987). These
studies treat cohesion as a “cure all” for minority legislators; implying that if minority
caucuses vote cohesive, then they could be successful. However, previous literature
has merely asserted that the cohesion of the CBC leads to various policy benefits,
but they do not directly test for this nor do they demonstrate it. For instance, Gile
and Jones (1995) argues that “bloc voting is a valued political asset that enhances
the political stature, leverage, and coalition attractiveness of the unofficial group”
(p. 625). Notwithstanding the various issues that scholars have enumerated when
using roll call votes (Achen, 1978; Hall, 1996) to study the preferences and political
behavior of MCs, one cannot ascertain why, exactly, minority caucus members vote
in a similar vein. It could be because of parallelism of interest, pressures from similar
constituencies, coincidence, or other factors (Levy and Stoudinger, 1976; Pinney and
Serra, 2002). Even if minority congressional caucuses were responsible for the cohesive
voting patterns observed in their membership, it’s not clear how cohesion leads to
policy benefits for racial and ethnic minorities. Hence, I argue that studying minority
caucuses as voting blocs is not going to represent a plausible story of why the CBC
or CHC should or should not matter. Instead, my dissertation posits that students
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of minority caucuses should not just look at the caucus as a voting bloc, but should
examine these caucuses as organizations that assist members’ individual and collective
agenda-setting behavior.
Also, in surveying the literature on minority congressional caucuses, much of the
work to date has failed to evaluate both the CBC and CHC. The conspicuous absence
of CHC and their constituencies in past research, I posit, is problematic for several
reasons, not the least of which is their growing size and significance in the American
politics demography. Despite different historical legacies and different patterns of
geographic concentrations, Latinos, like African Americans, have suffered from dis-
crimination in and outside of the polity (Casellas, 2007; Rocca and Sanchez, 2007).
The omission of the CHC introduces important estimation problems in the systematic
study of race and representation. Also, if my theory about the influence of the CBC
is correct, then the theories that I posit should also apply to the CHC as well. Hence,
studying the CHC is vital because there is no theoretical reason to believe that the
theories I isolate should only apply to the CBC. After all, the CHC also has caucus
staff and an executive committee that function similar to the CBC’s staff. There-
fore, it is imperative that I include the CHC in my study of minority congressional
caucuses.
1.4 Minority Congressional Caucuses
Despite their institutional longevity and consistent activism, few studies have di-
rectly examined whether minority congressional caucuses facilitate the agenda-setting
behavior and legislative effectiveness of their members. Of the studies that have inves-
tigated minority caucuses, much of this work underestimates their influence. There
are several reasons for this. First, these studies only examine agenda-setting through
the lens of positive agenda control, which refers to the ability to move introduced
bills through the legislative process. This may be problematic; literature has demon-
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strated that when compared to their White counterparts, minority MCs are less apt
to command positive agenda control (Griffin and Keane, 2009; Rocca and Sanchez,
2007). This may be due to minority MCs’ ideological stances-that is, most of their
members are extremely liberal (Singh, 1998) or because of the narrow set of bills
minority legislators introduce (Volden, Wiseman and Wittmer, 2013).
Second, as mentioned above, much of the previous literature that studies the col-
lective influence of minority congressional caucuses use roll call votes as an outcome
variable. This research design makes it difficult to ascertain whether minority legisla-
tors are voting for a specific bill because of their own preferences or pressure from their
caucus. In general, roll call votes can present a distorted picture of representation,
as MCs are presented with a single choice, typically structured by party leaders to
attract a majority of votes; hence, polarizing proposals are filtered out (Cox and Mc-
Cubbins, 2005; Hall, 1996). In addition, the selection inherent in roll call data skews
the conclusions about race’s impact on representation by systematically excluding
proposals that may polarize the preferences of minority and White legislators, this
phenomenon is known as the “censored sample problem” (Hall, 1996; Hall and Heflin,
1994, p. 192).
This project contributes to the literature on race and representation by demon-
strating the important role that minority caucuses play in subsidizing the legislative
behavior of its members. This notion of subsidies from groups readily applies to
minority caucuses, as caucuses operate “in the leader’s budget line, not his or her
utility function” and that it is “more like a service bureau”(Hall and Deardorff, 2006,
p. 72).5 Specifically, these caucuses provide MCs with important informational, net-
working, and staff support to assist them in representing racial and ethnic minorities
within and outside of their constituency, thereby enhancing the capabilities of MCs
5The goals of both interest groups and congressional caucuses are virtually identical–to impact
and shape policy on issues of interest. However, this is not to say that interest groups and caucuses
are one in the same. Identity caucuses are legislative caucuses that are organized by a shared identity,
namely race, ethnicity or gender (Hammond, 1998).
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as representatives (Hammond, 1998).6 Hence, it is not just that Black and Latino
MCs have access to their respective caucus staff, but that other MCs do not–this is
the subsidy argument.
Before discussing the organization of my dissertation, the following section offers a
brief history of the CBC and CHC and details about the internal makeup of minority
congressional caucuses (e.g. caucus leadership and their selection, caucus staff, and
financing).
1.5 Congressional Black Caucus
Beginning in the late 1960s, Black legislators determined that neither the Demo-
cratic Party nor the Republican Party was adequately addressing the issues that
were most salient to Blacks. In response, Black MCs formed the Democrat Select
Committee (DSC). Later, in 1971, the CBC was formally inaugurated with thirteen
members from the House of Representatives (Clay, 1993). The creation of the CBC
formed a network that facilitates information gathering and coordination on issues
important to Blacks nationally. The founding members believed that speaking with
a single voice through a congressional caucus would increase their political influence
(Barnett, 1975; Clay, 1993; Singh, 1998).
The CBC relies on its leadership, commonly referred to as the executive commit-
tee, and the caucus staff, which I will discuss later, to get much of its work done.
Each Congress, CBC members elects its executive committee, which comprise of five
members: Chair, who is responsible for setting, presenting and publishing the CBC’s
legislative agenda and budget priorities each Congress and presides over all caucus
meetings; First Vice-Chair, who is responsible for chairing CBC meetings in the ab-
sence of the caucus Chair and responsible for special committees as appointed by the
6Identity caucuses are legislative caucuses that are organized by a shared identity, namely race,
ethnicity or gender (Hammond, 1998).
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Chair; Second Vice-Chair, who manages the CBC task forces and caucus messaging
and performs the duties of the First Vice-Chair in his or her absence; Secretary, who
is generally responsible for record-keeping of official documents and keeps detailed
notes of all caucus meetings, and manages all CBC outreach activities; Whip, who
manages the CBC’s floor activities and provides weekly vote recommendations, which
promotes unity on votes (Clay, 1993; Singh, 1998).7 The CHC has a similar leadership
structure, which has similar responsibilities, but they do not elect a Secretary.
The CBC receives the majority of its funding from non-congressional sources.
The caucus established the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation (CBCF) in 1976
(Clay, 1993). The CBCF sponsors programs under the direction of the caucus lead-
ership. These initiatives focus on education, economic development, public health,
and African globalization programs. The bulk of these outside contributors donate
during the CBC’s annual Legislative Weekend (Singh, 1998). During this weekend,
the caucus hosts numerous educational sessions, networking opportunities, and town
hall style meetings (Clay, 1993).
Before relying solely on outside funding, in 1981, the CBC achieved Legislative
Service Organization (LSO) status (Singh, 1998). LSOs were prohibited from receiv-
ing outside funding, but they were allowed to establish tax-exempt foundations (e.g.
CBCF) to carry out research and other activities. This allowed for the CBC to have
one of the largest staffs of all congressional caucuses. While the majority of caucuses
only had one or two staff members in the 1990s, the CBC was one of the few caucuses
who had over ten staffers (Singh, 1998).
The staff of the CBC has numerous responsibilities. When the CBC was first es-
tablished, the functions that individual Black MCs perform for their constituents, the
CBC staff would perform for Black Americans generally. In carrying out this man-
date, the caucus staff provided casework services, gather and disseminate information,
7An example of the Whip’s weekly vote recommendation is provided in Appendix K.
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engage in administration oversight, articulate the interest of specialized groups within
the black community and develop legislative proposals (Barnett, 1975).
However, in the mid-1990s, the Republican majority in the House abolished all
LSOs. Representatives Pat Roberts and Newt Gingrich were among several GOP
members that campaigned against the public subsidization of caucuses (Singh, 1998).
All caucuses were forced to move out of congressional office space and become Con-
gressional Member Organizations (CMOs) or private corporations. Since then, the
caucus staff has reduced in size to an average of three to five members and their job
duties are primarily focused on congressional issues such as briefing members on leg-
islative issues and organizing weekly caucus meetings and task forces and constituent
casework is typically handled by a member’s district office (Grose, 2011). The change
in the caucus staff responsibility has to do with reductions in their staff capacities and
because the salaries of staff members a paid by the congressional budgets of caucus
members.
1.6 Congressional Hispanic Caucus
Seeking to increase their influence in Washington and following in the footsteps
of the CBC, the CHC was founded in 1976 by six Hispanic MCs. The CHC charges
itself with promoting and advancing policies that address the concerns of the Latino
community (Casellas, 2007). The function of the CHC is to serve as a forum for
Hispanic MCs to coalesce and develop around a collective legislative agenda. Through
the legislative process, the CHC is dedicated to voicing and advancing issues affecting
Hispanics in the United States and its territories.
The CHC, like the CBC, has officers who make up their executive board: Chair,
First Vice-Chair, Second Vice-Chair, and Whip. Currently, there are twenty-six
members of the CHC, the majority of whom come from California, Florida, New York,
and Texas. This number is lower than the actual number of Hispanic lawmakers in
14
Congress because the original Congressional Hispanic Caucus split in two in 2003,
when four Hispanic Republican representatives banded together to form their own
group–the Congressional Hispanic Conference (CHC(R)) (Lopez, 2003).8
The rift materialized over the refusal of Hispanic Democrats to support a con-
servative Hispanic judge that was nominated by President Bush for the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals and differences that Hispanic Republicans had with the
leadership of the Caucus, who had visited Cuba and refused to call for democratic
elections in the communist state (Lopez, 2003). The split of the CHC along party
lines underscores the diversity and differences among Hispanic legislators and the
Hispanic MCs at-large.
Unlike the CBC, the CHC has always had a relatively small staff of three, which
includes an Executive Director, a Communications Director, and a Legislative Assis-
tant. The CHC has a variety of task forces, including civil rights, corporate America,
education, labor, Social Security, and immigration. There is also the Congressional
Hispanic Caucus Institute (CHCI), which is the caucus’s non-profit that is primarily
responsible for fundraising for the CHC. Unlike the CBC, the chair of the CHC is also
chair of the CHCI, which has a large staff of its own. The CHCI is also responsible for
making policy recommendations, sponsoring internships and fellowships, and hosting
the annual gala and public policy conference.
The CHC has received much less media attention than the CBC, resulting in less
praise and also less criticism. Soon after the formation of the CHC, the media touted
it as the voice of the Hispanic community. It was also suggested that any ethnic
differences were less important than the well-being of all Hispanic people (Lopez,
2003). The CHC has also had legislative success, including stopping a bill that would
increase job discrimination against minority groups. Like the CBC, the CHC has
8Since the acronym for both the Congressional Hispanic Caucus and the Congressional Hispanic
Conference is “CHC,” I will refer to the Congressional Hispanics Caucus as the “CHC” and the
Congressional Hispanic Conference as “CHC (R).”
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received attention from the president with occasional meetings.
1.7 Minority Congressional Caucuses and Caucus Influence
As mentioned earlier, much of the previous literature on minority congressional
caucuses has posited that they are rather weak and ineffective. Of the studies that
find evidence of their relevance, it is mostly in the form of voting cohesion. However,
given that members of minority congressional caucuses are located at the tail, left
end of the ideological spectrum, and according to the median voter theorem, these
members should not matter in legislative politics because they are clear ideological
outliers (Downs, 1957). That is, if the process is democratic, then the median or
pivotal voter should drive the outcomes that we observe, which means that the CBC
and CHC should never be pivotal (Downs, 1957). However, this dissertation argues
against that claim.
Similar to the debate between Cox and McCubbins and Krehbiel and others about
the importance of political parties, I want to argue for the importance of congressional
caucuses as an important variable for agenda-setting. While Cox and McCubbins
study how the majority of the majority party can exert influence over the agenda,
my study, however, examines the conditions under which the majority party defers
to a numerical minority. My dissertation moves beyond the narrow view of minority
caucuses as merely voting blocs. It is difficult to ascertain the effect of minority
caucus membership from the preferences of individual members because all Black
and Democratic Latino MCs are members of the CBC and CHC, respectively.
Similar to Cox and McCubbins’s argument about the majority party agenda-
setting investment in committee chairs, I argue that caucus leaders get more staff
rights, so they are able to sponsor more legislation and claim more credit–I refer to
this as the caucus leadership advantage. They are able to advance their interest over
the race-related interest of the backbenchers in the caucus, but they are also working
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as agents of their caucus. The caucus leadership is able to do both things because
of the additional staff capacity they get from the caucus staff members. Also, in
addition to studying the differences between leaders and non-leaders within a caucus,
I contend that minority caucuses assist members in agenda control. That is, members
of minority congressional caucuses assist White MCs in advancing minority interest
legislation through the endorsement of this legislation via cosponsorship, which I refer
to as caucus influence. I will explain the leadership advantage and caucus influence
in the next chapter, which details my theoretical framework.
1.8 Organization of Dissertation
Although there is considerable research on the impact of race and ethnicity on
political representation, it generally concerns the extent to which minority members
of Congress (MCs) provide substantive representation to its minority constituents.
While members of the CBC and CHC spend a substantial of amount of time and
finite resources on caucus-related activities, much less research has been directed to
understanding how these legislative organizations serve member’s legislative goals.
This dissertation seeks to fill this gap by presenting qualitative and quantitative
evidence that suggest that minority congressional caucuses play a vital role in agenda-
setting.
In Chapter Two, I draw upon literature on Congress, race and ethnic politics, and
congressional caucuses to help explain the CBC’s and CHC’s role in agenda-setting.
I compare and contrast my theory of minority caucuses with previous studies on
legislative organizations in Congress, namely the work of Cox and McCubbins (2005)
and their theory of negative agenda control. I also sketch out two theoretical tasks.
One is about the behavior of the caucus chairs in promoting their own, or the caucus’s,
priorities by virtue of their staff capacity. The other is about the caucus’s ability to
assist in advancing a White MC’s minority interest legislation. After detailing my
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theoretical tasks and its moving parts, I present my research design.
Next, in Chapter Three, I discuss my methodological approach and results from
my qualitative interviews. After a brief discussion of previous studies that have
employed qualitative data, I discuss my research design, including a note on the merits
and limitations of taking a qualitative approach to studying minority congressional
caucuses. I then describe how I recruited my sample, as well as the demographic
information of my interviewees compared to non-respondents. Next, I detail my
interview protocol and discuss the topics covered during each interview. Finally, I
discuss the four topics that emerge from my qualitative interviews and conclude with
a note about how these results shape the succeeding quantitative chapter.
In Chapter Four, I present the statistical results of the caucus leadership advantage
models. I examine the effect of caucus leadership on bill production. I find that caucus
leaders are generally positively associated with bill introduction.
In Chapter Five, I present the statistical results of the caucus influence models.
In the caucus influence model, I found that the support via cosponsorship of minority
caucus leaders help to predict the success of minority interest legislation by a White
MC. I run additional analyses to illustrate that their ability to wield caucus influence
is confined to issues relating to racial and ethnic minorities.
Finally, in Chapter Six, I offer conclusions and implications of this dissertation. I
consider how my caucus leadership advantage and caucus influence and its empirical
support illuminates the current debate on the importance of minority congressional
caucuses and race, ethnicity, and political representation in general.
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CHAPTER II
A Theory of Caucus Agenda-setting
2.1 Introduction
Legislative organizations in Congress, such as committees and political parties,
have been the subject of a great deal of scholarly research (Aldrich, 1995; Cox and
McCubbins, 2005; Fenno, 1973; Krehbiel, 1993; Rohde, 1994). However, as Miler
(2011) suggests, while parties and committees are important resources in Congress
for structuring legislative behavior, their primary role is not representation. Instead
she offers a legislator’s caucus membership as an important complement to their
party or committee assignment, as caucuses provide members of Congress (MCs)
with “discretion and flexibility to personalize their caucus membership to best reflect
their constituents” (Miler, 2011, p. 888).
While caucuses play a complementary role in representing a member’s constituency,
caucuses also play a vital role in assisting their members with agenda-setting. Al-
though previous research on caucuses has focused on their impact on legislative out-
comes (Hammond, 1998; Loomis, 1981; Stevens, Mulhollan and Rundquist, 1981),
there is little systematic empirical work that examines the mechanism by which cau-
cuses affect agenda-setting. I argue that an important missing variable from these
literatures is a measurement for the collective influence of minority congressional cau-
cuses and its impact on agenda-setting. My theory about the agenda-setting behavior
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of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) and Congressional Hispanic Caucus (CHC)
rests on six main assumptions about legislators, all of which stems from our common
knowledge of Congress and race, ethnicity, and political representation. In particu-
lar, I will borrow the six assumptions that Cox and McCubbins made in constructing
the Procedural Cartel Theory (PCT) and amend them to fit minority congressional
caucuses.
This chapter is organized in five sections. First, I list the central tenets of Cox
and McCubbins’s PCT. Second, I detail the assumptions I make in constructing
my theoretical framework. In this section, I discuss how I amend PCT and draw
on literature from race and ethnic politics and Congress to construct a theory of
minority congressional caucus–the CBC and CHC–as agenda-setters. Third, I present
two theoretical frameworks–caucus leadership advantage and caucus influence–and
discuss the motivations undergirding them. Fourth, I explicitly state the hypotheses
regarding the CBC and CHC’s role in legislative productivity and caucus influence .
Fifth, I discuss how these models are complicated by majority party status. Sixth, I
conclude by summarizing my theoretical tasks and introduce the next chapter.
2.2 Procedural Cartel Theory (PCT)
In Setting the Agenda, Cox and McCubbins (2005) review the six central tenets
of PCT. These six tenets are summarized below:
1. MCs seek reelection, internal advancement within Congress, good public policy,
and majority party status.
2. The reputation, or brand name, of a member’s party affects both the member’s
personal probability of reelection and, more significantly, the party’s probability
of securing a majority.
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3. A party’s reputation depends considerably on its record of legislative achieve-
ment.
4. Legislating–compiling favorable records of legislative accomplishment–is par-
allel to team production and entails overcoming an array of cooperation and
coordination problems.
5. The primary means by which the majority party polices its members’ actions,
in order to overcome issues of team production in the legislative process, is by
delegating to a central authority.
6. The key resource that the majority party uses is their ability to delegate to
their senior partners. Hence, the majority party forms a procedural cartel that
collectively monopolizes agenda-setting power (Cox and McCubbins, 2005, p.
24).
According to Cox and McCubbins (2005), a majority party creates or inherits a set
of offices with agenda-setting powers. Majority party members expect those members
in such offices to aid bills that most of the majority party supports. However, most
importantly, legislators are expected to never push bills that would pass despite the
opposition of a majority of their party; even if said legislators personally support such
bills and could get them passed.
The operation of the CBC and CHC works in a similar manner to the majority
party, but differ in distinctive ways, as these organizations are informal networks.
These caucuses are similar to the majority party in that they delegate to the leaders of
the caucus to promote the central issues of the caucus. Also, as we will see in Chapter
Three, these caucus leaders do not make public statements on an issue unless all
members of the caucus agree on an issue for fear of alienating other caucus members.
However, if these leaders wanted to, they could still go to individual CBC or CHC
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offices to get support from individual caucus members, but they cannot use the “brand
name” of the caucus to promote their position on an issue.
I will detail below the other important ways my theory of the agenda-setting
power of minority congressional caucuses differs from Cox and McCubbins’s theory
concerning the majority party. Simply put, Cox and McCubbins studies how the lion’s
share of the majority party can exert influence over the legislative agenda. My study,
however, questions the conditions under which a numerical minority, such as the
CBC and CHC, matters in agenda-setting. While my theory does not contradict their
theory, it does challenge their theory to consider how other congressional institutions,
like caucuses, help to set the agenda in Congress.
2.3 Assumptions
Before discussing the assumptions of my model and how they compare to PCT,
I want to point out that the second and third assumptions in PCT do not readily
apply to minority caucuses because caucuses are informal and its members rely on
other factors in getting reelected. That is, caucus members typically do not reference
the CBC or CHC in their efforts to get reelected in ways that they draw on their
political party or other factors. Also, the third assumption, which posits that the
party’s reputation depends significantly on its record of legislative accomplishment,
operates differently for minority caucuses. In PCT, Cox and McCubbins discuss
the majority party’s ability to get legislation passed that its members want enacted.
However, minority caucus’s reputation develops from a variety of factors, which I
discuss later. Next I will discuss the other four assumptions and how they operate
differently for the CBC and CHC. Later, I will offer additional assumptions that are
vital in constructing my theoretical model.
First, like the PCT, I posit that MCs are interested in other goals outside of
reelection (Fenno, 1973). Since all Black and (Democratic) Latino MCs join the CBC
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and CHC, respectively, seeking reelection does not provide an adequate reason for
why these legislators join racial and ethnic-based caucuses. That is, Mayhew’s theory
of representative government would not suggest that preservers of time and attention
would take positions on issues that have an appeal to persons of African and Latin
American descent nationally and internationally, especially since it is uncertain how
these positions would advance their reelection prospects. Instead, I argue that MCs
will pursue a cause or commitment as long as it bears no clear electoral detriment
(McCormick and Mitchell, 2007, p. 582). Therefore, caucus membership provides
evidence that MCs are not always motivated solely by reelection, but in part, by
their ideological preferences of “good” public policy (Fenno, 1973; McCormick and
Mitchell, 2007).
Second, like the fourth assumption in PCT suggests, the ability to legislate requires
solving coordination and cooperation problems. Minority MCs, like all legislators,
have a plethora of responsibilities and goals competing for their time and attention,
and have a limited ability to ensure that introduced items reach the agenda and get
enacted (Fenno, 1973; Hall, 1996; Mayhew, 1974). For the CBC and CHC, the caucus
staff subsidize the legislative work of their members by providing them with useful
information and opportunities for coalition-building (Fiellin, 1962; Hammond, 1998;
Stevens, Mulhollan and Rundquist, 1981). As I mention in Chapter One, I borrow
Hall and Deardorff (2006)’s theory on interest groups and their ability to subsidize
members who already support the cause of the group and apply it to the relationship
between the CBC and CHC staff and its membership. In short, membership costs
in joining and participating in the CBC and CHC are relatively modest because the
caucus staff contributes substantially. With this support, the costs of sustaining
the activity of the CBC and CHC’s membership need only be concentrated on a
handful of “entrepreneurial” members willing to assume a leadership role (Cox and
McCubbins, 2005), which is filled by their respective executive committees. Extending
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the theoretical arguments in these ways assumes that the members of the CBC and
CHC represent a, more or less, committed group of members who operate on the
basis of conviction, rather than the expectation of direct reelection benefits.
Third, like the fifth assumption in PCT implies, the principal means to regulate a
group in Congress is to deputize its authority to a key figure. CBC or CHC members
defer to its executive committees in deciding their caucus’s position on an issue. As I
mentioned in Chapter One, the caucus chair is responsible for setting, presenting, and
establishing the CBC or CHC’s legislative agenda and is responsible for facilitating
the caucus meetings. Also, the caucus staff, which is physically located in the chair’s
office, assists the chair in making sure that caucus members present a caucus position
to persons outside of the caucus that is consistent with the chair’s position.
A few questions emerge after learning this new information about caucus lead-
ers. First, how is the CBC and CHC leadership chosen? Are caucus leaders selected
randomly? Are members being chosen because of their presumed legislative effective-
ness? Fortunately, while interviewing legislative staffers in Washington, D.C., I was
able to ask legislative staffers about this. According to one senior staffer in a CHC
office,
The CHC leadership is done by election. However, most of the time it’s agreed
upon beforehand... there’s not really a controversy over who will be the next
chair. Generally, the person who is the current First Vice-Chair is likely go-
ing to be the Chair next Congress. What actually becomes important then, is
becoming the Second Vice-Chair because if you become the Second Vice-Chair,
then in four years, you will become the Chair. (laughs) Of course, unless there’s
a big controversy, which rarely happens, but it happened once and it wasn’t even
much of a controversy. So, most times it’s a shoo-in for the previous [First]
Vice-Chair, everyone knows they’re gonna give it to that person because it is
their turn, but anyone can challenge it... so that’s how it is done.
As these comments suggests, it is difficult to ascertain what is undergirding the initial
selection of a caucus member into the leadership. We do know that this process is non-
random in its first election, which could be because of their presumed effectiveness or
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some other factor(s). However, since members seem to subscribe to turn-taking after
the initial election, the effect an non-random initial election is mitigated over time.
Evidence of turn-taking can be seen in Appendix I and J. These appendices detail
historical CBC and CHC leadership data I gathered and they illustrate that members
typically start as Whip of their caucus and move up to higher positions over time.
Fourth, as the sixth assumption of PCT suggests, agenda control is the key to
the majority party’s influence over the legislative process. The legislative majority
party works to control the agenda by giving “senior partners” valuable offices that
commands considerable agenda-setting powers. Senior partners are expected to obey
a minimal commandment of party loyalty–generally, they are expected not to use their
influence to support bills, which would, if considered on the floor, split the party (Cox
and McCubbins, 2005). However, agenda control for the CBC and CHC operates in
a different matter.
Traditionally, students of legislative effectiveness have measure the effectiveness of
a MC as the number of bills he or she passes. However, previous studies on minority
legislators demonstrate that their ability to command positive agenda control is not as
likely as their White counterparts. According to Tate (2014), institutional barriers,
two-party politics, and lingering racism–both at the elite and mass level–helps to
explain why it is arduous for CBC and CHC members to pass legislation alleviating
racial and ethnic disparities. She then poses the question: “What can they do,
then?” While minority caucus members have a difficult time passing legislation, this
project posits that minority caucuses can exert caucus influence, which refers to their
ability in assisting White MCs in advancing minority interest legislation through the
endorsement of legislation via cosponsorship. I will discuss caucus influence in further
detail below.
Fifth, MCs view caucus membership as beneficial (Hammond, 1998). While dif-
ferent caucuses serve different goals for legislators, all caucuses enhance cooperation
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among concordant legislators and provide alternative routes of influencing an issue or
cause (Hammond, 1998; Tate, 2014). Other reasons why MCs join caucuses include:
cost of participation is rather low; accountability is shared by the group, not a single
MC; and MCs can push for or block legislation that implicates their policy interests
as a group and therefore reap both the symbolic and substantive benefits, all while
not being held accountable for any of the negative press (Hammond, 1998). Given
that most MCs serve on at least one caucus (McCormick and Mitchell, 2007), an
analysis of legislative behavior without attention to informal networks like caucuses,
may prove problematic.
An important and unique benefit that is afforded to minority congressional cau-
cus members is access to the caucus staff (see Chapter One for more details on the
structure of the CBC’s and CHC’s caucus staff). In addition to their personal staff
members, CBC and CHC members have access to caucus staffers who work exclu-
sively on caucus-related activities. However, as evidence from Chapter Three suggests,
access to the caucus staff is particularly concentrated amongst the caucus leadership–
especially the caucus chair. Now, this is not to say that other caucus members do not
have access to these staffers, but their primary purpose is to serve the caucus chair.
Caucus staffers serve the needs of its membership on a daily basis, which makes it an
important institutional tool for CBC and CHC members.
Sixth, members of minority congressional caucuses exhibit an attachment not sim-
ply to their own district, but to the racial group with which she identifies. There is
both quantitative and qualitative evidence that minority MCs seek to represent all
members of the racial or ethnic group with which they identify (Fenno, 2003; Hall,
1990; Mansbridge, 1999; Minta, 2011). For instance, Hall (1990) found that minority
MCs often feel the obligation of compensating for past and current underrepresenta-
tion. During an interview one staffer of a Black MC stated that, “One of the things
he cares about [is] improving the life-chances within the [B]lack community, and he
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doesn’t care whether they’re from Watts or Washington” (Hall, 1990, p. 10).1 In
addition, Swain (1993) found that Black MCs had a much broader perception of who
encompassed their constituency than did White MCs. In a more recent study, Minta
(2011) develops a theory of “strategic group uplift,” in which Black and Latino MCs
choose to intervene in congressional oversight hearings on behalf of Blacks and Lati-
nos when most of their constituents are not paying attention. Hence, these studies
provide evidence that Black and Latino MCs are motivated to represent the inter-
est of not just Blacks and Latinos in their districts, but of all Blacks and Latinos
nationally. This phenomenon is also known as surrogate representation.
In the next two sections, I will used the assumptions mentioned here in construct-
ing my theoretical models of agenda-setting for minority congressional caucuses.
2.4 Caucus Leadership Advantage
As I mentioned in Chapter One, previous research on race and political repre-
sentation has primarily been concerned with the role that race or ethnicity plays in
providing descriptive and substantive representation to racial and ethnic minority
constituents. These studies present conflicting evidence as to whether race or eth-
nicity matters in legislative politics. Part of this confusion stems from the fact that
most scholars study minority representation through the lens of roll call data and
they fail to include a collective measure for minority caucuses. In the proceeding
paragraphs, I discuss the importance of minority congressional caucuses and their
staff and studying their influence in agenda-setting via bill sponsorship.
This dissertation argues that an important missing variable in the study of race
and political representation are minority congressional caucuses. I am particularly
1In another study, a staffer to Congressman Mickey Leland (D-TX) stated that, “Mickey Leland
must be the Congressman for the entire Southwest. There isn’t another [B]lack congressman in this
general vicinity” (Swain, 1993, p. 218). The sentiment of Congressman Mickey Leland was also
expressed in other academic studies (Smith, 1996; Cohen, 1999)
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interested in the CBC’s and CHC’s role in agenda-setting. Drawing on the third
assumption–the principal means to regulate a institution in Congress is to deputize
its authority to a key figure–I demonstrate that minority caucuses, as legislative
institutions, are a integral part in agenda-setting. I do this by demonstrating that
there is a caucus leadership advantage for minority MCs who are leaders within their
caucuses because they have more access to staff resources. I developed this theory
because according to several of my interviewees, the caucus leadership–the caucus
chair in particular–has more access to the staff to assist them with their legislative
agenda than their colleagues in the CBC and CHC (see Chapter 3).
The test the caucus leadership advantage theory through studying agenda-setting
via bill sponsorship. Agenda setting is an important part of the political process
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1963). Erbring, Goldenberg and Miller (1980) define agenda
setting as a “process by which problems become salient as political issues around
which policy alternatives can be defined and supported or opposition can be crys-
tallized” (Erbring, Goldenberg and Miller, 1980, p. 17). The importance of agenda
setting via bill sponsorship has been widely discussed in the legislative literature.
For the most part, bill sponsorship is viewed as a substantive institutional tool that
benefits MCs; these benefits include electoral success, information shortcuts, and leg-
islative influence (Fenno, 1973). The high opportunity costs of bill sponsorship makes
it a selective action, signaling a strong commitment of legislators to distinct issues
(Schiller, 1995). On the other hand, some scholars claim that in certain instances,
bill sponsorship may function symbolically to give a voice to issues rather than to im-
plement new public policy (Sinclair-Chapman, 2003). Along with previous scholars,
I contend that bill sponsorship is a selective action that serves as a “thermometer
for gauging the intensity of commitments to particular interests” (Hall, 1996; Haynie,
2001, p. 26).
Moreover, bill sponsorship requires substantial commitment of time: securing
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cosponsors, attending hearings, and lobbying other members for support (Hall, 1996).
MCs have complete control over the number and the content of the bills they spon-
sor (Swers and Caiazza, 2000, p. 1). And because all members “must suffer under
the same resource constraints as everyone else, more or less, they cannot be more in-
volved in everything” (Hall, 1996, p. 206), the decision to sponsor a piece of legislation
reveals a high degree of commitment to a policy issue. Therefore, bill sponsorship
offers a reasonable approximation of the intensity of preferences of a legislator and her
commitment to representing a given interest (Canon, 1999). When CBC and CHC
members become the chairs of their caucus, I expect for these chairs to produce more
legislation because of the staff resources provided.
As I mentioned in Chapter One, the CBC and CHC caucus staffs act as an im-
portant resource to the caucus chair and its membership. However, to the author’s
knowledge no study has examined the behavior of these staffers directly. Although
numerous studies suggest that congressional staffers have the potential to influence
policy processes or policy-making, evidence demonstrating that this is actually the
case relies almost exclusively on descriptive accounts and qualitative data of mem-
ber’s personal staff, not the CBC or CHC’s caucus staff (DeGregorio, 1994; Fox and
Hammond, 1977; Grose, 2011; Peterson, 2008; Romzek, 2000; Romzek and Utter,
1997). For example, research suggests that congressional staffers are often involved
in “working out the details” of principal legislation (Fox and Hammond, 1977, p. 123);
congressional staffers have autonomy and chance to influence the policy process from
behind the scenes, although they derive much of their authority from and remain
largely accountable to the representatives they serve (Romzek, 2000); and congres-
sional staffers may “achieve recognition as leaders in their own right” depending on
the positions they hold, and the expertise they offer to the legislative process (De-
Gregorio and Snider 1995, 494). Overall, the impression of staff influence implied by
these qualitative studies is that staffers assist and facilitate representatives’ pursuits
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of their political and legislative objectives. In Chapter Three, I present qualitative
evidence that the same is true for CBC and CHC caucus staff.
The caucus leadership advantage theory is vital to this study because it is oth-
erwise difficult to differentiate the effect of minority caucus membership from the
preferences of individual members because all Black and (Democratic) Latino MCs
are members of the CBC and CHC, respectively. Hence, the theory I employ helps to
create necessary variation between members of the CBC and CHC, which is vital as
both groups are homogenous in terms of race or ethnicity and political identification.
I am interested in the leadership’s role in agenda-setting because it is a proxy for
measuring the collective influence of minority caucuses. Simply studying the number
of bills introduced by Black and Latino MCs would not be sufficient since these vari-
ables are not connected to an institutional aspect of the CBC and CHC. However,
the chairs of the CBC and CHC and their caucus staffers are essential institutional
tools derived from the minority congressional caucuses, as an institution.
2.5 Caucus Influence
After establishing that minority caucuses matter in the chairs’ legislative produc-
tion, I want to establish what influence, if any, do the CBC and CHC have in the
legislative process? This dissertation argues against the claim that the CBC and CHC
are largely ineffective because they rarely succeed in passing ubiquitous legislation al-
leviating racial and ethnic disparities (Hero and Tolbert, 1995; Singh, 1998, p. 70).
Another way we can test whether or not these caucuses are effective is by examining
the extent to which minority MCs’ ability to block legislation that would contravene
the interest of their constituents. This dissertation broadens the definition of agenda
control for members of minority congressional caucuses by considering their ability
to aid the passage of minority interest legislation introduced by White MCs, which I
call caucus influence. Moreover, I assert that examining the agenda-setting behavior
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of minority congressional caucus members is not just about minority MCs securing
policies that their constituencies want enacted, but it is also about them preventing
policies that gainsay the interest of their constituents.
When caucus influence occurs, minority congressional caucuses, I argue, are dis-
rupting what would be the normal flow of minority interest legislation. Their ability
to censor minority interest legislation could occur at any level of the legislative pro-
cess. However, the further a minority interest bill introduce by a White MC that
is not cosponsored by the caucus leadership gets through the legislative process, the
more it would falsify my claim. Hence, if caucus influence exists, then the lack of
cosponsorship by the caucus leadership sends an important signal to other MCs (e.g.
committee chairs) to not allow these bills to go forward because the CBC and CHC do
not support it and MCs know this is an area of interest to CBC and CHC members.
Hence, looking forward in the legislative process, a MC knows that their bill is not
going to get anywhere because the CBC and CHC does not support it. In Chapter
Five, I also analyze non-minority interest legislation to demonstrate that their ability
to censor bills is confined to minority interest legislation because this is the policy area
in which these caucuses have unique policy expertise. Simply put, I do not expect
for there to be a caucus effect in analyses of non-minority interest legislation.
When compared to bill sponsorship, cosponsorship is often seen as a low-cost ac-
tivity that, at face value, does not mean much. However, bill cosponsorship has been
shown to have policy implications. For example, Kessler and Krehbiel (1996) show
that it can be used as a tool to signal preferences to colleagues within the House
of Representatives. Their study “favors an intralegislative signaling view of the dy-
namics of cosponsorship rather than the view of cosponsorship as electorally targeted
position taking”(Kessler and Krehbiel, 1996, p. 565). Furthermore, Fowler (2006)
shows that trends in cosponsorship can be used to detect MCs’ “connectedness,” or
the social distance between legislators. This measure, he posits, helps to explain MCs’
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roll call votes even when controlling for the ideology and party of each legislator.
While some research has explored constraints that shape cosponsorship (Kre-
hbiel, 1993), relationships and policy expertise, and consequences for cosponsorship
(Browne, 1985), few studies have examined the relationship between minority congres-
sional caucuses and bill cosponsorship. For my study, I am examining cosponsorship
as a selective tool, where the decision to cosponsor or not is purposeful. I am par-
ticularly interested in the extent to which leaders in the CBC and CHC cosponsor a
White MC’s minority interest bill. I am interested in the leadership in particular be-
cause it is a proxy for measuring the collective influence of minority caucuses. Simply
studying the number of Black and Latino cosponsors would not be sufficient because a
high or low number of cosponsors can exist irrespective of the existence of a minority
congressional caucus. However, the executive committees of the CBC and CHC is an
institutional by-product of the establishment minority caucuses. Therefore, CBC’s
or CHC’s leader cosponsorship, or lack thereof, of a White Mc’s minority interest
legislation sends strong signal to other MCs to support a bill. As I mentioned earlier,
the lack of cosponsorship by these legislators sends a signal to other legislators that
this bill is potentially dangerous for racial and ethnic minorities.
2.6 Hypotheses for Caucus Leadership Models
As discussed in the outset of this chapter, I expect that there is an increased level
of legislative productivity that is unique to the CBC and CHC chairs–and not their
colleagues on the executive committee–because they have more access to the caucus
staff, as well as their personal staff, which gives them the means to introduce more
legislation.
Hypothesis 1. CBC and CHC chairship should be positively associated with
their level of general bill introduction.
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Similarly, I posit the following hypothesis about the caucus leadership effect on
“substantive and significant” and significant bill sponsorship categories:2
Hypothesis 2. CBC and CHC chairship should be associated with their level of
substantive and significant bill introduction.
Hypothesis 3. CBC and CHC chairship should be associated with their level of
significant bill introduction.
Commemorative bill introduction is one of the ways that symbolic representation–
while, at times, devoid of substance, influences the attitudes and behavior of con-
stituents through feelings of empowerment–can manifest itself. There is a plethora of
research that has examined the sponsorship of symbolic legislation for African Ameri-
cans (Canon, 1999; Tate, 2003). Canon (1999) also examines floor speeches. Much of
this research suggest that African American MCs disproportionately sponsor symbolic
representation that is relevant to Black constituents. Similar results were found in
studies of Latino representatives (Bratton, 2006; Wilson, 2010). For example, Pan-
toja and Segura (2003), in their study of Latino elected officials in California and
Texas, find that feelings of political alienation significantly diminishes as descriptive
representation increases for Latinos. Similarly, Sanchez and Morin (2011) find that
Latino citizens represented by co-ethnic Mayors are less alienated from the political
system than those without descriptive representation. In short, the literature in this
area suggests that historically disadvantaged groups may derive a positive effect from
seeing members of their own communities in positions of power and, in particular,
bonds of trust between legislators and their constituents when there is racial or ethnic
congruence.
2I will explain the coding schema for the bill sponsorship in the data and methods section of
Chapter Four.
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Hypothesis 4. CBC and CHC chairship should be associated with their level of
commemorative bill introduction.
2.7 Hypotheses for Caucus Influence Models
After establishing the boundaries of how minority congressional caucuses via cau-
cus leadership matters, I also want to examine CBC and CHC’s role in agenda-setting.
As I mentioned in Chapter One, minority interest legislation sponsored by White MCs
have varying levels of support by minority caucus members. That is, some of these
bills have a plethora of Black and Latino cosponsors while others have few or none.
Irrespective of the number of CBC and CHC cosponsors on their bill, what is more
important, I argue, is whether or not said bill has the support of the CBC and CHC’s
executive committee. This is because the CBC and CHC executive committee mem-
bers are viewed by White MCs as leaders on legislation relevant to racial and ethnic
minorities. Hence, I have the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5. When a White MC introduces a minority interest bill, the
greater number of the CBC and CHC leader cosponsors, the
more likely that bill will pass the House of Representatives.
In this way, I am arguing that a White member’s pursuit of minority interest
legislation hinges, in part, on the support of leaders in CBC and CHC. These hy-
pothesis perhaps identify cases where White MCs try to move minority legislation in
a conservative direction, but minority congressional caucuses act as gatekeepers to
maintain the status quo which, I argue, makes the CBC and CHC effective institu-
tions. Also, as I mentioned in Chapter Two, the ability of CBC and CHC members
to exert caucus influence is confined to minority interest legislation and the legislative
process within the House of Representatives. To bolster my claim, I also run similar
analyses for non-minority interest legislation introduced by White MCs and I test
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both categories–minority interest and non-minority interest legislation–in predicting
the likelihood of a bill becoming law.
I also run similar agenda-setting models for CBC and CHC members. I run these
models to demonstrate the same factors that predict the the success of minority
interest legislation for White MCs is different for CBC and CHC members. To this
end, I develop the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 6. When a CBC member introduces a minority interest bill,
the greater number of CBC and CHC leader cosponsors, will
not increase the likelihood that bill will pass the House of
Representatives.
Instead, other factors will predict the probability of bill passage for CBC members
such as whether or not the bill is commemorative or if they’re in the majority party.
Also, I do not expect for the number of CBC and CHC leaders to amend the likelihood
of bill passage of CBC members because they are expected to already support the
efforts of Black MCs legislation.
I have different expectations for Latino MCs. I posit the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 7. When a CHC member introduces a minority interest bill, the
greater number of the CBC leader cosponsors, the more likely
that bill will pass the House of Representatives. However, I
expect for the number of CHC leader cosponsors to have no
baring over the likelihood of a CHC member’s bill passing.
My expectations for CHC members are different than the CBC because leaders
of CBC have longer tenure records than CHC leaders. Also, CBC members are more
homogenous on legislation in general and have rates of cosponsorship than CHC
leaders. In addition, MCs may view CBC cosponsorship and CHC cosponsorship
differently. That is, legislators may see CBC leader cosponsorship as representative
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of all Black MCs, since African Americans are typically viewed as monolithic, but
view CHC leader cosponsor differently since Latinos are seen as a more diverse group
than Blacks.
2.8 Caucus Leadership Advantage, Caucus Influence, and
Majority Party Status
My theory concerning caucus leadership advantage is complicated by which politi-
cal party is in the majority. Since most racial and ethnic minorities in Congress belong
to the Democratic Party–over 85% of Latino MCs and over 95% of African American
MCs who served between the 93rd and 112th Congresses were Democrats–Black and
Latino MCs may be less disadvantaged in sponsoring legislation during Democratic
Congresses than Republican Congresses (Rocca and Sanchez, 2007). Therefore, CBC
and CHC members should have greater incentive to sponsor legislation during Demo-
cratic Congresses than during Republican Congresses (Rocca and Sanchez, 2007).
Majority party status is also related to the ability of the CBC and CHC to wield
caucus influence. That is, when CBC and CHC leaders withhold cosponsorship from a
White MC, this signal should have a stronger impact during Democratic Congresses
than during Republican Congresses. This occurs for a plethora of reasons. First,
as I mentioned before, racial and ethnic minorities MCs are concentrated in the
Democratic Party. Second, previous literature suggests that Democrats are better
representatives of the policy interests of racial and ethnic minorities than Republicans
on general ideological issues as well as civil rights issues (Grose, 2011, 2005; Hutchings,
1998; Lublin, 1997). Thus, Democratic Party control of the chamber is necessary, but
not sufficient to promote greater congressional attention to minority issues. Instead,
“it is the collective commitment by minority legislators to represent national minority
populations and to establish a diversity infrastructure to achieve those goals that
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makes greater attention to minority issues possible? (Minta and Sinclair-Chapman,
2013, p. 136). Therefore, my study will consider the effect of majority status on CBC
and CHC leaders’ ability to exert caucus influence.
2.9 Conclusion
In sum, this chapter presents two theoretical frameworks–caucus leadership ad-
vantage and caucus influence–and discuss the motivations undergirding them, which
I test in Chapters Four and Five. I argue for the inclusion of minority congressional
caucuses in studies of race and political representation. In the next chapter, I dis-
cuss the qualitative research design and results from my interviews with CBC and
CHC caucus staff and other legislative staffers from CBC and CHC members’ per-
sonal staff. The next chapter provides important context for the statistical findings
to come in Chapters Four and Five and provide important qualitative evidence for
the assumptions mentioned in this chapter.
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CHAPTER III
In Their Own Words: Minority Congressional
Caucuses
3.1 Introduction
Several studies have employed qualitative methods in order to address questions of
race and ethnicity in Congress (Fenno, 2003; Glaser, 1996; Grose, 2011; Hawkesworth,
2003; Swain, 1993). These studies have enriched our understanding of the relationship
between race and representation by providing more context on the happenings within
congressional districts, particularly as it relates to the relationship between Black
members of Congress (MCs) and their constituents (e.g. Fenno, 2003). In addition,
using qualitative methods to study the relationship between race and representation
is vital, as the subtleties of conversational dynamics and norms of race relations
are, at times, too complex to capture in quantitative data (Hawkesworth, 2003).
Hawkesworth (2003) found qualitative evidence that racial and ethnic minority MCs–
especially Black female legislators–are forced to grapple with institutional dynamics
and interpersonal relationships that constitute them as subordinate.
To date, little qualitative data exists on race and ethnic-based caucuses altogether.
Moreover, there are significant gaps in our understanding of the legislative behavior
of minority caucus members, as studies tend to focus on historic analyses (Barnett,
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1975), voting cohesion (Levy and Stoudinger, 1976; Pinney and Serra., 1999), leg-
islative effectiveness, which has mostly focused on caucus members’ ability to pass
legislation (Canon, 1999), and institutional power, which examines how the priori-
ties of caucus members change as they gain more seniority and prestigious positions
in Congress (Singh, 1998; Tate, 2014). Generally, these studies argue that minority
caucuses are ineffective in a policy sense, as they do not pass ubiquitous legislation
alleviating racial or ethnic disparities (Singh, 1998). However, these studies contend
that minority caucuses are vital because they foster social relationships between mem-
bers and provide publicity to the leadership on its central issues (Levy and Stoudinger,
1976; Singh, 1998).
Previous research does not consider members of minority congressional caucuses
as agenda setters. I argue that this is an important missing variable for two reasons:
first, Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) and Congressional Hispanic Caucus (CHC)
members spend a significant amount of time each week on caucus-related activities,
specifically as it relates to caucus meetings where members discuss their individual
and collective legislative goals; second, the CBC and CHC, unlike other congressional
caucuses, have a staff that strictly works on caucus-related issues. Previous research
rarely mentions these two important facts and, more importantly, fail to explore how
the caucus staff contributes to the members’ legislatives goals.
To better understand the relationship between Black and Latino MCs and the
CBC and CHC, I conducted qualitative interviews with representatives from both
groups and asked them questions about their relationship with one another. In par-
ticular, I ask the caucus staff about what kind of assistance, if any, they provide their
caucus members (for more details on the interview questions see Appendices D, E, F,
and G). From the perspective of the MC, I am interested in better understanding their
relationships with congressional institutions, with a specific interest in their relation-
ship with the CBC and CHC. To ensure I garnered the most creditable information
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possible, I asked interview subjects to recall their concrete behavior, instead of asking
them to explain or generalize their behavior (Beckmann and Hall, 2013). This chapter
presents multiple illustrations that provide plausibility for the hypotheses mentioned
in Chapter Two, which I will subsequently test more rigorously in Chapters Four and
Five.
3.2 Purpose of Interviews
The interviews I conducted were semi-structured and asked open-ended questions
meant to explore the legislative priorities of CBC and CHC offices, the way these cau-
cuses go about obtaining support on legislative issues, the role that the caucus staff
plays in assisting its members, and in general, gain a better understanding of the re-
lationship between caucus staff and individual member offices. Within the literature
on minority congressional caucuses and other Congressional Member Organizations
(CMOs), there are a number of studies that employ quantitative analysis in an at-
tempt to measure caucus influence. Denoting the limitations of these studies, Singh
(1998) states that, “Caucus influence is also rarely amenable to empirical analysis
that yields consequential data... since caucuses frequently fail to adopt collective po-
sitions in the absence of broad consensus among their members, evaluations of votes
where the caucus did or did not assume common positions is not indicative of influ-
ence per se... The bargains determined by members, concessions granted or denied
a specific group, and reasons for particular policy outcomes are powerfully affected
by factors which are frequently not amenable to systematic empirical quantification”
(Singh, 1998, p. 83).
My research supports Singh’s assertions about the limitations of quantitative
methodological techniques in studying minority congressional caucuses. I think a
qualitative approach provides a complimentary account of how the CBC and CHC
exert influence through its organizational structure and its relationship with actors
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inside and outside of Congress. These interviews gives me important insight to how,
exactly, this relationship operates from the perspective of both parties involved. In
addition, these interviews provide the author and reader with vital factual informa-
tion about the inner workings of minority congressional caucuses, which will help me
to establish the plausibility of my theoretical arguments I discussed in Chapter Two.
In this analysis, “back room” activities and negotiations are brought to the forefront
and provide important insight into the CHC’s and CBC’s political and policy function
in Congress.
Just as there are differences in opinion within any group, there are diverse per-
spectives held by individual CBC and CHC members. This chapter explores these
unique perspectives through a series of interviews conducted with legislative staffers
in CBC and CHC offices and caucus staffers. These interviews reveal similarities and
differences on members’ relationships with caucus staff. This variance is important
to my theory, as it can demonstrate whether or not being in the leadership leads to
members having more interactions with the caucus staff relative to members who do
not serve in the leadership. If there is variation among caucus members, then it is
plausibile that there is something unique about the CBC and CHC, which supports
my claim that a caucus level measurement is important for studies of race, ethnicity,
and political representation.
3.3 Merits and Limitations of Qualitative Data
At the most basic level, interviews are conversations (Kvale, 1996). Kvale defines
qualitative research interviews as “attempts to understand the world from the sub-
jects’ point of view, to unfold the meaning of peoples’ experiences, to uncover their
lived world prior to scientific explanations” (Kvale, 1996, p. 89). While interviews
can take various forms, I decided to conduct face-to-face interviews because the ben-
efits are numerous. First, in face-to-face interviews an interviewee can see directly
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whom he or she is dealing with and, more importantly, gauge whether the interviewer
is trustworthy (Groves, 2004). An in-person interview also gives both of the partici-
pants engaged in the dialogue the opportunity to go off of the predetermined script
when necessary and appropriate. I departed from my predetermined script in several
instances because my interviewees had different levels of knowledge depending on
their employment tenure or their boss’s seniority in Congress.
Another advantage of interviews is that researchers can ask follow-up questions
or vary the order of questions depending on the flow of the discussion. By picking
up on cues from body language, an interviewer can also assess comfort level, as
well as the participant’s level of engagement or lack thereof. This was particularly
important for my interviewees because congressional staffers are very busy and their
offices are generally compensated a lot of money for in-person meetings. For instance,
one interviewee told me that he works over seventy hours per week and receives over
four hundred emails per day that requires a response. Hence, I was very mindful
of their time and only asked more questions if the participant allowed me to. In
another instance, I noticed that a person I was interviewing, for whatever reason, was
uncomfortable answering the questions I posed. After noticing this, I offered to stop
the interview and the person gladly accepted my offer and seemed relieved.
While there are many benefits to using a qualitative approach to explore ques-
tions on the role of race, ethnicity, and political representation, these methodological
approaches are not without limitations. As Grose (2011) mentioned, compare to
quantitative research, issues in qualitative research are typically more difficult to dis-
entangle and often grapple with concerns about research design. In my case, it would
have been ideal to study the effectiveness of other caucuses to see whether the hy-
potheses and conclusions I make are applicable to similar legislative organizations.
However, given the initial difficulty I had in securing interviews with staffers in CBC
and CHC offices, I decided to focus only on minority congressional caucuses.
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3.4 Interview Methods
This section discusses the approach I took in conducting my interviews to better
understand the relationship between minority caucuses and its membership. During
interviews, I did not immediately bring up the CBC or CHC. Instead, I introduced
myself as a graduate student at the University of Michigan working on a paper that
studies the legislative priorities of Black and Latino members of Congress. I began
my interviews by asking an innocuous question about the last piece of legislation that
their boss sponsored. 1 Once they responded I them asked them, “If this legislation
were to pass, who would be helped or hurt by it?” Once they discussed the intended
impact of their legislation, I asked them whom their office worked with in advancing
the legislation. Again, here I am allowing for the interviewee to mention whatever
they think is relevant without specifically mentioning caucuses, race, or ethnicity.
Next, I inquired about the legislative priorities of member offices. In particular, I
asked respondents to list the top five legislative priorities. After the interviewees list
their office’s priorities, I asked them to discuss how the issues that they mentioned
affect African Americans or Latinos in their district. Next, I inquired about the
assistance that the caucus staff and other congressional institutions provide on their
legislative priorities. Here I am interested in the types of legislation that these offices
seek and expect assistance on. Do caucus members receive assistance from the caucus
staff mostly on issues relating to racial and ethnic minorities? Or do they receive
assistance on issues more broadly? After collecting information about the assistance
that the caucus provides, I asked them for an estimate of the number of times that
they interacted with the caucus staff. I was particularly interested in the duration
and nature of their conversations.
From these questions, I wanted to get a sense of how the legislative priorities of
1Before each interview, I made sure that the interviewee’s office introduced legislative that
Congress. If their office did not introduce legislative, I asked them about cosponsorship and who
their MC goes to for advice.
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MCs compare and contrast to other members that belong in the same caucus. I was
also interested in how these priorities related to racial and ethnic minorities in their
district. I was mostly interested in the variance among members. Will members who
have higher concentrations of racial and ethnic minorities in their district discuss race
more? Will it depend on if they currently or recently serve in their caucus leadership?
Does the interviewee’s own race or ethnicity matter?
3.5 Sample Overview
The purpose of the qualitative component of my study is to understand the rela-
tionship between the staff of the CBC and CHC and their membership. To this end,
I conducted twenty-seven face-to-face interviews with the staff of the CBC and CHC
and legislative staffers employed by minority caucus members during January 2015 to
March 2015. My initial goal was to interview a legislative staffer from each CBC and
CHC office, but some offices were more cooperative than others. I received a response
from thirty-one of the forty-five CBC offices, which is a sixty-nine percent response
rate, but I only interviewed eighteen CBC legislative staffers and one CBC congress-
man because twelve offices had a policy against participating in research studies. 2 I
received a response from seven of the twenty-two CHC offices, which is a thirty-two
percent response rate, but I only interviewed four CHC legislative staffers because
three offices had a policy against participating in research studies. 3
There is a noticeable difference between the number of interviews I was able to
secure with the CBC and CHC. I think this occurred for several reasons. First, the
race of the interviewer can have an effect on the likelihood of securing an interview,
responses during an interview and what is observed in the interview. I am African
2At the time of the interviews there was actually forty-six CBC members, but I did not contact
Senator Cory Booker’s Office for an interview.
3At the time of the interviews there was actually twenty-three CHC members, but I did not
contact Senator Robert Menendez’s Office for an interview
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American and I would argue that this is something that potential interviewees were
made aware of before meeting me. I sent requests for interviews via e-mail and my first
name is typically associated with a Black woman and my last name is not common
among Latinos. Also, to confirm my identity to potential interviewees, I included a
link to my profile on my department’s website that details my research interests and
has a recent photo of me.
Second, I interned for a CBC member in the spring of 2009 and I mentioned this
after sending several emails without receiving a response. This technique helped me
in securing additional interviews. Third, after interviewing a senior staffer in a senior
CBC member’s office, this person volunteered to contact other legislative staffers
employed in CBC offices on my behalf. This made the biggest difference in me being
able to secure a lot of interviews with legislative staffers in CBC offices. Several of
the interviewees even mentioned that the only reason they responded was because
the senior staffer contacted them personally. One staffer even mentioned that, “Ellen
[name of senior staffer], is the only reason why I agreed to be apart of your study.
Ellen has done way too many favors for me not to do this small favor for her. Ellen
even threatened me.” 4
When respondents did not respond to my request after several emails, instead of
dropping these cases from the analysis, which could cause selection bias, I arrived at
the Washington, D.C. office anyway and simply requested an opportunity to meet with
a staff member (Grose, 2011). This strategy worked in some cases I was eventually
treated to an interview, but in other cases, some respondents still did not reply to my
requests. Next, I started contacting another person in the same office using the same
process and several offices still did not reply to my requests. In a few cases, follow-up
4To protect participants’ identities, I have altered their names and omitted any references to rep-
resentatives. In addition, in some cases I have modified the respondent’s position as it could possibly
identify some staffers. For instance, I replace a specific title such as a “legislative director” with a
more general designation like “senior staffer.” Any alternations have been thoughtfully considered
so not to drastically distort the characteristics of the respondent.
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phone calls were also conducted to garner additional information or to verify certain
data.
3.6 Interview Results
As mentioned earlier, the purpose of this chapter is to provide plausibility for the
hypotheses mentioned in Chapter Two, which I will subsequently test more rigorously
in Chapters Four and Five. Based on the questions I asked, four topics emerged
from my interview transcriptions and notes: legislative priorities for CBC and CHC
members; advantages of being apart of the CBC and CHC, which primarily had to do
with bloc voting via cohesiveness and psychological benefits; information about the
assistance that caucus staffers provide individual CBC and CHC offices–both from
the perspective of legislative staffers in CBC and CHC offices, and former employees
of the caucus staff; building coalitions for legislation, where interviewees primarily
discuss the value of cosponsorship and their office’s policy in obtaining cosponsors for
the legislation they introduce.
3.6.1 Legislative Priorities
I asked my interviewees questions about their boss’s legislative priorities to verify
that the legislative issues they mentioned related to the coding schema I used to code
the minority interest legislation data. I used these data in Chapter Four to test the
extent to which minority caucus leaders engage in caucus influence.
After a few introductory questions, I asked my interviewees to discuss and list the
top legislative priorities for their boss. Most of the respondents list these priorities in
no particular order and explained at great length why these priorities are important
to their boss. More than half of the respondents mentioned race or ethnicity before
I explicitly asked them to explain to me how, exactly, the issues that they mention
affect racial and ethnic minorities in their district. For instance, Jill, a junior staffer
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in a CBC office stated that,
I would have to say social justice issues like police brutality; criminal justice re-
form; education; social programs like Head Start; voting rights are top priorities
for [one member]. His district was actually created... to be a majority-minority
district, even though it may not be majority Black right now, our district was
created for that purpose. So, for example, government studies show that mi-
norities are more impacted by issues like healthcare, poverty, discrimination,
jobs and social security, and many other issues than whites. These inequalities
have been going on for years and he’s just trying to shrink them. He wants to
ensure that minorities get an equal footing at the table. I should note that his
work helps to lift up everyone else too. For example, his legislation helps poor
whites; he champions women’s rights; he’s working to help minority children
get access to a better education, but that in turn ensures a better education for
all. My boss represents some of the most vulnerable Americans in the nation.
Unfortunately, a majority of these people just happen to be Black women, men,
and children. So, by supporting these programs that have been proven by gov-
ernment studies to improve the conditions of Black Americans in need, my boss
is trying to improve the conditions of everyone.
I should note that while Jill was quick to bring up how their legislative priorities were
important to African Americans in their district, she also noted that these issues affect
poor Whites in their district as well. Other interviewees like Jill who had a sizable
percent of Whites in their district made similar remarks whereas interviewees with
a supermajority–which I characterized as over sixty percent–of African Americans or
Latinos did not mention Whites in discussing their legislative priorities.
I aggregated all of the priorities and displayed the top priorities by the CBC and
CHC in Figures 1 and 2, respectively. For a complete list of legislative priorities see
Appendix A.
I allowed these categories to be defined by the interviewees themselves. Arguably,
some of the categories in Figure 3.1 can be combined, but several of my interviewees
made distinctions between seemingly similar priorities.
Among interviewees in CBC offices, education ranked as the top priority with
sixty-three percent of participants listing it as a top priority for their district. Within
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Figure 3.1: Legislative Priorities for CBC Offices
Figure 3.2: Legislative Priorities for CHC Offices
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this category, interviewees were primarily concerned with improving public schools,
college affordability, funding for Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HB-
CUs), and funding for vocational training. For staffers in CHC offices, healthcare
and immigration ranked as the top issues. While one of the respondents did not rank
immigration as a top priority for their district–because of where their district is geo-
graphically located–he/she acknowledged that immigration is an important national
issue for Latinos and an issue that the CHC has made a top priority for the past
several decades.
I should also note that all of the legislative priorities mentioned in Figures 3.1 and
3.2 relate to CBC and CHC task forces, which are small groups of caucus members
that work together on a particular policy area. Most of the respondents listed the
name of the issue that related to their CBC and CHC task force first and were more
likely to discuss caucus-coordinated activities as it relates to that issue. Interviewees
from offices that served in their caucus leadership were more likely to have legislative
priorities that were consistent with names of CBC and CHC task forces.
3.6.2 Cohesion
As I mentioned earlier, the literature on congressional caucuses have primarily
been preoccupied with adequately measuring how groups behave as a unit. Congres-
sional scholars have developed several measures of vote cohesion, but the most famous
of these indices is the “Rice Index for Vote Cohesion,” which accounts for how group
members vote across different roll call votes. This measure gave rise to more detailed
measures of group behavior. Clausen (1972) takes the Rice index even further by
creating a measure that focuses on intergroup conflict and group cohesion. Other
scholars have used a much simpler measure of group behavior by focusing solely on
cohesion. Several studies have concluded that the CBC demonstrates a high level of
cohesion using the Rice Index (Gile and Jones, 1995; Pinney and Serra, 1999), but
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it is difficult to conclude that caucuses matter because legislators may just be voting
with their own preferences and not because of their caucus membership. Also, to the
author’s knowledge, this is the first study to include the perspective of the CHC when
studying voting cohesion within congressional caucuses.
In addition to shedding light on the aforementioned questions, this section helps
to establish plausibility for my argument that minority congressional caucuses, as an
institution, matters. Previous literature suggests that the CBC is extremely cohesive
in their voting patterns (Bositis, 1994; Canon, 1999; Gile and Jones, 1995; Jones,
1987; Levy and Stoudinger, 1976). This conclusion implicitly claims that minority
caucuses are just labels for MCs with liked preferences, which implies that caucuses,
as an institution, does not matter. Some of the narratives presented in this section
provide support for the conventional cohesion argument about minority congressional
caucuses.
Moreover, some of the narratives presented in this section suggest that mem-
bers of the CBC and CHC vote with their caucus colleagues when they have the
same interest–this is mostly on issues relating to their African American and Latino
constituents–but vote differently when they have different interests. This sentiment
supports my argument that caucuses matter. In particular, the narratives presented
in this chapter provide plausibility that minority caucus members make concerted
efforts to block legislation that disadvantages racial and ethnic minorities–caucus in-
fluence. While this could occur without the establishment of minority caucuses, it
would occur in a less organized fashion. Hence, caucus influence may explain why
CBC and CHC members appear to be a lot more cohesive than they actually are.
This is because CBC and CHC members are going to block things that they’re not
cohesive on (Cox and McCubbins, 2005). Hence, the bills that remain makes minor-
ity congressional caucuses appear extremely cohesive. This is why my dissertation is
important. It complicates how political scientists have previously conceived cohesion
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within minority congressional caucuses.
Although I did not specifically ask my interviewees any questions about the issues
that they think the CHC or CBC is cohesive on, all of my interviewees discussed
the extent to which their caucus is cohesive and whether or not they see that as an
advantage. For instance, several participants mentioned that the CHC is generally
cohesive on immigration and healthcare legislation, but do not agree on all issues.
Several of my interviewees suggested that contention within the CHC usually stems
from issues such as Puerto Rico statehood and lifting the embargo against Cuba.
However, they are also some issues that emerge that can divide CHC members because
of where their districts are geographically located. For example, Luke, a senior staffer
in a CHC office mentioned that,
On immigration the CHC really acts as one unit. They’re [the caucus staff]
very good about making sure we’re all on the same page when it comes to im-
migration. They’re [the caucus staff] also the same on health issues. The CHC
works cohesively on health issues and so, when we are working on health issues,
a lot of times we look to see what the position of the CHC is.
Some of these other issues CHC disagrees on. So, they’re not always working
together cohesively. An example of this is on water issues. I’d say that the
majority of CHC members are from urban areas and so their interest in water
policy are based on providing water to urban communities. However, there are
quite a few CHC members that are from rural areas, so their interests in water
policy are based on providing irrigation for farmers and those two can clash
sometimes. So, many times the CHC does not see eye-to-eye on water issues.
Luke’s response underscores an important issue that came up in all of the in-
terviews I had with staffers in CHC offices: CHC members do not always agree on
legislative issues. After receiving this information, I interviewed a senior CHC staffer,
Estefania, to see how they handled disagreements among caucus members. Estefania
stated that,
For the most part, if each individual member does not agree on some-
thing, then there’s no caucus position. Each individual member votes their
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conscience and they have healthy discussions about it. On things like Puerto
Rico statehood and Cuba I think they all have accepted that they’re at differ-
ent places and that’s where it is. And there are other issues where you could
have two-thirds support on an issue, but they realize it is not worth the risk of
alienating some members. So, a lot of times the chair will make an executive
decision.
But, as the chair, you have to think to yourself that there is a litany
of things we agree upon and we have to focus on that, instead of the
handful of things that we don’t agree on. So, my personal opinion, there
are a lot of people who wonder why the Hispanic caucus doesn’t engage more
in Latin American policies. Well, one of the reasons why we don’t engage in
Latin American policies is that we don’t have a unified voice on Latin American
policies. So, while it is an important issue to many members’ constituencies,
they have to work on this issue individually because they don’t agree. As opposed
to the CBC, which has a pretty standard, unified response to things going on in
different African nations, the CHC does not.
This response illustrates that, from the prospective of caucus staff, CHC members
respects the diversity that exists among its members and focuses on the plethora of
issues they agree on rather than the issues they do not have a consensus on. This also
provides plausibility that my approach is unique in that the caucus is a consequence
of the preferences of the members in the caucus rather than the amalgamation of
approximately fifty votes for the CBC and approximately thirty votes for the CHC
that can be leverage at any given time. When a divisive issue does emerge, Estefania
later mentioned that members would typically go to CHC offices individually to garner
support for issues that are divisive within the caucus. I also noticed that while the
caucus is democratic in its approach in deciding on what position to take, the chair
has some power to act unilaterally and set the agenda on the statements that the
caucus makes. Lastly, the CHC staff seems to view the CBC as being much more
cohesive than the CHC.
As Estefania suggests, legislative staffers in CBC offices generally thought of their
caucus as cohesive on most issues, but occasionally, they disagree on issues. Usually,
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these disagreements were based on where members’ district is geographically located–
listing specific differences in caucus members that hail from southern districts. Some
interviewees listed the percentage of non-black population in CBC districts as a point
of contention; highlighting specific concerns about these populations and their capac-
ity for donating to a member’s campaign. Some of my interviewees from CBC offices
in some way mentioned how beneficial it is to be in the CBC because of the approxi-
mately fifty votes they can have at any given time, which supports the conventional
claims made about minority caucuses. For example, Kyle, a senior staffer states that,
My boss always says that the strength of the wolf is in the pack and
you need a pack for legislation to move forward. The CBC has a voice
because they are critical in the Democratic Party and no one wants to upset
them. A lot of people don’t go out of their way to assist them, but no one
wants to get in a fight with the CBC and that’s been made clear over the last
couple of years. They have a voting bloc of forty-five individuals and
the top leading Democrats are members of the CBC. However, in a
situation when they are in the minority it is much harder to get the
Republicans to pay attention to the CBC’s wants because they often
don’t care about the communities they serve.
Kyle and several other interviewees outline additional benefits CBC members
receive from being apart of the caucus. These claims bolster my expectation that
caucuses matter as an institution. One junior staffer, Maurice, suggested that despite
the seniority of many of the CBC members, they still feel ostracize. The caucus helps
members grapple with these feelings of marginalization by validating their feelings
and providing advice on how to deal with interpersonal issues that can surface in
Congress. Kyle comments also provides plausibility that the CBC may possibly exert
caucus influence, as non-CBC or CHC members actively try to not upset members
of the CBC.
According to Maurice,
Black members of Congress need to stand together to meet their goals as mem-
bers of Congress because we’ve seen too often in history where just trying to be
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a party player or trying to do things alone or just working with your state del-
egation, or any other group that you may be associated with, isn’t good enough.
Too often we’re still marginalized and don’t get a seat at the table, but as part
of the caucus they band together to make a team of forty-three members who
can speak on one accord. Often times, that demands a certain level of respect
because it’s a major voting bloc in Congress, especially for Democrats.
When the CBC stands together cohesively as members of Congress and not just
as individual black members, who, if they were standing on their own could
be easily ignored, toss aside, or even more marginalized, or whatever. That’s
probably the thing that she finds most useful. She can go to the CBC
and talk about the issues she’s having with the leadership or with
members of her committee or someone in her hallway or whoever,
she goes to the CBC and often receives a lot of advice and counsel on
how she can deal with that. They will stand up with you. They will
stand up for her if what she saying is important enough to her and
I think that’s an invaluable resource, especially being a new member
and you’re still trying to find your way. CBC contains some of the most
senior members of Congress who have gotten landmark legislation passed, they
have made a name for themselves and they just really know their way around
here. That’s what the CBC is all about. They try to teach one another and
help one another.
Another interviewee provided an example of what Maurice discusses as the need
for members, regardless of their seniority, to call on the CBC to prevent further
marginalization. In January of 2015 there were efforts made to sidestep seniority
norms and prevent a member of the CBC from becoming a ranking member of the
Veteran’s Affairs Committee. The person that tried to take the ranking position did
not have as much seniority as the CBC member who was next in line for the position,
but was the highest-ranking soldier in congressional history and was endorsed by a glut
of prominent veteran groups. CBC members stood with this MC, which prevented the
other MC from taking the ranking position. The respondent claim that incidents like
this would happen a lot more if Black MCs did not have an institution like the CBC
and their staff. According to the interviewee, the caucus staff played a major role
in getting press coverage about the incident and facilitated other members’ efforts
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to make speeches and stances on behalf of the CBC member, which undoubtedly
contributed to the CBC member becoming the ranking member of the Veteran’s
Affairs Committee.
Staffers in more senior CBC offices also expressed similar comments in the CBC’s
ability to provide members a safe place to feel protected and to discuss issues that are
pertinent to African Americans. For instance, Ella, a senior staffer in a CBC office
stated that
CBC members have a lot of offline conversations. You can go to them [other
CBC members] and be like, (draws closer and whispers in a low voice) “Okay,
so, what’s really going on?” They can take care of each other and help each
other out. I think they’re helpful in that sense, and they know how to navigate
things.
Since a majority of the people in Congress are white men who get heard, we
have to come together to work on these issues in order to get heard. I think they
[the CBC] do have a very important role here. If we didn’t need the CBC,
that would be great, but we do. We need someone to say “hey, that’s
not okay specifically because it hurts African Americans.” Without the
CBC, that voice wouldn’t get heard in the same matter. It would be individ-
uals making noise but there is strength in numbers and the caucus
helps us to make a united voice on issues affecting African Ameri-
cans and the caucus staff facilitates these efforts.
This illustrates that CBC members regardless of their level of seniority see the
caucus as a useful tool in gathering information about current issues in Congress and
to discuss feelings of marginalization with their colleagues. Both Ella’s and Maurice’s
comments provides plausibility for the conventional characterization of minority cau-
cuses, as an institution, provides members “strength in numbers.” However, both
respondents complicate this characterization by enumerating additional benefits that
minority caucuses uniquely provide its members. There was also narratives presented
that suggests that the Hispanic caucus provides its members psychological benefits.
Estefania stated that,
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It’s like a family. I often tell people when they ask, “what was it like working
for the caucus?” I always reply, “It was like a family.” I do see them as family
members and they protect each other and they make fun of each other, but
when someone outside the family starts attacking them, then everyone joins
forces and says, “hey, only I can insult my brother, you cannot.”
Hence, the CBC and CHC provide members a safe haven where they can share meals
during meetings and protect one another when attacked by non-caucus members.
Ella’s earlier comments suggest that CBC members may see themselves as surro-
gate representatives of African Americans (Dawson, 1994; Grose, 2011; Hall, 1996;
Mansbridge, 1999; Minta, 2011; Tate, 2003). That is, Black MCs feel a responsibility
to stand up for African Americans who may or may not be geographically located
in their districts. After hearing Ella’s comments, I asked a CBC member if he/she
feels pressure to represent African Americans outside of his/her district and the CBC
member stated that, “For sure. You sometimes have to resist that because in some
instances you are violating legislative courtesy. Unless, they [the constituent] can-
not get any representation from that person [the representative]–that’s another story.
That person is usually not Black.” Here we observe that this CBC not only tries to
represent African Americans outside of his geographic district, but he also implies
that African Americans may have a difficult time being represented by a non-Black
MC. The MC further explained that minority MCs are uniquely equipped to respond
to the unique concerns of the African American community because of their share
fate. He also explained that part of the reason that they do this is because being a
member of the CBC always reminds him/her to be concerned with how issues affect
African Americans broadly. The member also mentioned that the caucus staff spends
time on reminding members of this responsibility.
While all of my interviewees expressed the value in having the CBC work col-
lectively on legislative issues, they were also quick to say that there are occasional
disagreements. The topic of internal conflict within the CBC also came up during
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my interview with a current CBC member. The CBC member suggested that since
caucus members now hail from geographically diverse districts (compared to when
the caucus was first started with thirteen members who hailed mostly from northern
states), it is more difficult to build a consensus. The CBC member suggested that,
Now, there is more diversity, which requires listening to different viewpoints and
interests. Now, it is a tougher task for someone to corral and get consensus
on any issue, which makes us somewhat dysfunctional. They don’t handle it
[internal conflict] well. They don’t handle it [internal conflict] well at
all. It usually breaks down along regional lines. For instance, there
is the upcoming visit with Netanyahu, the president of Israel. Some folks in
the black caucus wanted to issue a press release to take a stand against the
visit and him disrespecting the first African American president by ignoring
diplomatic protocol that has been in existence for hundreds of years. He should
have notified the White House of his visit. They couldn’t agree on issues on the
stance, they were divided mostly along regional lines. Some members, mostly
from the South, did not want to go on record as opposing the president of Israel
because of their Jewish constituency and their donor base. That’s an example
of the dysfunction.
From the CBC member’s comments we observe that when conflict within the CBC
arises, it usually stems from differences in where a member’s districts is geographically
located. The member later explained that when CBC members do disagree, they
prefer to do so in private.
Next, interviewees referred to the CBC and CHC as useful networks that allow
members to be more effective and organized in building support for the issues that
are important to them. Also, these members see themselves as being responsible for
providing caucus influence, as they see their role as speaking up for issues that are
particularly harmful to racial and ethnic minorities. This gives plausibility for my
theory of caucus influence that I discuss in my previous chapters. Lastly, members
in the CBC may feel pressure to represent all African Americans, especially Black
constituents that are not represented by a Black MC.
In general, the responses in this section complicates previous research on cohesion.
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While many of my interviewees referred to the CBC’s and CHC’s size and their po-
tential for bloc voting, other narratives suggest that CBC and CHC members work to
protect the interest of Blacks and Latinos by speaking up issues that negatively affect
them. Moreover, the above response from the CBC members and work from Barnett
(1975) suggests that there is perhaps a time component to the shift in cohesion. That
is, in the formative years of the CBC and CHC there was more agreement on issues,
but more recently, cohesion is really about the aggregation of individual preferences
because there is now more diversity in the representational styles and the districts the
CBC and CHC members emerge from (Canon, 1999). Hence, there is some plausibil-
ity that minority congressional caucuses matter as an institution, rather than simply
being a label for members with liked-preferences.
3.6.3 Caucus Staff
An important missing variable in the study of minority congressional caucuses is
their staff capacity. In previous chapters I hypothesize that caucus staff provide useful
resources for its caucus members, but I did not specify what services they perform
for its members. My qualitative interviews shed light on what tasks caucus staff
members perform, but also reveal some vital information about the internal make-up
of the CBC and CHC. In addition, I found multiple illustrations that the caucus staff
provide individual CBC and CHC offices with legislative subsidies.
In previous chapters I have also hypothesized that part of the reason that minority
caucuses are influential is the resources provided by the caucus staff. Moreover, the
caucus staff is disproportionately accessed among caucus members. That is, caucus
members in the leadership have more access to the caucus staff than non-leaders. I
refer to this as the caucus leadership advantage. I found plausibility of the leadership
advantage in several of the interviews I conducted. For instance, when I asked senior
staffer, Martin, about the difference between when his boss was the CHC chair and
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when they were not, he stated that,
The obvious difference is that they’re [the CHC staff] located in your
office... they work for everyone [all CHC members], but when you’re
the chair, you’re their main boss... So, the interaction goes from
working with them all day, everyday to working with them only a
couple times a week. To put it differently, when you’re the chair,
you’re the main boss and in the other instance... you’re just a mem-
ber, so you’re one of their twenty-five bosses.
Other interviewees from CBC offices also suggested that although the caucus staff
technically works for everyone that they mainly work for the caucus chair in assisting
them in setting the agenda for the caucus.
All of my interviewees in CBC offices either implicitly or explicitly stated that
the caucus staff reminds their office to not just be concern about their district or
the minorities in their district, but to be concerned with African Americans as a
group. The vehicle that the caucus staff does this is through the various caucus-
coordinated activities. For instance, one respondent stated that, “I wouldn’t focus
on the CBC budget if they didn’t make me. We have too many other things going
on.” However, I noticed a difference that interviewees whose boss served on their
caucus’s executive committee, specifically as the chair, referred to the caucus staff as
extremely helpful and provided a lot of examples to demonstrate when, exactly, the
caucus staff assistance made a difference.
For interviewees who boss did not serve in their caucus leadership, they were
less likely to recall specific instances of when assistance from the caucus staff made
a difference. Instead, they mentioned the weekly vote recommendations that the
caucus staff helps the current CBC or CHC Whip create (see Appendix K) and the
weekly lunches that the caucus staff plans. Interviewees generally consulted with the
weekly voting recommendations, but stated that their member does not feel pressure
to always vote with their caucus colleagues. In fact the CBC member in my study
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mentioned that members are free to vote how they want because members “cannot
be kicked out of the CBC.”
Interviewees that had contact with the caucus staff often referred to them as
extremely helpful and discussed the caucus staff ability to be “facilitators of informa-
tion.” Renee, a senior staffer in a CBC office stated that,
The CBC staff is very helpful. They are like mini computers in that
they realize what is important to our bosses; they are the eyes and
ears because there are so many opportunities that are galvanized in
the CBC office and they farm them out to members based on their
interests. They are a great resource.
For example, say you’re the Communication Director at the CBC, and Al
Sharpton calls because he wants to talk about economic development. You,
as the Communications Director would put him in touch with the CBC member
working on that specific issue. Or the White House may contact the caucus staff
and say that they’re interested in discussing SNAP, WIC and income equality
and they’ll put them in contact with the CBC member working on that issue.
Those are some examples of how the caucus staff connects CBC members to
different opportunities.
Hence, not only can the caucus staff connect members to outside groups who are
working on similar issues, the staff acts as a liaison between caucus members and
other branches of government. Kyle, who I mentioned earlier, explains what tasks
the caucus staff performs for his boss in their interaction with a representative from
government agencies.
Caucus staffers do all the legwork. They organize members into different
task forces depending on what congressional committees they serve on. They
also assign members to task forces outside of their expertise; that way members
can get different experiences and maybe later serve on a committee similar to
that task force.
They [the caucus staff] also help facilitate meetings for outside groups that want
to start working with the CBC, but everything is not just about working with
the current chair and his or her staff, because they’re the chair. It’s more about
getting that broad access to CBC members and getting them to the right person.
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The caucus staff brief members before meetings on what needs to be done and
how to do it. The caucus staffers are like law clerks working for mul-
tiple attorneys preparing all types of notes and facts so that when
they get to the courtroom, the lawyer [CBC member] is ready to go.
Now, I don’t want to make it seem like members are not involved.
They’re not just figureheads. But they just don’t have the time to
do all of the research and find the background information necessary
for these meetings.
Here we notice that caucus staffers do a lot of the groundwork that it takes to run
the CBC. The caucus staff uses the CBC task forces as a filter to connect members to
different opportunities to collaborate with government agencies and interest groups.
This interviewee later discussed the process that the CBC takes each year in devel-
oping an alternative budget with the help of the CBC’s Budget Task Force and their
network of Black organizations and interest groups outside of Congress. Through
this and other mechanisms, the CBC helps its members to raise issues to the level of
discussion and policy formulation. He added that in a number of instances, caucuses
are the initial contact between Congress and citizens, facilitating efforts to obtain an
audience within Congress for particular interests and points of view, and perhaps to
place issues on the formal agenda. From Kyle’s and other respondents’ comments,
it seems that minority congressional caucuses serve the pre-committee function in
policy-making for its members, as members can develop expertise in a policy area
and galvanized leadership opportunities that they might not otherwise get.
From the above narrative we also notice that not only do caucus staffers connect
members to these outside groups, they also help brief members before these meetings
to make sure that they are prepared. In addition to hosting briefings before meeting
with outside groups, Kyle stated that caucus staffers would create fact sheets, develop
talking points, and questions to ask outside speakers for caucus members. This
provides plausibility that caucus staffers provide unique legislative subsidies for its
membership.
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The analogy that Kyle used to describe the work that caucus staffers do for CBC
members as paralegal work was also present in my other interviews. For instance,
Estefania, former staffer for the CHC stated that, “If the caucus has a position on
something, it was my job to make sure everyone understood the position and everyone
understood what their members would report if they were interviewed.” She later
explained that the caucus staffers would serve as a clearinghouse for press inquiries
because a lot of offices did not have their own press staff person and relied on the
caucus staff to obtain airtime for them.
A staffer from a CHC office, Peter, recalls an instance where the caucus staff
assisted his boss in setting up a meeting with the President. In particular he suggested
that this meeting would have not taken place without the support and “brand name”
of the CHC, but also because of the assistance of the caucus staff. Peter stated that,
I recall an instance where the caucus staff and the CHC, as a group of Hispanic
legislators, made a huge difference for a bill my boss wanted to pass. Before my
boss’s bill became a law, there was a lot of controversy around the bill, so the
President invited the CHC to come to the White House. My boss got a chance
to speak and said, “Mr. president I support this bill, but the current draft is
unfair to the territories.” President Obama turned to his official that works on
the intergovernmental affairs at the White House and said, “[name of official]
fix this.” The next day [name of official] calls our office and says, “Can we
meet? We have good news.” [name of official] came to Congress with a whole
bunch of White House staffers, we had a whole bunch of Healthcare staffers
from all the territory offices in the CHC. She tells us that we are giving you an
additional two billion dollars for that bill.
All of that happened because the CHC, as an entity, went to the
White House. So, one great thing about the CHC is that there is
strength in numbers and they [CHC members] gets invited to the
White House as an entity and you can use those opportunities to
make specific requests to the President, which is very rare. Otherwise
you’re limited to writing a letter to the President that you know he
doesn’t read. We write letters to the President all the time and he
doesn’t read them. So, the CHC is good for obtaining meetings with
the President. And CHC staff coordinated this whole thing.
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Here we notice that the CHC, and perhaps the CBC, can use their brand name
to obtain meetings with the President and lobby him/her on issues that might not
otherwise be able to get attention on by themselves. Hence, minority congressional
caucuses makes individual Black and Latino MCs visible in circumstances that they
are rendered invisible. The idea of minority congressional caucuses having a brand
name came up in another interview, but in a different context. The comments below
from Maurice reveal that some legislative organizations in Congress try to use the
CBC’s brand name to promote their events, especially if these events concern African
Americans. Maurice stated that,
One time the DNC [Democratic National Committee] was hosting some event
geared towards African Americans. It was about some report they were releas-
ing. I don’t remember the details of it. But, I do remember having a conversa-
tion with one of the caucus staff members about it. The event wasn’t working
with my schedule so I considered sending someone in my place. Before doing
so, I called the office to make sure that this was a CBC sponsored event. The
caucus staff didn’t find the event important because it was a “DNC African
American event,” not a CBC event.
The CBC staff felt taken advantaged of by the event because they felt that the
outreach to CBC offices by the DNC was for a “rubberstamp” approval by the
caucus rather than actually trying to engage with the CBC members. This is
because the DNC didn’t involve the caucus staff. So, because of the conversation
I had with them about it, I didn’t go.
In general, if the CBC staff is not involved in planning an event
about black people on the Hill, we’re [legislative staffers] inclined
not to attend. I’m so glad we had that conversation online. Our
time is very limited. But, if the CBC calls and asked my boss to
do something, she would do everything to make it happen. Now,
that doesn’t mean that she always wants to do and it doesn’t mean
she always agrees with them. Now, if an organization is planning a
black event on the Hill and the CBC is not involved... That’s going
to raise a red flag and I know my boss would not want me to attend
that event.
Maurice comments reveal that his boss is willing to go above and beyond for the CBC
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even if his boss does not always want to do the task. Also, his comments suggest that
members of minority caucuses are selective in the events that they associate with.
While they are willing to collaborate with other organizations in Congress, they want
to do so in a meaningful way.
In addition to examining the tasks that caucus staff perform for its members, I
was also interested in how often and to what end do individual CBC and CHC offices
consult with the caucus staff. All of my respondents mentioned that they contact or
are contacted by members of their caucus staff. At the lowest level, the caucus staff
contacted my interviewees twice a week–once for the weekly vote recommendations
and once for a reminder about the caucus meeting, which included the agenda. How-
ever, most of my respondents admitted to having contact more than this. While the
purpose of the contact varied according to the respondent, generally speaking, the
communication was so that both the caucus staff and the individual office was aware
of different issues that were occurring in Congress or for status updates on different
projects. Maurice, a staffer in a CBC office stated that,
The purpose of our conversations is basically to keep my finger on the pulse. So,
I keep in touch daily to see if they need anything for us and so they know what
we’re working on so that we’re not stepping on anyone’s toes. I also keep in
touch to ensure that there is a personal connection so that when we need them,
they don’t associate us as the office that only calls the CBC staff when we need
them. So, we keep these important personal connections with them. That way
when we need a favor they’ll do it and if they need us to do something on [name
of issue] or whatever the issue may be, we’ll do it. Our relationship is about
constant check-ins. 5
From Maurice’s comments we see that his office talks to the caucus staff on a
daily basis to provide one another with status updates regarding various projects
that they are working on together. He also wants to keep in contact with the caucus
staff because he knows that his boss will eventually need their help on something and
5I left the name of the issue out of this quote because the office that my interviewee works for
would have been too easily identifiable.
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he does not want his boss to be seen as the member who only calls when they need
something. Another staffer, Nicole, stated that her office keeps in contact with the
caucus staff because they are a great resource for a “temperature test” to see what
offices will cosponsor a bill or knowing which members her boss could count on for a
supportive vote. I later asked caucus staff about Maurice’s and Nicole’s comments on
contact with caucus staff and they confirmed that they were more likely to go above
and beyond for members who stayed in constant contact with them. The narratives in
this section provides plausibility that caucuses matter as institutions because aspects
of their institutional arrangement allows for members to act differently than they
might otherwise–say, if there were no minority congressional caucuses.
The interviews revealed that part of the CBC and CHC staff’s responsibility is
planning the weekly lunches for their caucus members. When Congress is in session,
these lunches occur once a week for approximately one and half to two hours and the
CBC and CHC staffs are responsible for gathering the information for the agenda
items and distributing it to all of the members before and during the meeting. They
call for the meetings electronically and set them up by communicating with all of
the individual offices. There is usually an outside speaker at every meeting and if
necessary, the caucus staff hosts a briefing on the topic before the speaker comes. Also,
after the meeting is over, the caucus staff often works late into the night following up
with different offices concerning issues that came up during the meeting.
Something that was made clear from my interviews with caucus staffers who had
an opportunity to attend the weekly caucus meetings was that these weekly meetings
allowed members to share a personal connection that is not present in any other
legislative organization in Congress. For example, Nicole, a senior staff who has
worked in several CBC offices and for other government agencies, stated that,
I think the best thing about these meetings is the collegiality between members,
that personal relationship, that allows you to communicate about something
that might be difficult or compromise on something that you really wouldn’t
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have done; you’ve got a personal relationship with someone and so you did it,
because you knew they would do it back. I think that we [Congress] lost that.
So, I think the nice thing about the CBC and what the staff tries to do, and I
did it too when I was there, is really allow members to talk to each other and
ask questions and get information from the staff and the staff pulls information
from the administration, agencies, etc. To give it to them in a way that
they also can have a private discussion with a large group of their
colleagues, and go through pros and cons and say things that maybe
they won’t say in a greater caucus meeting because they don’t know
who’s in there, who’s listening or who’s going to repeat it.
I think that’s probably one of the best things that the luncheon brings; a chance
to relax and feel comfortable in their discussion. The staff likes to keep a lot of
the information during meetings confidential as much as possible. You have to
keep your mouth shut when you go to the meetings.
From Nicole’s comments we learn that CBC meetings are unique in that it is
perhaps one of the few places in which minority legislators feel completely comfortable
in expressing their ideas because of the expectation of confidentiality. The caucus staff
also fill in gaps of information about topics either by providing their own knowledge or
inviting other outside groups or representatives from different branches of government
in for a meeting. Below another senior staffer, LeRoy, explains how the caucus staff
assists its members. He also speculates about what would happen if there were no
CBC or caucus staffers.
If the caucus staff weren’t there then the work would just be done in a less
organize or systematic fashion. It would just fall upon the worker bees and
individual offices to get it done, which I doubt is actually possible. I think the
CBC staff is helping members magnify their interest in and outside of Congress
in ways that they would not be able to accomplish without their staff person or
ability to organize as a group of forty something members.
Overall, my interviewees found the caucus staff to be helpful. However, intervie-
wees whose member served in the caucus leadership found the caucus to be extremely
helpful and provided several detailed examples of how the caucus assistance made a
difference for their office. The caucus meetings are also important because it allows a
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chance for members to share ideas and advice on a weekly basis. For instance, Lindsey
who is a staffer that’s been working in the same CBC office for decades, claims that
her boss never actually eats the food at the lunches, but still attends them because he
wants to listen to what his colleagues are working on and to offer advice and counsel
to freshman and junior CBC members.
However, I should also note that a few of my interviewees expressed a desire for the
caucus staff to do more, but recognized they are limited in what they can do because
they only have between three and five employees since the early 2000s. I hypothesize
that part of the reason is that legislative staffers in CBC and CHC expect more from
the caucus staff is because they help to pay the salaries of the caucus staff since the
2000s from their congressional budgets. In fact, the CBC member I interview stated
that, “we all care about what they’re doing because all of the members are helping
to pay their salaries.”
3.6.4 Cosponsorship and Coalition Building
Although legislative staffers in CBC and CHC offices expressed similar comments
about the usefulness of the caucus staff, I noticed differences in how these offices decide
to support legislation via cosponsorship. In particular, I observed that freshman or
junior members, had an explicit protocol they followed in deciding whether or not
to sign their boss on to a bill, but offices with senior MCs, staffers had much more
leeway in their decision to sign their boss on to it a bill. One thing that remained
constant across my sample is that there is a large value place on cosponsorship from
the perspective of both the sponsor of the bill and the potential co-sponsor.
In discussing the process of which bills she signs her boss’s name on to, Nicole
explains the detailed process that she goes through every week when Congress is in
session of reviewing bills for cosponsorship:
I have about three hundred bills in my inbox right now; so I’ll cut them to about
sixty and I review all sixty on a Friday, and then I pick out ones that I think
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that represents the markers that she’s given me, the guidelines she has set out
as her priority, and then from there I take it down to typically about twenty-five.
After that, I write cover sheets on them. I tell her what I think are the pros
and cons to signing on to the bill are. I tell her who’s on it, if it was introduced
previously; who was on it then, maybe it was a contentious issue? I try to do
an impact statement. I ask myself, “what would this do for [name of the state]
or the district–if I can get it down that far? Then I put that cover sheets on
the bills and she looks at every single one of them, and she says yes or she says
no. Because I take a long time with it before she gets it, she does not spend
that much time on it. But, I don’t believe in not just signing her up for stuff.
She is aware of every bill that I put her name on to.
While Nicole’s boss looks at all the bills before she signs on to them, Nicole still
plays a major role in not only filtering the number of bills down to a manageable
number, but she also can help sway her member in one way or the other by the
information she provides on the cover sheets that are attached to the bills. Many
of my other interviewees from freshman or junior offices expressed a similar process
to deciding whether or not their boss signs on to a bill. That is, they first examine
whether the bill has to do with the legislative priorities that are most important to
the member, then they think about the effect that bill could have on their state or
district and lastly, they examine whether the bills has something to do with their
committees or caucus memberships. For instance, Renee, a staffer in a freshman
CBC office explains why their office takes the process of deciding to sign on to a bill
so seriously. In particular she states that,
Everything goes through her. We want you to look at the legislation that she
introduced and cosponsored and tell what she’s about. You know, there are four
hundred and thirty-five members and they all have ideas and we get asked to be
on bills all of the time, but my main goal, in my position, is to make sure that
we can support these things with a vote down the line.
In terms of cosponsorship, not cosponsoring does not mean we don’t
support it. It is just that we really want her to be able to say that I’m
not a member who is all over the place. You have to be a champion of
certain things; so, we want to make sure her cosponsorship matches
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up to her priorities.
Again, we see that minority caucus members do not take what bills they cosponsor
lightly. Both Renee and Nicole comments suggest two things. First, their bosses
seem to think what they cosponsor is important; we know this just from the mere
time their office invest in the process of reviewing bills for cosponsorship. Second,
their bosses feel that what bills a member cosponsors reveals something about their
personal legislative priorities. Perhaps cosponsorship is so important in these offices
because freshman or junior MCs introduce fewer bills than their senior colleagues and
in absent of their own legislation, they feel that their colleagues and constituents will
form conclusions about their legislative priorities from the types of legislation that
they decide to cosponsor.
Interviewees from senior offices has a lot more autonomy in reviewing and signing
their boss onto legislation. Some of these interviewees suggested that their bosses
rarely reviewed legislation themselves before agreeing to cosponsor it.
With [number of years left intentional blank] years in his position I know where
he is on ninety-nine percent of the issues. So it’s easy for us as staff to say,
“Yes, we’ll cosponsor it.” If we don’t know what his position is then we’ll do a
memo and put it in front of him and let him decide. That rarely ever happens.
But for a lot of stuff we know what his position is, so it’s not hard for us to sign
him on to things. In other offices, the staff has to go to the members themselves.
They don’t let anybody say “yes” for them except them and they’re the hardest
people to work with because of that.
Notice that Ellen and other interviewees from more senior offices have a lot more
leeway in signing their MC on to a bill. Also, senior interviewees, like Ellen, often
characterize freshman or junior offices as “difficult to work with” because everything
has to go through the member, which makes it difficult for these members to reply
promptly to requests for cosponsorship.
Regardless of their approach to deciding to cosponsor a bill, all of my interviewees
that mentioned cosponsorship viewed it as an important legislative tool for CBC and
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CHC members. For example, LeRoy, a senior staffer in a CBC office explains the
importance of cosponsorship below.
Cosponsors are very important, you know, not just for the CBC members, but
they’re important to the legislative process of the House. Have you learned about
signaling theory? Well, cosponsors are probably the best signals you could ever
get. There is so much information that comes across my desk here at the Hill.
There are not enough hours in the day, there are not enough days in the year
to read all of the legislation that people are asking you to cosponsor and sign
on to. And you have to make a decision. I could try and read a hundred-twelve
page bill or I can make another kind of decision.
Members, over time, develop brands and give off signals just by the
legislation they sponsor. And once you learn how to read the sig-
nals, you can cut through all of the white noise and the signal comes
through loud and clear. So, for example, if I read the cosponsors then
I can make a decision whether to cosponsor the bill or not without
ever having to read the bill. I guarantee that if I ever got time to
actually reading the bill, it wouldn’t change the decision at all. The
initial instinct would be correct because of the cosponsors. That’s
why you don’t really make decisions based on one or two cosponsors.
There are a few things to notice about LeRoy’s comments. Being a cosponsor sends
an important signal to other MCs about your position on an issue. Also, he reveals
that he uses a few heuristics in making his decision to cosponsor a bill that allows
him to never actually have to read most of the bills he signs his boss on to. First,
the current number of cosponsors matters. Are there a few members signed on to the
bill or are there a lot of members signed on? If the bill only has a few cosponsors,
then he is going to hold off and do research on the bill himself. Second, the names of
the current cosponsors and the congressional districts that these members hail from
are important. Do they come from similar districts that have similar demographics
and legislative priorities as mine? Later he discussed how most of the CBC members
have similar priorities and also hail from similar districts, which makes him cosponsor
most of the bills that CBC members introduce.
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Previous research has examine constraints that shape cosponsorship (Krehbiel,
1995), but few studies have studied the relationship between minority congressional
caucuses and bill cosponsorship. However, narratives from my qualitative interviews
reveals that members use cosponsorship as a tool to signal their legislative priorities
to their colleagues in the House.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I illustrate that there is plausibility to my argument that the
caucus staff assist minority congressional caucuses in their legislative efforts. As I
mentioned in the outset of this chapter, four themes emerged during the qualitative
interviews I had with legislative staffers in CBC and CHC offices and caucus staffers.
First, staffers in CBC offices revealed that the top legislative priorities for CBC mem-
bers include: education, unemployment, healthcare, civil rights, transportation, crim-
inal justice reform and economic equality, social programs, and African trade. Staffers
in CHC offices rank healthcare and immigration as their top priorities. Second, in-
congruence with previous literature the advantages of being apart of the CBC and
CHC include bloc voting via cohesiveness and psychological benefits (Singh, 1998).
However, results from this chapter suggest that the CBC is mostly cohesive on issues,
but disagreements can arise and they usually stem from differences in where dis-
tricts are geographically located–listing specific differences in caucus members that
hail from southern districts that have a sizable non-Black population. Similar results
were found within the CHC, but Puerto Rico statehood and lifting the embargo in
Cuba are two specific issues that divide the caucus.
Representatives from the CBC and CHC suggested that when issue arises within
the caucus that divide members, the caucuses generally do not take a position on it.
The results from the cohesion section illustrates that my approach is plausibility in
that the caucus is a consequence of the preferences of caucus members rather than
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the amalgamation of roll call votes. The illustrations is derived from the unique in-
stitutional arrangements of minority congressional caucuses that its members benefit
from and their unique relationship with their caucus staff.
Third, the caucus staff of the CBC and CHC act as facilitators of information
for their caucus members. In congruence with previous literature, I found instances
of minority caucuses providing members with independent information outside of
the information provided through traditional channels (Hammond, 1991; Richardson,
1993). However, I present specific instances where the assistance from the caucus
staff made a difference in how a CBC or CHC member reacted in a situation. Lastly,
an unexpected theme that emerged from these data was cosponsorship. In particular,
members, regardless of their seniority, valued took cosponsorship seriously and some
members even sought out the caucus staff for assistance in garnering support for
their legislative pursuits. However, seniority had an affect on how member evaluated
legislation for cosponsorship. That is, legislative staffers in senior offices had more
leeway in signing their boss on to a bill, while freshman or junior interviewees had
boss’s that wanted to review all the legislation before signing on to a bill.
The chapter suggests that caucus members see their minority caucus as something
that is vital to their ability in advancing legislation, but also other related legislative
activities. This is not to say that previous research on CBC and CHC were wrong,
but they are incomplete. While interviewees, on several occasions, expressed senti-
ments that are consist with previous work on minority caucuses, these data suggest
that these studies only reveal part of the story. Instead, these data reveal that there
is space for my argument that minority congressional caucuses, as institutions, mat-
ter. Moreover, the results from this chapter help to demonstrate the merit of the
assumptions and hypotheses made in the previous chapter, and to a certain extent,
demonstrate how these assumptions operate in Congress.
In the next two chapters, I move onto more systematic tests of the collective
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influence of minority congressional caucuses. This chapter provides plausibility for the
two subsequent quantitative chapters. In particular, I use the illustrations of caucus
staff influence to construct the statistical model for Chapter Four, which studies the
extent to which the CBC and CHC produce more legislation when they serve as
their caucus’s chair because of the legislative subsidies provided by the staff. I also
observed illustrations of the CBC and CHC purposely withholding support on White
member’s bill during my qualitative interviews, which I call this caucus influence.
I couple illustrations of caucus influence with the importance of cosponsorship to
these members and construct the statistical model for Chapter Five, which studies
the degree to which CBC and CHC leaders’ ability to advance a White member’s
minority interest bill by offering support via cosponsorship.
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CHAPTER IV
Legislative Production and Minority Congressional
Caucuses
4.1 Introduction
As I mentioned in Chapter One, this study, as with any study on minority politi-
cal representation, at some level, studies descriptive representation.1 Previous studies
concerning descriptive representation has focused on whether Black and, to a lesser
extent, Latino legislators provide better substantive representation to racial and eth-
nic minorities when compared to their White counterparts (Bratton 2006; Cameron,
Epstein, and O’Halloran 1996; Canon 1999; Casellas 2007; Hero and Tolbert 1995;
Huerta and Santos 2006; Gamble 2007; Minta 2011; Swain, 1993; Tate 2003; Wilson,
2010). Research examining the substantive influence of congressional staff, however,
is sparse. Two studies examine the relationship between Black congressional district
staffers and Black constituents (Grose 2011; Grose, Mangum, and Martin 2007).2
Each study imparts qualitative evidence that staffers observed stronger connections
between African American district staffers and African American constituencies when
1As I mentioned in Chapter One, representation scholars define descriptive representation as the
extent to which the legislature mirrors the demographic characteristics of the population that it
represents.
2To the author’s knowledge, no study to date has examined the influence of Latino congressional
staffers.
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compared with their White colleagues. This relationship appears to be the conse-
quence of an overlap in the social, political, and professional communities among
Black staffers and constituents (Grose, Mangum, and Martin 2007, p. 457).
Previous studies on staff influence does not include the Congressional Black Cau-
cus (CBC) and Congressional Hispanic Caucus (CHC) staffs in their examination
of congressional staffers. This oversight is surprising given the qualitative evidence I
present in Chapter Three that suggests that the caucus staff of the CBC and CHC act
as facilitators of information for their caucus members. In congruence with previous
literature, I also found evidence that minority caucuses provide members with inde-
pendent information outside of the information provided through traditional chan-
nels (Hammond, 1991; Richardson, 1993). As I mentioned in Chapter Two, I posit
that the reason minority caucuses are influential is, in part, because of the resources
provided by the staff, which, presumably, the leadership has more access to than
non-leaders–since the staff is located in the chair’s office. This phenomenon, which I
refer to as caucus leadership advantage, creates necessary variation among Black and
Latino MCs in the same caucus; more importantly, it allows me to examine minority
caucuses’ institutional significance, whereas previous research typically uses an act
committed by an individual member of the CBC or CHC to make inferences about
the group. My approach, however, is different in that I incorporate institutional by-
products of the CBC and CHC–their staff and caucus leadership–to examine their
agenda-setting behavior.
Framing the discussion of descriptive and substantive representation of racial and
ethnic minorities by emphasizing the institutional foundation of congressional caucus
activity is essential in developing a more informed theoretical assessment of how, and
why, race and ethic-based interests matter in Congress. I argue that previous research
has not adequately investigated the agenda-setting behavior of Black and Latino MCs
because they do not consider these MCs as members of the CBC and CHC nor their
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ability to exert caucus influence .
Before studying caucus leaders’ ability to exert caucus influence in the next chap-
ter, I must first establish that minority caucuses, as institutions, matter in Congress.
In this chapter, I present evidence that when CBC and CHC members serve as their
caucus chair, their legislative output increases. After establishing this, in the next
chapter, I present evidence that the caucus leadership exerts caucus influence in the
legislative process.
This chapter is organized in five sections. First, I restate the hypotheses that I will
test in this chapter. Second, I discuss the data and methods of the statistical model,
which measures the effect of the caucus leadership in bill sponsorship. Third, I present
the statistical results and I detail the relative importance of the hypothesized factors.
Fourth, I explore the implications of the results and explain how these results provide
evidence of the importance of minority congressional caucuses and their inclusion in
future studies of agenda-setting.
4.2 Hypotheses
As discussed in Chapter Two, I expect an increase in legislative productivity when
a member of the CBC or CHC serves as the chair of their caucus. This productivity
is unique to the CBC and CHC chairs–and not their colleagues on the executive
committee (e.g. First Vice-Chair, Whip)–because of their unique access to caucus
staff, as well as their personal staff, which gives them the means to introduce more
legislation. As I mentioned in Chapter Two, simply studying the number of bills
introduced by Black and Latino MCs would not be sufficient since these variables are
not connected to an institutional aspect of the CBC and CHC. However, the chairs of
the CBC and CHC and their caucus staffers are essential institutional tools derived
from minority congressional caucuses.
I test the following hypotheses concerning CBC and CHC chairs and their legisla-
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tive production in this chapter:
Hypothesis 1. CBC and CHC chairship should be positively associated with
their level of general bill introduction.
Hypothesis 2. CBC and CHC chairship should be positively associated with
their level of “substantive and significant” bill introduction.
Hypothesis 3. CBC and CHC chairship should be positively associated with
their level of substantive bill introduction.
Hypothesis 4. CBC and CHC chairship should be positively associated with
their level of commemorative bill introduction.
I test my expectation of caucus influence across these four categories to see if cau-
cus chair’s legislative output holds generally or if it depends on the type of legislation
that is introduced. I will discuss the coding of the bill categories below.
4.3 Data and Methods
The principal purpose of this project is to assess whether the collective orga-
nization of minority congressional caucuses helps to facilitate the performance of its
individual members. As I mentioned in the outset of this chapter, I want to study the
caucus leadership’s agenda-setting behavior. 3 I posit that the leadership in minority
caucuses is an appropriate proxy for examining the influence of minority congressional
caucuses because becoming apart of the leadership of the CBC or CHC enhances a
member’s ability to propose legislation because of their access to the caucus staff.
I amend Volden et. al (2013)’s bill sponsorship data that spans the 93rd (1973-
1975) through the 112th (2011- 2013) Congresses to examine the effect of minority
3I consider a Black or Latino MC to be a leader if they are apart of the Executive Committee,
which comprises of four positions: Chairman, First Vice Chair, Second Vice Chair, Secretary, and
Whip (Singh, 1998). Please note that positions within each caucus has changed slightly over time.
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congressional caucus on legislative productivity. I added several covariates relevant to
my study, but most importantly, I added independent variables for caucus leadership,
which I collected myself (see Appendices J and K for more details). The total number
of observations in this dataset is 8,522.
The dependent variable in this model is bill sponsorship, which is an overdispersed
count variable. Hence, I estimate a negative binomial model of bill sponsorship. When
compared to other regression models, the negative binomial is said to appropriately
grapple with overdispersion in count data, which makes it ideal for this analysis
(Coxe, West and Aiken, 2009). Also, since these data spans over thirty years, this
study includes fixed effects using dummy variables for each Congress.
4.3.1 Dependent Variables for Caucus Leadership Models
The dependent variables for the first set of analyses are four different categories
of legislation: all bills (ABills), commemorative (CBills), substantive (SBills), and
substantive and significant (SSBills). The categorization of these bills was constructed
by Volden and Wiseman (2010) and Volden et. al (2013). An introduced bill is deemed
“commemorative” if the substance of the legislation satisfies one of several criteria
deeming it as commemorative or symbolic in purpose, such as the naming or renaming
of public buildings, the minting of commemorative coins and medals, and related
matters. An introduced bill is denoted as “substantive and significant” if it had been
the subject of an end-of-the-year report in the Congressional Quarterly Almanac.
Finally, an introduced bill is deemed “substantive” if it is neither commemorative
nor substantive and significant, according to Volden and Wiseman’s coding protocol;
or, if it would have been coded as commemorative, but it was mentioned in an end-
of-the-year report in the Congressional Quarterly Almanac that corresponds to the
relevant Congress.
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4.3.2 Independent Variables for Caucus Leadership Model
Several variables are needed to test the hypotheses specified earlier. As I men-
tioned earlier, I expect CBC and CHC chairship to be positively associated with
several categories of bill introduction. Hence, I include dummy variables for the CBC
Chair and CHC Chair. Each variable is coded “1” for each MC who served as the
chair of the CBC or CHC and a “0” otherwise. However, to ensure that these re-
sults are unique to minority caucus chairs, I also include dummy variables for general
membership in the CBC and CHC as well as caucus leadership variables for the other
members in the executive committee.
In addition to the key independent variables I referenced above, I include several
control variables that previous literature suggests significantly influence the number
of bills that an MC introduces.
Seniority. Seniority may be a guide to legislators’ decisions. The growing experi-
ence related to seniority (i.e. learning how to establish oneself as a credible force in
the chamber) is basic to establishing a legislative agenda and building a creditable
reputation (Schiller, 1995). First or second term representatives may face the chal-
lenge of deciding where bill sponsorship fits into their goals. Thus, junior members are
more likely to sponsor fewer bills than their more senior colleagues. Seniority is mea-
sured as the number of consecutive terms that a representative served in Congress.
Since seniority contributes to a MC’s knowledge, expertise and familiarity with the
legislative process, I expect senior MCs to introduce more legislation (Hibbing, 1991).
Previous vote margin. This variable is included as it is a relevant explanatory vari-
able. Previous electoral margin is an interval variable that measures the percentage of
the vote that the legislator obtained in the previous election. Electorally vulnerable
MCs may be more or less likely to introduce legislation.
Democratic Congress. When compared to Republicans, Democrats have incli-
nation for expanding government whereas Republicans’ preference for constricting
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the role of government. Therefore, Democratic Congresses may permit higher levels
of bill introduction when compared to Republican Congresses. Congresses with a
Democratic majority is coded “1” and “0” otherwise.
Female. Gender and bill sponsorship has been widely discussed in the literature.
Some scholars find that women are disadvantaged in introducing legislation while
others find that women sponsor at least as many bills as men regardless of which
party controls Congress (Rocca and Sanchez, 2007, p. 146). Also, some scholars have
found evidence that, under certain conditions, female MCs may produce higher levels
of bill introduction when compared to their male colleagues (e.g. Swers, 2002). To
investigate how gender might impact my study, I include a gender variable where
female MCs are coded “1” and male MCs are coded “0.”
Chair and Sub-chair of Committee. Chairs of committees may produce higher
levels of bill introduction when compared to their colleagues because they introduce
legislation relevant to their committee and district. MCs are coded “1” if they are a
chair of a congressional committee and “0” otherwise. For similar reasons, I included
a control for committee sub-chairs.
Ideological Extremity. Previous research purports that ideological extreme MCs
sponsor more legislation than the median member of the House of Representatives on
average (Rocca and Sanchez, 2009). Scholars suggest that ideologically extreme MCs
engage in bill sponsorship, and other non-roll call activities, as a form of position-
taking since their bills may have a lower probability of passing. Ideological extremity
is measured as the absolute value of MC’s DW-Nominate score minus the House
Median’s DW-Nominate score.
4.4 Results
Tables 4.4 through 4.8 depict the results from the negative binomial regression
models I ran to examine the influence of caucus leadership in legislative production.
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The first table presents the results of the general negative binomial where the depen-
dent variable is a count variable of the total number of introduced bills (“All Bills”).
First, I should note that the CBC Chair variable has an independent effect, which is
significant (p < .05) and positive, suggesting support for hypothesis one. However,
this hypothesis is only partially supported because there is no such result for the CHC
Chair. The beta coefficient on the CBC Chair variable is 0.233, which tells us how
much a one unit increase in each bill causes the log of µ to increase. Since beta coef-
ficients are not the most useful or intuitive way to report my results, I exponentiate
the coefficients and report the incident rate ratios (IRRs). The idea being that the
coefficient tells you how changes in CBC chair (or any other independent variable)
affect the rate at which bill introduction (or any other dependent variable) occurs.
Hence for the CBC variable, the IRR is 1.26, which states that if a MC is the Chair of
the CBC, they introduce twenty-six percent more bills than non-CBC chairs, which,
according to the marginal effects chart, equates to about three and a half additional
bills. This result has vital implications considering the the average number of bills
introduce by a MC is only seventeen.
It is also important to point out that I observe significant and negative results
for a general CBC member. That is, the CBC member beta coefficient is −0.391,
which means they introduced six less bills when compared to non-CBC members;
this result is statistically significant at the p < .001 level. Similarly, I found negative
and significant results for a general CHC member. That is, the CHC member beta
coefficient is −0.181, which means they introduced approximately three less bills when
compared to non-CHC members; this result is statistically significant at the p < .05
level. This result is consistent with previous studies that suggests that given the lack
of influence of minorities in Congress, Black and Latino MCs sponsor and cosponsor
fewer bills on average than their White colleagues (Rocca and Sanchez, 2007).
After establishing that a CBC member is more productive in introducing legisla-
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tion when she is the chair, it is important to see what types of bills might be driving
this effect. To this end, I run similar models for commemorative, substantive, and
substantive and significant bills (see above for information on coding schema). In re-
gards to substantive bills, I find that the CBC Chair has an independent effect, which
is significant (p < .05) and positive, suggesting support for hypothesis two. However,
as with hypothesis one, this hypothesis is only partially supported, as there is no
such result for the CHC Chair. The coefficient on the CBC chair variable is 0.265;
the IRR is 1.30, which implies that if a MC is a chair of the CBC, they introduce
thirty percent more substantive bills than non-CBC chairs, which, equates to about
four additional bills. This result has vital implications considering the the average
number of substantive and significant bills introduce by a MC is only fifteen.
Next, I did not find support for hypothesis three–substantive and significant bills
should be positively associated with CBC and CHC chairship. Instead, institutional
leadership variables, such as chairship or sub-chairship of a committee in the House,
was positively associated with a member’s level of substantive and significant bill
introduction.
Also, I did not find support for hypothesis four–commemorative bills should be
positively associated with CBC and CHC chairship. Instead, general membership in
the CBC and CHC was positively associated with commemorative bill introduction
and the result is statistically significant. This result is consistent with work by Tate
(2003) and others who suggest that without Black MCs participating in the legisla-
tive process, the symbolic interest of Black constituents, such as the Martin Luther
King Jr. holiday, would not be represented in the polity. 4 Similarly, Latino legisla-
tors have engaged in symbolic bill introduction on the behalf of Latino constituents
(e.g. Wilson, 2010). As Tate (2003), Sanchez and Morin (2011), and others sug-
gest, the absence of racial and ethnic minority legislators in Congress would further
4Work from Brenson (2009) details the arduous process that CBC members, especially Congress-
man John Conyers (D-MI), took in establishing the national holiday.
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marginalize the symbolic importance of African Americans and Latinos as well as
their contributions to American society.
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Democratic Congress 0.65 0.477 0 1
Democrat 0.560 0.496 0 1
CHC Member 0.035 0.185 0 1
CHC Leader 0.007 0.082 0 1
CHC Chair 0.004 0.06 0 1
CBC Member 0.069 0.254 0 1
CBC Leader 0.011 0.104 0 1
CBC Chair 0.002 0.048 0 1
Female 0.096 0.295 0 1
Previous Vote Margin 68.258 13.815 23 100
Ideological Extremity -0.005 0.424 -0.916 1.633
Chair [Committee] 0.05 0.218 0 1
Sub-chair [Committee] 0.246 0.431 0 1
Seniority 5.27 4.043 1 29
South 0.301 0.459 0 1
Substantive Significant Bills 0.752 1.883 0 24
Significant Bills 15.34 17.045 0 255
Commemorative Bills 0.999 2.118 0 58
All Bills 17.091 18.305 0 258
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Table 4.2: Determinants of Legislative Production (93rd − 112th Congresses)
All Bills
Variable b/se
CBC Member -0.391***
(0.072)
CBC Chair 0.233*
(0.136)
CBC Leader -0.184**
(0.085)
CHC Member -0.181*
(0.095)
CHC Chair 0.047
(0.154)
CHC Leader -0.078
(0.119)
Democratic Congress -0.091**
(0.036)
Democrat -0.441***
(0.055)
Seniority 0.013***
(0.003)
Female 0.125**
(0.051)
Chair of Committee 0.405***
(0.031)
Sub-chair of Committee 0.308***
(0.016)
Previous Vote Margin 0.004***
(0.001)
Ideological Extremity -0.630***
(0.068)
Constant 2.527***
(0.064)
N 8522
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The dependent variable is a count variable of all bills introduced.
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Table 4.3:
Determinants of Legislative Production [By Category] (93rd − 112th Con-
gresses)
SS Bills SBills CBills
Variable b/se b/se b/se
CBC Member -0.779*** -0.406*** 0.172*
(0.161) (0.076) (0.079)
CBC Chair 0.386 0.265* -0.217
(0.530) (0.144) (0.398)
CBC Leader -0.221 -0.230** 0.596**
(0.374) (0.091) (0.206)
CHC Member -0.222 -0.196* 0.285**
(0.202) (0.101) (0.100)
CHC Chair 0.407 0.063 -0.593
(0.668) (0.162) (0.378)
CHC Leader -0.737 -0.071 0.285
(0.607) (0.125) (0.100)
Democratic Congress -0.475*** -0.102*** 0.327***
(0.180) (0.037) (0.109)
Democrat -0.228* -0.458*** -0.330***
(0.125) (0.058) (0.069)
Seniority 0.085*** 0.010*** 0.009*
(0.007) (0.003) (0.005)
Female 0.039 0.131** -0.026
(0.114) (0.054) (0.059)
Chair of Committee 1.761*** 0.273*** -0.092
(0.070) (0.033) (0.078)
Sub-chair of Committee 1.493*** 0.257*** 0.128**
(0.046) (0.017) (0.041)
Previous Vote Margin 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Ideological Extremity -0.282* -0.634*** -0.713***
(0.160) (0.072) (0.088)
Constant -3.191*** 2.510*** -.637***
(0.188) (0.067) (0.145)
N 8522 8522 8522
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
SS Bills = substantive and significant bills
S Bills = significant bills
C Bills = commemorative bills
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As I mentioned in Chapter Two, previous research suggest that the ability for
racial and ethnic minorities to introduce bills is constricted under Republican con-
trolled Congresses (e.g. Rocca and Sanchez, 2009). To investigate how this might
influence the CBC and CHC chairs’ ability to introduce legislation, I conduct simi-
lar statistical models below for each category of legislation to examine how majority
party status might effect different types of introduced legislation. I also included
several independent variables that significantly affects a MC’s ability to introduce
legislation.
The first column of Table 4.4 shows that when Democrats are in control, the CBC
Chair has an independent effect on the general category of bill introduction, which is
significant (p < .05) and positive, which is consistent with hypothesis one. However,
this hypothesis is only partially supported because there is no such result for the
CHC Chair. The beta coefficient on the CBC Chair variable is 0.323 with an IRR
of 1.38, which suggests that if a MC is a chair of the CBC during Democratically
controlled Congresses, they introduce thirty-eight percent more bills than non-CBC
chairs, which equates to about four and a half additional bills. Also, consistent with
the results in the previous table, I observe significant and negative results for a general
CBC member. That is, the CBC member variable is −0.431 or introduce six less bills
during Democratically controlled Congresses when compared to non-CBC members;
this result is statistically significant at the p < .001 level. I found no significant results
for the CHC variables.
Next, the second column of Table 4.4 demonstrates that when Republicans are in
the majority, a CBC member variable has a beta coefficient of −0.229, which implies
they introduce approximately three less bills when compared to non-CBC members;
this result is statistically significant at the p < .05 level. Similarly, I found negative
and significant results for general CHC membership. That is, the CHC member
variable has a coefficient of −0.263 or introduces approximately three less bills when
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compared to non-CHC members; this result is statistically significant at the p < .05
level.
In Table 4.5, which examines substantive and significant bill introduction and
party control, I find no statistical significant results for the CBC and CHC chairs. In-
stead, I find that CBC members are less likely to introduce substantive and significant
legislation regardless of which party is in control.
Next, in Table 4.6, which examines significant bill introduction and party control,
I find a statistical significant and positive result for the CBC Chair when Democrats
are in the majority. In particular, the CBC Chair has a beta coefficient of 0.324
with an IRR of 1.39, which suggests that CBC chairs introduces approximately five
additional bills when Democrats are in the majority than non-CBC chairs. I find no
statistically significant result for CHC chairship.
Lastly, in Table 4.7, which studies the interaction between commemorative bill
introduction and majority party status, I find that under Republican controlled Con-
gresses, the CBC member variable is a CBC member variable is statistically significant
at the p < .001 level and has a beta coefficient of 0.550, which implies they introduce
ten more bills when compared to non-CBC members. I do not find a statistically
significant result for CBC and CHC Chairs.
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Table 4.4:
Determinants of Legislative Production by Majority Party Status (93rd −
112th Congresses)
Democratic Congresses Republican Congresses
All Bills Introduced All Bills Introduced
CBC Member -0.431∗∗∗ -0.229∗∗
(0.0813) (0.0883)
CBC Chair 0.323 ∗ 0.0428
(0.170) (0.227)
CBC Leader -0.286∗ -0.0233
(0.115) (0.126)
CHC -0.154 -0.263∗
(0.109) (0.116)
CHC Chair -0.0213 0.210
(0.236) (0.246)
CHC Leader -0.0112 -0.150
(0.214) (0.149)
Democrat 0.375∗∗∗ -0.500∗∗∗
(0.0609) (0.109)
Seniority 0.0209∗∗∗ 0.0158∗∗
(0.00333) (0.00485)
Female 0.175∗∗ 0.0971
(0.0594) (0.0644)
Chair of Committee 0.239∗∗∗ 0.443∗∗∗
(0.0429) (0.0584)
Sub-chair of Committee 0.263∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗
(0.0240) (0.0350)
Previous Vote Margin 0.00356∗∗∗ 0.00179
(0.000681) (0.000986)
Ideological Extremity -0.699∗∗∗ -0.521∗∗∗
(0.0789) (0.116)
Constant 2.379∗∗∗ 2.635∗∗∗
(0.0722) (0.108)
N 5529 2993
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.5:
Determinants of Legislative Production by Majority Party Status [Sub-
stantive and Significant Bills] (93rd − 112th Congresses)
Democratic Congresses Republican Congresses
Substantive Significant Bills Substantive Significant Bills
CBC -0.740∗∗∗ -0.695∗
(0.173) (0.344)
CBC Chair 0.488 -0.0867
(0.516) (12935.2)
CBC Leader -0.496 -17.06
(0.373) (5964.2)
CHC 0.0305 -0.964
(0.220) (0.534)
CHC Chair -0.104 18.44
(0.677) (6975.7)
CHC Leader -0.487 -16.57
(0.624) (6975.7)
Democrat 0.128 -2.049∗∗∗
(0.141) (0.271)
Seniority 0.120∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗
(0.00777) (0.0120)
Female 0.0354 0.195
(0.141) (0.157)
Chair of Committee 0.963∗∗∗ 1.550∗∗∗
(0.0795) (0.130)
Sub-chair of Committee 0.969∗∗∗ 0.734∗∗∗
(0.0574) (0.0947)
Previous Vote Margin 0.00381∗ -0.0000179
(0.00173) (0.00303)
Ideological Extremity -1.313∗∗∗ -0.230
(0.193) (0.276)
Constant -4.172∗∗∗ -2.388∗∗∗
(0.214) (0.304)
N 5529 2993
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.6:
Determinants of Legislative Production by Majority Party Status [Signif-
icant Bills] (93rd − 112th Congresses)
Democratic Congresses Republican Congresses
Significant Bills Significant Bills
CBC -0.427∗∗∗ -0.263∗∗
(0.0864) (0.0932)
CBC Chair 0.324∗ 0.0774
(0.181) (0.244)
CBC Leader -0.286∗ -0.102
(0.124) (0.136)
CHC -0.173 -0.276∗
(0.115) (0.122)
CHC Chair -0.0711 0.278
(0.250) (0.259)
CHC Leader 0.0539 -0.210
(0.226) (0.158)
Democrat 0.395∗∗∗ -0.444∗∗∗
(0.0647) (0.115)
Seniority 0.0164∗∗∗ 0.0135∗∗
(0.00354) (0.00511)
Female 0.185∗∗ 0.105
(0.0630) (0.0680)
Chair of Committee 0.121∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗
(0.0462) (0.0616)
Sub-chair of Committee 0.227∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗
(0.0257) (0.0368)
Previous Vote Margin 0.00401∗∗∗ 0.00168
(0.000727) (0.00104)
Ideological Extremity -0.685∗∗∗ -0.491∗∗∗
(0.0838) (0.122)
Constant 2.345∗∗∗ 2.591∗∗∗
(0.0767) (0.114)
N 5529 2993
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.7:
Determinants of Legislative Production by Majority Party Status [Com-
memorative Bills] (93rd − 112th Congresses)
Democratic Congresses Republican Congresses
Commemorative Bills Commemorative Bills
CBC -0.184 0.550∗∗∗
(0.145) (0.163)
CBC Chair 0.0925 -0.281
(0.338) (0.490)
CBC Leader -0.167 0.398
(0.221) (0.244)
CHC 0.311 0.409
(0.189) (0.220)
CHC Chair 0.397 -0.633
(0.563) (0.693)
CHC Leader -0.399 0.354
(0.523) (0.338)
Democrat 0.335∗∗ -0.358
(0.107) (0.239)
Seniority 0.0113 -0.000194
(0.00651) (0.0112)
Female 0.0917 -0.0838
(0.108) (0.128)
Chair of Committee 0.151 -0.264
(0.0873) (0.204)
Sub-chair of Committee 0.0861 -0.0118
(0.0483) (0.104)
Previous Vote Margin 0.00174 -0.00228
(0.00139) (0.00279)
Ideological Extremity -0.711∗∗∗ -0.494
(0.145) (0.254)
Constant -0.905∗∗∗ -0.912∗∗∗
(0.144) (0.262)
N 5529 2993
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
91
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I present evidence that minority congressional caucuses play a role
in the agenda-setting behavior of its leadership via their staff capacity. In particular,
I present evidence that when a CBC member serves as the Chair of their caucus,
she introduces more legislation–which is specifically tied to substantive legislation.
This contradicts previous literature on minority caucuses, which constitutes minority
congressional caucus as peripheral institutions in Congress (e.g. Singh, 1998). Also,
this result contradicts literature concerning the link between descriptive and substan-
tive representation for Black and Latino MCs and provides evidence that not only do
minority caucuses matter in agenda-setting, but they matter in a substantive way,
which is consistent with findings from Grose (2011) and Minta (2011).
One important caveat to the points mentioned in the above paragraph is that I
did not find any statistically significant results for CHC Chairs. I will speculate about
why this might be in Chapter Six.
Across all of my models, I find no statistically significant and positive results
for variables relating to the general membership of the CBC and CHC except for
commemorative bills. Some may interpret findings that CBC and CHC members in-
fluence symbolic legislative efforts most significantly as evidence that their effect on
policy responsiveness is relatively unimportant. But previous research refutes such
interpretations. For instance, Tate (2003) argues that symbolic legislation can pro-
vide political cover, initiate and augment larger legislative agendas, persuade MCs to
embrace core principles on policy, and address group concerns that might otherwise
be ignored. Aside from resolutions that provide political cover, Tate describes sym-
bolic legislation as a “way to distribute nonmaterial public goods to constituents”
(p. 100). A group’s pride and social inclusion associated with symbolic tributes is
not unimportant from the perspective of groups whose presence and interests have
been historically ignored, neglected, and excluded in policy processes. Commemo-
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rative legislation sends the empowering message that Blacks and Latinos matter to
the fabric of American society, and also brings broader social recognition to African
American and Latino concerns, accomplishments, and goals.
While the results in this chapter demonstrate that minority congressional cau-
cuses, as institutions matter, in the next chapter, I examine what role, if any, do
minority caucuses play in agenda-setting. How might minority caucuses use its influ-
ence to affect the behavior of non-caucus members?
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CHAPTER V
Incorporating Minority Congressional Caucuses in
Studying Agenda-setting
5.1 Introduction
The vast majority of research on congressional institutions has focused on when,
and how, political parties are influential via agenda-setting (e.g. Cox and McCubbins;
Krehbiel, 1993). These studies are primarily concerned with one question: under
what conditions will members of the majority party in Congress delegate authority
to party leaders and exercise strong party discipline? Cox and McCubbins (2005)
argue that the majority party routinely uses it near-monopoly of the formal agenda
in order to keep bills off the floor that would, if passed, displease majorities of its
membership. However, another study suggests that despite the preponderance of
research on political parties influence over the legislative agenda, strong party effects
are rarely observed (Krehbiel, 1993).
Since the literature on agenda-setting has been preoccupied with political parties,
few studies examine the potential of agenda control within other congressional institu-
tions. This dissertation seeks to fill this void by studying the agenda-setting behavior
of minority congressional caucuses. The essential question of this chapter is: under
what conditions will a numerical minority, such as the Congressional Black Caucus
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(CBC) and Congressional Hispanic Caucus (CHC), matter in agenda-setting? As I
mentioned in Chapter Two, while my theory of minority caucuses does not contradict
the previous work on the agenda-setting power of political parties, it does challenge
these studies to consider how other congressional institutions, like caucuses, help to
set the agenda in Congress.
Previous research has either ignored the CBC’s and CHC’s role in agenda-setting
all together or suggested that these caucuses are ineffective because they do not pass
legislation that alleviates racial and ethnic disparities (e.g. Singh, 1998). As I have
argued previously, this is not the only way to measure the effectiveness of the CBC
and CHC. Instead, I posit that the CBC and CHC are effective at exercising caucus
influence. As I explained in Chapter Two, caucus influence occurs when CBC and
CHC leaders support minority legislation introduced by a White member of Congress
(MC) via cosponsorship, which aids in the advancing through the legislative process.
Moreover, I weigh the caucus’s ability to assert caucus influence against claims that
the CBC is largely ineffective (Levy and Stoudinger, 1976; Singh, 1998; Smith, 1996;
Swain, 1993) and conclude that minority caucuses can be effective in representing the
interest of racial and ethnic minorities.
This chapter is organized in four sections. First, I restate the hypotheses that I
will test in this chapter. Second, I discuss the data and methods of the statistical
model, which measures the effect of the caucus leadership on caucus influence. Third,
I present the statistical results and I detail the relative importance of the hypothe-
sized factors. Fourth, I explore the implications of the results and explain how these
results provide evidence of the importance of minority congressional caucuses and
their inclusion in future studies of agenda-setting.
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5.2 Hypotheses
As I mentioned in Chapter Two, caucus influence occurs when minority congres-
sional caucuses disrupt the progress of minority interest legislation introduced by a
White MC. Their ability to censor minority interest legislation could occur at any
level of the legislative process. However, the further a minority interest bill introduce
by a White MC that is not cosponsored by the caucus leadership gets through the
legislative process, the more it would falsify my claim. I also explore the extent to
which their ability to exert caucus influence is restricted depending on which party
is in the majority.
In this chapter, I test the following hypotheses concerning CBC and CHC leaders
and agenda-setting:
Hypothesis 5. When a White MC introduces a minority interest bill, the
greater number of CBC and CHC leader cosponsors, the more
likely that bill will pass the House of Representatives.
Hypothesis 6. When a CBC member introduces a minority interest bill, the
number of CBC and CHC leader cosponsors will have no
influence over the likelihood that bill will pass the House of
Representatives.
Hypothesis 7. When a CHC member introduces a minority interest bill, the
greater number of CBC leader cosponsors, the more likely that
bill will pass the House of Representatives. However, I expect
for the number of CHC leader cosponsors to have no baring
over the likelihood of a CHC member’s bill passing.
I test my expectations of agenda control across several different statistical mod-
els to investigate whether caucus influence is an unique agenda-setting power that
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minority congressional caucuses have over minority interest legislation.
5.3 Data and Methods
The principal purpose of this study is to investigate minority caucus leadership’s
ability to assist in advancing minority interest legislative proposals generated by their
White colleagues through their cosponsorship behavior. To investigate my expecta-
tions for caucus influence and positive agenda control, I conduct an analysis that
identifies the success of each member’s sponsored legislation within the House of
Representatives. Since these dependent variables are binary, I run a logistic regres-
sion model to study the factors that predict the success of minority interest legislation
introduced by White MCs. To bolster my argument, I also run analyses that predict
the success of non-minority interest legislation introduced by White MCs to demon-
strate that minority caucuses’ ability to exercise caucus influence is unique to minority
interest legislation. I run similar analyses for Black and Latino MCs to demonstrate
that minority caucuses are not able to command agenda control under these cir-
cumstances. Later, I run analyses accounting for majority party status and conduct
Heckman selection regression models to demonstrate that my results are robust.
I use Scott Adler and John Wilkerson’s data from the Congressional Bills Project,
which details all bills introduce during the 106th and 112th Congresses. I amend
these data by adding several covariates that may interfere with my ability to predict
the introduction and passage of minority interest legislation. Most importantly, I
add independent variables for the number of Black cosponsors, Latino cosponsors,
Black caucus leader cosponsors and Latino caucus leader cosponsors, which I collected
myself. The total number of observations in this dataset is 43,841.
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5.3.1 Dependent Variable
The unit of analysis is bills introduced from the 106th to 112th Congresses. As
I mentioned in Chapter Two, bill sponsorship and cosponsorship have been found
to have significant consequences for members’ legislative goals and policy interests.
Previous research suggest that a bill’s author, topic and language can predict the
success of a bill (e.g. Anderson, Box-Steffensmeier, and Sinclair-Chapman, 2003;
Franzitch, 1979; Hibbing, 1991). Others have argued that a bill’s racial content also
matters (Cannon, 1999).
Minority congressional caucus members and staff, I argue, have specific expertise
over issues that are considered of specific importance to racial and ethnic minorities.
To this end, and drawing on data from the Congressional Bills Project, my research
assistants coded every bill introduced in Congress from 1999 to 2013 as dealing with
minority issues or not. Consistent with previous literature, I define minority issues
as those that deal explicitly with race or ethnicity as well as those policies that dis-
proportionately impact African Americans and Latinos–access to a quality education,
equal housing, crime, immigration, poverty, unemployment, and welfare to name a
few (Gamble, 2011; Platt, 2014).
Upon downloading these data, I noticed that Adler and Wilkerson and Platt
(2014) coded bills into nineteen categories: macroeconomics; civil rights; health;
agriculture; labor, employment, and immigration; education; environment; energy;
transportation; law, crime, and family; social welfare; housing/development; bank-
ing/commerce; defense; science/communication; foreign trade; international affairs;
government operations; and public lands.1 My research assistants examine all of the
bills by category and whenever possible, coded each bill by its title as dealing with mi-
nority interest or not. However, if a bill’s title was not sufficiently descriptive, either
1More details regarding the coding of these categories can be found on the website for these data:
www.congressionalbills.org.
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the bill’s summary or the full text of the bill was consulted by my research assistants.
More information about coding and examples of minority interest legislation for each
category, see Appendices B and C.
While previous literature has suggested that this type of coding is problematic
in that it assumes policy that addresses some subset of racial and ethnic minorities
should be important for all racial and ethnic minorities (Platt, 2014). Another poten-
tial issue is that studying policies that mention having a disproportionate effect on
racial and ethnic minorities is not sufficiently precise. While these points are valid,
for the purposes of my study, I do not see these issues as a problem as I am studying
the introduction of minority legislation from the prospective of the legislator. That
is, while the introduction of a bill providing additional financial support for the study
of breast cancer in Black women, for example, may or may not be relevant to African
Americans with no history of breast cancer in their family, the legislator would, I
argue, still consider her behavior as representing minority interests (Platt, 2014).
5.3.2 Independent Variables for Agenda-setting Models
Several variables are needed to test the hypotheses specified earlier. As I indi-
cated above, I expect that CBC and CHC leadership is positively associated with the
introduction of minority legislation by White MCs, thereby exerting caucus influence.
To this end, I include dummy variables for CBC leader cosponsor and CHC leader
cosponsor. Each variable is coded “1” for each MC who identifies as a member of
that group and a “0” otherwise. However, to ensure that these results are unique
to caucus leaders, I also include independent variables for the number of CBC and
CHC cosponsors. As I stated in Chapter Two, the number of CBC or CHC cospon-
sors, or general number of cosponsors, may matter, but what is most relevant for my
study is the number of CBC and CHC leaders that cosponsor a piece of minority
legislation because caucus leadership is an unique institutional aspect of minority
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caucuses. Moreover, I include several control variables that previous literature sug-
gests significantly influence the number of minority interest legislation that an MC
introduces.
Many of the same control variables from the bill sponsorship analysis will also be
used. I will not repeat the significance of these variables, but instead discuss control
variables unique to this analysis.
Majority Party. The ability of minority caucuses to enhance the work of its mem-
bers is dependent upon who is in the majority party. Previous literature suggests
that Democrats are better representatives of the policy interests of racial and ethnic
minorities than Republicans on general ideological issues as well as civil rights issues
(Grose, 2011, 2005; Hutchings, 1998; Lublin, 1997). Thus, Democratic Party con-
trol of the chamber is necessary, but not sufficient to promote greater congressional
attention to minority issues. Instead, “it is the collective commitment by minority
legislators to represent national minority populations and to establish a diversity in-
frastructure to achieve those goals that makes greater attention to minority issues
possible” (Minta and Sinclair- Chapman, 2013, p. 136). Also, as discussed in Chap-
ter Two, majority party status influences a member’s ability to see their bill progress
through the legislative process (Cox and McCubbins, 2005).
South. This variable is included because MCs often pursue bill introduction
through the lens of their regional differences. Since some members hailing from south-
ern congressional districts have historically demonstrated opposition to legislation of
interest to racial and ethnic minorities, while others from the region have been sup-
portive of said issues, regional effects were included in this model. This dummy
variable is coded “1” if the sponsor hails from a southern congressional district, while
other districts are coded “0”.2
2I coded southern congressional districts as those districts located in any of the following eleven
states: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Car-
olina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.
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Percentage of Black Population; Percentage of Latino Population. The racial
and ethnic composition of a district should shape how minority interest legislation
is perceived, so non-Black and non-Latino MCs will sponsor more minority interest
legislation as the percentage of Black and Latino citizens in their district increases
(Platt, 2014; Rocca and Sanchez, 2009). Hence, I control for the percentage of Blacks
and Latinos in each congressional district.
5.4 Results
Tables 5.2 through 5.4 and Figure 5.1 depict the results from the logistic regression
models I ran to examine the factors that determine the passage of minority interest
legislation introduced by White MCs. The first table presents the results of the
logistic regression model where the dependent variable is the probability of minority
interest legislation introduced by White MC. Instead of reporting the beta coefficients,
I reported the odds ratio for the independent variables, which represents how the odds
change with an one unit increase in that variable holding all other variables constant.
I find that if a CBC leader cosponsors minority interest legislation introduced by a
White MC, the odds of it passing the House increases by 1.25 times or twenty-five
percent and this result is statistically significant at the p < 0.01 level. However, I
did not find a statistically significant result for CHC chairs. Being a member of the
majority party and the bill being commemorative affected the odds of a White MC’s
ability to pass minority interest legislation in the House.
In the second column of Table 5.2, I run a similar model for the introduction of
non-minority interest legislation. The purpose of this analysis is to demonstrate that
minority congressional caucuses do not have the ability to exercise caucus influence
because this type of legislation is outside of the scope of their policy expertise. As
expected, I find no statistical significant result for minority caucus leadership. In-
stead, other variables, like the number of cosponsors, being a member of the majority
101
party and whether the bill was commemorative or not, mattered in predicting the
likelihood of non-minority legislation passing. Also, I should note that the number
of Black cosponsors and women were negatively associated with the introduction of
non-minority legislation introduced with White MCs.
Next, I run a logistic regression model to estimate the factors that determine the
passage of minority interest legislation introduced by Black MCs. As expected, I
find no statistically significant result for minority caucus leadership. Instead, other
variables, like the number of cosponsors, being a member of the majority party and the
bill being commemorative, mattered in predicting the likelihood of minority legislation
passing when introduced by a Black MC.
Similarly, I run a statistical model to estimate the factors that determines the
passage of non-minority interest legislation introduced by Black MCs. As I expected,
I find no statistically significant result for minority caucus leadership. Instead, other
variables, like the percent of Blacks in a district, being a member of the majority
party, seniority, MCs from southern congressional districts and the bill being com-
memorative, mattered in predicting the likelihood of non-minority legislation passing
when introduced by a Black MC. Recall that the purpose of running these analyses is
to demonstrate that I do not find evidence of positive agenda control among minority
caucus leaders, which supports my argument that their ability to exert agenda control
is uniquely tied to White MC’s sponsorship of minority interest legislation.
Lastly, I run a statistical model to estimate the factors that determine the passage
of minority interest legislation proposed by a Latino MC. I find no statistical signifi-
cant result for minority caucus leadership in the models for minority and non-minority
legislation introduce by a White MC. Instead, other variables, like the number of
cosponsors, MCs from southern congressional districts and whether the bill was com-
memorative or not, matter for predicting the likelihood of minority legislation passing
when introduced by a Latino MC. Again, this bolsters my argument that the ability
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of minority congressional caucuses to exert agenda control is uniquely tied to White
MC’s sponsorship of minority interest legislation.
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics for Agenda Control Model
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Percent Black 0.146 0.178 0 0.855
Percent Latino 0.144 0.166 0 0.988
Democrat 0.517 0.5 0 1
Majority Party 0.585 0.493 0 1
Female 0.174 0.379 0 1
White 0.867 0.34 0 1
CBC Member 0.095 0.293 0 1
CBC Chair 0.002 0.046 0 1
CBC Leader 0.012 0.108 0 1
CHC Member 0.038 0.192 0 1
CHC Chair 0.001 0.034 0 1
CHC Leader 0.008 0.089 0 1
Seniority 6.196 4.353 0 29
South 0.269 0.443 0 1
Cosponsor 16.655 35.957 0 432
Black Cosponsor 2.146 5.438 0 44
Latino Cosponsor 0.902 2.478 0 24
CBC Leader Cosponsor 0.28 0.832 0 21
CHC Leader Cosponsor 0.187 0.623 0 33
Commemorative Bill 0.05 0.219 0 1
Bill Passed in House 0.102 0.303 0 1
Bill Passed in Senate 0.052 0.221 0 1
Bill Became Law 0.046 0.209 0 1
Minority Interest Legislation 0.066 0.249 0 1
Ideological Extremity 0.014 0.382 -1.381 1.329
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Table 5.2:
Minority Interest Bill Introduction by White MCs [Logistic Results]
(106th − 112th Congress)
Minority Interest Legislation Non-Minority Interest Legislation
Passed House (odds ratio/se) (odds ratio/se)
Number of CBC Leader Cosponsors 1.25∗∗ 1.10
(0.1101) (0.5164)
Number of CHC Leader Cosponsors 1.20 1.10
(0.2741) (0.0472)
Number of Black Cosponsors .981 .955∗∗∗
(0.0240) (0.009)
Number of Latino Cosponsors .882 1.00 ∗
(0.582) (0.183)
Number of Cosponsors 1.00 1.00∗∗∗
(0.0045) (0.0007)
Percent Black 1.32 .706
(1.294) (0.157)
Percent Latino .868 1.47∗∗
(0.468) (.210)
Democrat .694 .925
(0.1661) (0.0418)
Majority Party 1.651∗∗∗ 2.659∗∗∗
(0.254) (0.1217)
Female .9043 .814∗∗∗
(0.251) (0.0477)
Seniority 1.034 1.060∗∗∗
(0.0227) (0.0041)
South .7401 1.006
(0.2304) (0.0489)
Commemorative Bill 3.158∗∗∗ 9.300∗∗∗
(0.338) (0.5038)
Ideological Extremity 1.790∗ 1.22∗∗∗
(0.4803) (0.0618)
Constant -3.482∗∗∗ 0.3072∗∗∗
(0.0606) (0.0018)
N 1325 36675
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure 5.1: Predicted Probability for Minority Interest Bill Passage (White MC)
-.0
2
0
.0
2
.0
4
Ef
fe
cts
 o
n 
Pr
( B
ill 
Pa
ss
ing
 th
e 
Ho
us
e)
Black Caucus Leader Cosponsor Latino Caucus Leader Cosponsor
Bill Passage of Minority Interest Legislation (White MC)
105
Table 5.3: Logistic Regression Results for Black MC (106th − 112th Congress)
Minority Interest Legislation Non-Minority Interest Legislation
Passed House (odds ratio/se) (odds ratio/se)
Number of CBC Leader Cosponsors .991 0.799
(0.163) (0.129)
Number of CHC Leader Cosponsors 0.792 1.311
(0.186) (0.279)
Number of Black Cosponsors 0.964 0.972
(0.0267) (0.0290)
Number of Latino Cosponsors 0.792 1.0575
(0.1857) (0.0789)
Number of Cosponsors 1.028∗∗∗ 1.003
(0.0068) (0.0046)
Percent Black 1.683 9.76∗∗∗
(0.515) (6.05)
Percent Latino 0.8234 1.78
(0.613) (0.8634)
Majority Party 3.068∗∗∗ 4.828∗∗∗
(0.721) (0.786)
Female 0.897 0.910
(0.242) (0.170)
Seniority 0.951 0.0443∗∗
(0.0245) (0.0147)
South 0.597 0.431∗∗∗
(0.168) (0.081)
Commemorative Bill 11.15∗∗∗ 15.15∗∗∗
(2.66) (3.56)
Ideological Extremity 1.70 1.00
(0.595) (0.263)
Constant 0.537∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.002)
N 1147 3011
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 5.4: Logistic Regression Results for Latino MC (106th − 112th Congress)
Minority Interest Legislation Non-Minority Interest Legislation
Passed House (odds ratio/se) (odds ratio/se)
Number of CBC Leader Cosponsors 1.506 1.026
(0.565) (0.282)
Number of CHC Leader Cosponsors 0.854 0.965
(0.325) (0.231)
Number of Black Cosponsors 0.842∗ 0.844∗
(0.065) (0.0616)
Number of Latino Cosponsors 0.893 0.915
(0.091) (0.064)
Number of Cosponsors 1.050∗∗ 1.027∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.008)
Percent Black 0.072 0.333
(0.131) (0.259)
Percent Latino 1.119 0.734
(1.670) (0.497)
Majority Party 1.760 2.430∗∗∗
(0.785) (0.530)
Female 0.788 1.042
(0.517) (0.306)
Seniority 1.036 0.983
(0.085) (0.412)
South 3.855∗ 2.377∗∗
(2.640) (0.734)
Commemorative Bill 16.509∗∗∗ 7.180∗∗∗
(8.240) (2.225)
Ideological Extremity 0.575 .335∗∗
(0.580) (0.120)
Constant 0.031∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.036)
N 417 1189
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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5.4.1 Heckman Selection Model
A critic might be skeptical of my use of logistic regression in studying caucus influ-
ence because the research question posed can be seen as a two-step selection process;
where the first step estimates the probability of a White MC introducing a minority
interest bill and, conditional on the first stage, the second step estimates the prob-
ability of that minority interest legislation passing in the House of Representatives.
Within the second step, I am particularly interested in the extent to which minority
caucus leaders exercise caucus influence over minority interest legislation introduced
by a White MC.
In general, scholars typically employ sample selection models when the group
that their interested in studying is able to select themselves into a particular group,
which occurs because certain people may be likely to self-select into certain samples
(Heckman, 1979). Hence, the sample observed is not representative of the population
that I am interested in studying. As I have argued previously, and consistent with
previous research, Black and Latino MCs are more apt to sponsor legislation relevant
to racial and ethnic minorities. In addition, I am not observing some minority interest
legislation introduced by White MCs because some of these MCs are reticent to
sponsoring race-relevant bills because of fear of appearing racist or the potential
reaction from minority congressional caucuses.
For the purpose of my study, I employ the Heckman Selection Model to study the
ability of minority congressional caucuses to exert positive agenda control and caucus
influence. I employ this model because my question grapples with two stages of the
agenda-setting process and there are different factors that influence each decision,
which means that I will use slightly different covariates in measuring the two stages
of agenda-setting.
The Heckman model is ideal for my case because I am interested in studying
the factors affecting the decision of MCs to sponsor legislation and the probability
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of its success. Hence, I observe a selection decision: whether a member chooses to
introduce minority interest legislation. But, if I just used a logistic regression model,
I would only observe the people who introduced minority interest legislation, whereas
the Heckman Selection Model only allows for a minority interest bill to be censored,
if it was introduced in the first place. Simply put, the Heckman model allows for
selection of introducing minority interest legislation, but the logistic regression can
only study one category of a dependent variable at a time.
In addition to employing the Heckman Selection Model for studying agenda control
among minority caucuses, I explore to the extent to which majority party status
might affect their ability to exercised agenda control; these results are reported in
Tables 5.5 through 5.10. I should note that I am primarily interested in the top
half of these tables, which report the second stage of the analyses–the probability
of a MC’s minority interest bill passing, conditional on them introducing at least
one minority interest legislation. However, I am interested in the first stage–which
measures the probability that a MC introduces a minority interest bill–insofar as the
relevant variables as significant because this will have implications on the results of
the second stage.
Now, in Table 5.5, I observe that being Black caucus leader, members of the
majority party, and introducing a commemorative bill are all still positively associated
with predicting the passage of minority interest legislation introduced by a White MC.
After running a similar analysis accounting for majority party status, I find that when
Democrats are in the majority, I still find positive and statistically significant result
for minority caucus leadership and commemorative bills.
Next, in Table 5.7, I observe that being in the majority party, number of cospon-
sors, and introducing a commemorative bill are all still positively associated with
predicting the passage of minority interest legislation introduced by a Black MC. Af-
ter running a similar analysis accounting for majority party status, I find that when
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Democrats are in the majority, I still find positive and statistically significant result
for the number of cosponsors. Again, as expected, I find no statistically significant
result for minority caucus leadership.
Finally, in Table 5.9, I observe that being a MC from a southern congressional
district, number of cosponsors, introducing a commemorative bill, and support for the
Black caucus leadership are all still positively associated with predicting the passage
of minority interest legislation introduced by a Latino MC. After running a similar
analysis accounting for majority party status, I find that when Democrats are in
the majority, I still find positive and statistically significant result for the number
of cosponsors and introducing a commemorative bill. However, after accounting for
Democratic controlled Congresses, I do not find a statistically significant result for
Black caucus leader cosponsor.
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Table 5.5:
Minority Interest Bill Introduction by White MCs (106th−112th Congress)
Pass House
Democrat -0.0211
(0.0227)
Female -0.0113
(0.0211)
Seniority 0.00291
(0.00192)
South -0.0125
(0.0210)
Majority 0.122∗∗∗
(0.0176)
Number of Cosponsors -0.000195
(0.000732)
Number of Black Cosponsors 0.00117
(0.00379)
Number of Latino Cosponsors -0.00847
(0.00620)
Number of Black Leader Cosponsors 0.0214∗
(0.00976)
Number of Latino Leader Cosponsors 0.00804
(0.0175)
Commemorative Bill 0.484∗∗∗
(0.0386)
Minority Legislation Introduction
Percent Black 0.549∗∗∗
(0.130)
Percent Latino 0.809∗∗∗
(0.0839)
Democrat 0.179∗∗∗
(0.0315)
Female 0.00000872
(0.0350)
Majority -0.00749
(0.0282)
Seniority 0.00515
(0.00301)
South -0.103∗∗
(0.0372)
Number of cosponsors -0.0119∗∗∗
(0.000866)
Number of Black Cosponsors 0.0677∗∗∗
(0.00534)
Number of Latino Cosponsors 0.0791∗∗∗
(0.0110)
Number of Black Leader Cosponsors 0.0413
(0.0240)
Number of Latino Leader Cosponsor -0.0774∗
(0.0334)
Commemorative Bill 0.000328
(0.0618)
N 38000
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 5.6:
Minority Interest Bill Introduction by White MCs [Partisanship](106th −
112th Congress)
Democratically Controlled Congresses Republican Controlled Congresses
Pass House Pass House
Heckman Selection Model
Democrat 0.0825 -0.127∗∗∗
(0.0468) (0.0251)
Female -0.0171 -0.00239
(0.0397) (0.0248)
Seniority 0.00590 0.00193
(0.00369) (0.00222)
South -0.0557 0.00820
(0.0416) (0.0241)
Cosponsors 0.00125 -0.000802
(0.00147) (0.000842)
Black Cosponsor -0.00656 0.00553
(0.00655) (0.00464)
Latino Cosponsor -0.0231 0.000237
(0.0124) (0.00749)
CBC Leader Cosponsor 0.0597∗∗ 0.00995
(0.0253) (0.0253)
CHC Leader Cosponsor 0.0541 0.0541
(0.0361) (0.0361)
Commemorative Bill 0.580∗∗∗ 0.580∗∗∗
(0.0844) (0.0102)
Count
Percent Black 0.719∗∗∗ 0.483∗∗
(0.217) (0.164)
Percent Latino 0.858∗∗∗ 0.800∗∗∗
(0.138) (0.106)
Democrat 0.223∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗
(0.0575) (0.0358)
Female -0.0231 0.0125
(0.0586) (0.0439)
Seniority -0.00259 0.00916∗
(0.00523) (0.00370)
South -0.146∗ -0.0846
(0.0690) (0.0443)
Cosponsors -0.0117∗∗∗ -0.0120∗∗∗
(0.00158) (0.00105)
Black Cosponsor 0.0579∗∗∗ 0.0719∗∗∗
(0.00989) (0.00643)
Latino Cosponsor 0.0610∗∗ 0.0931∗∗∗
(0.0201) (0.0134)
CBC Leader Cosponsor 0.0810 0.0233
(0.0481) (0.0277)
CHC Leader Cosponsor -0.0218 -0.123∗∗
(0.0623) (0.0408)
Commemorative Bill -0.141 0.0560
(0.119) (0.0729)
N 11617 26383
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 5.7:
Minority Interest Bill Introduction by Black MCs (106th−112th Congress)
Pass House
Democrat -0.0940
(0.102)
Female -0.0266
(0.0204)
Seniority -0.00647∗∗
(0.00215)
South -0.00810
(0.0199)
Majority 0.0887∗∗∗
(0.0186)
Number of Cosponsors 0.00404∗∗∗
(0.000889)
Number of Black Cosponsors -0.0104∗
(0.00430)
Number of Latino Cosponsors -0.0144∗
(0.00663)
Number of Black Leader Cosponsors -0.00337
(0.0121)
Number of Latino Leader Cosponsors -0.0272
(0.0172)
Commemorative Bill 0.232∗∗∗
(0.0564)
Minority Legislation Introduction
Percent Black 0.325
(0.173)
Percent Latino 0.615∗∗∗
(0.148)
Democrat -0.118
(0.214)
Female 0.0301
(0.0546)
Majority -0.0602
(0.0470)
Seniority 0.0132∗∗
(0.00476)
South -0.129∗
(0.0499)
Number of Cosponsors -0.0136∗∗∗
(0.00160)
Number of Black Cosponsors 0.0734∗∗∗
(0.00657)
Number of Latino Cosponsors 0.0555∗∗
(0.0199)
Number of Black Leader Cosponsors 0.0177
(0.0372)
Number of Latino Leader Cosponsors -0.0131
(0.0581)
Commemorative Bill 0.862∗∗∗
(0.0833)
N 4158
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 5.8:
Minority Interest Bill Introduction by Black MCs [Partisanship](106th −
112th Congress)
Democratic Congresses Republican Congresses
Pass House Pass House
Heckman Selection Model
Female -0.0734 -0.00782
(0.0501) (0.0199)
Seniority -0.00573 -0.00586∗∗
(0.00441) (0.00223)
South -0.0192 -0.00327
(0.0436) (0.0200)
Number of Cosponsors 0.00527∗ 0.00295∗∗∗
(0.00214) (0.000822)
Number of Black Cosponsors -0.0193 -0.00421
(0.0109) (0.00387)
Number of Latino Cosponsors -0.00859 -0.0124
(0.0145) (0.00657)
Number of CBC Leader Cosponsors 0.0325 -0.0101
(0.0283) (0.0118)
Number of CHC Leader Cosponsors -0.0585 -0.0162
(0.0403) (0.0168)
Commemorative Bill 0.0881 0.342∗∗∗
(0.129) (0.0543)
Constant 0.629 0.0756
(0.332) (0.135)
Count
Percent Black 0.202 0.384
(0.290) (0.197)
Percent Latino 0.555∗ 0.650∗∗∗
(0.256) (0.183)
Female 0.110 -0.00897
(0.0891) (0.0694)
Seniority 0.0105 0.0155∗
(0.00774) (0.00616)
South -0.127 -0.116
(0.0842) (0.0609)
Number of Cosponsors -0.0151∗∗∗ -0.0124∗∗∗
(0.00252) (0.00213)
Number of Black Cosponsors 0.0811∗∗∗ 0.0693∗∗∗
(0.0110) (0.00827)
Number of Latino Cosponsors 0.0434 0.0568∗
(0.0317) (0.0261)
Number of CBC Leader Cosponsors 0.0121 0.0220
(0.0628) (0.0463)
Number of CHC Leader Cosponsors 0.00569 -0.0261
(0.0989) (0.0726)
Commemorative Bill 0.846∗∗∗ 0.868∗∗∗
(0.144) (0.103)
Constant -1.255∗∗∗ -1.310∗∗∗
(0.162) (0.130)
N 1587 2571
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 5.9:
Minority Interest Bill Introduction by Latino MCs (106th−112th Congress)
Pass House
Democrat 0.145∗
(0.0729)
Female 0.0157
(0.0283)
Seniority 0.00102
(0.00505)
South 0.0916∗∗
(0.0307)
Majority 0.0194
(0.0250)
Number of Cosponsors 0.00390∗∗
(0.00147)
Number of Black Cosponsors -0.0177∗∗
(0.00537)
Number of Latino Cosponsors -0.00618
(0.00658)
Number of CBC Leader Cosponsors 0.0544∗∗
(0.0184)
Number of CHC Leader Cosponsors -0.00295
(0.0187)
Commemorative Bill 0.385∗∗∗
(0.0483)
Minority Legislation Introduction
Percent Black 0.424∗
(0.207)
Percent Latino 0.949∗∗∗
(0.215)
Democray 0.0709
(0.198)
Female 0.0942
(0.0871)
Majority -0.0462
(0.0726)
Seniority 0.0354∗
(0.0143)
South -0.0228
(0.0975)
Number of Cosponsors -0.0177∗∗∗
(0.00296)
Number of Black Cosponsors 0.0614∗∗∗
(0.0149)
Number of Latino Cosponsors 0.0623∗∗∗
(0.0179)
Number of CBC Leader Cosponsors 0.0751
(0.0635)
Number of CHC Leader Cosponsors 0.0724
(0.0641)
Commemorative Bill 0.436∗∗
(0.138)
N 1679
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 5.10:
Minority Interest Bill Introduction by Latino MCs [Partsainship](106th−
112th Congress)
Democratic Congresses Republican Congresses
Pass House Pass House
Heckman Selection Model
Female 0.00391 0.0245
(0.0480) (0.0350)
Seniority -0.00176 0.00104
(0.00780) (0.00654)
South 0.0157 0.111∗∗
(0.0647) (0.0353)
Number of Cosponsors 0.00467∗ 0.00344∗
(0.00234) (0.00175)
Number of Black Cosponsors -0.0131 -0.0199∗∗
(0.00924) (0.00641)
Number of Latino Cosponsors -0.00170 -0.0132
(0.0108) (0.00806)
Number of CBC Leader Cosponsors 0.0606 0.0466∗
(0.0408) (0.0193)
Number of CHC Leader Cosponsors -0.00244 0.0132
(0.0378) (0.0208)
Commemorative Bill 0.380∗∗∗ 0.411∗∗∗
(0.0939) (0.0536)
Constant -0.134 0.0547
(0.215) (0.179)
Count
Percent Black 0.692 0.280
(0.353) (0.258)
Percent Latino 1.357∗∗∗ 0.878∗∗∗
(0.405) (0.257)
Female 0.142 0.0307
(0.138) (0.114)
Seniority 0.00697 0.0514∗∗
(0.0228) (0.0192)
South -0.271 0.0884
(0.166) (0.121)
Number of Cosponsors -0.0221∗∗∗ -0.0159∗∗∗
(0.00497) (0.00386)
Number of Black Cosponsors 0.0824∗∗ 0.0550∗∗
(0.0265) (0.0185)
Number of Latino Cosponsors 0.0442 0.0668∗∗
(0.0304) (0.0230)
Number of CBC Leader Cosponsors 0.181 0.0250
(0.117) (0.0771)
Number of CHC Leader Cosponsors 0.0395 0.0930
(0.114) (0.0806)
Commemorative Bill 0.473∗ 0.422∗
(0.235) (0.171)
Constant -1.850∗∗∗ -1.728∗∗∗
(0.253) (0.201)
N 706 973
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I present evidence that minority congressional caucuses exert
caucus influence over White MCs’ sponsorship of minority interest legislation. In
particular, I present evidence that when a CBC member serves on the executive
committee of their caucus, she is able to block minority interest legislation introduced
by a White MC. As in the statistical results from Chapter Four, I did not find any
statistically significant results for the CHC executive committee. I will speculate
about why this might be in Chapter Six.
The results of this chapter provide evidence for the need of expanding what and
how the literature measures and considers as legislative effectiveness. Previous re-
search has tried to apply this “one size fits all” model in measuring legislative ef-
fectiveness. This study provides evidence that minority congressional caucuses can
be relevant in the agenda-setting stage, particularly as it relates to minority interest
legislation. This finding contradicts previous literature on minority caucuses, which
constitutes minority congressional caucus as peripheral institutions in Congress. Also,
this result contradicts literature concerning the link between descriptive and substan-
tive representation for Black and Latino MCs and provides evidence that not only do
minority caucuses matter in agenda-setting, but they matter in a substantive way,
which is consistent with findings from Grose (2011) and Minta (2011).
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CHAPTER VI
Conclusion
As mentioned in the outset of this dissertation, substantial research has examine
the relationship between the descriptive representation of African Americans and
Latinos and the substantive representation of minority interests in Congress (e.g.
Canon, 1999; Grose, 2011; Minta, 2011; Swain, 1993; Tate, 2003). Early studies
explore this connection via roll call voting and come to different conclusions. On
the one hand, these studies provide evidence that minority legislators do a better
job of representing the interest of racial and ethnic minorities when compared to
their White colleagues (e.g. Canon, 1999); on the other, race or ethnicity makes no
difference in the substantive representation of African Americans and Latinos (e.g.
Hero and Tolbert, 1995; Swain, 1993).
While these studies provide insight on how race and ethnicity affects members’
voting behavior, they only make use of one form of legislative behavior: roll call
voting. Moreover, several studies have argued against the use of roll call data, as it is
far from an exhaustive indicator of representation and can, on occasion, represent a
distorted one (Achen, 1982; Hall, 1996). Studies that rely solely on voting behavior
boil sets of complex decisions down to a handful of oversimplified dichotomous choices.
Moreover, a single roll call vote provides no information on the intensity of a member’s
preference, or the significance of her vote to the final outcome (Hall, 1996). The
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selection inherent in roll call analyses skews the conclusions about race’s impact on
representation by systematically excluding the proposals that might polarized the
preferences of minority and White MCs (the so-called “censored sample problem”)
(Hall, 1996, p.192).1
While examining voting behavior does help scholars place Black and Latino legis-
lators relative to other House members, this is only relevant for bills that come to the
House floor. Additionally, how a legislator votes only tells us a part of how well they
represent their constituents; it does not tell us what the legislator is doing proactively
for their constituents (Grose, 2011; Hall, 1996). More recent research has studied the
effect of race and ethnicity “beyond the vote.” This research has shown that both
African American and Latino legislators are more likely to sponsor legislation that
disproportionately affects members of their respective groups (Rocca and Sanchez,
2008, Sinclair-Chapman, 2003; Tate, 2003; Wilson, 2010). In addition, there are
noticeable differences in minority MCs’ legislative styles (Canon, 1999; Tate, 2003),
constituency service (Grose, 2011), and interventions in oversight hearings (Minta,
2011).
While these recent studies are an improvement on studies that exclusively focus on
roll call data, these studies overlook a vital component of any effective mode of repre-
sentation: organizations. Initial studies of minority congressional caucuses focused on
its formation and symbolic significance (Barnett, 1982; Levy and Stoudinger, 1976).
These studies claimed that minority caucuses acted as a social organization for its
members and rarely engaged in substantive representation. The second stream of
research focused on voting cohesion among minority congressional caucus (e.g. Giles
and Jones, 1995). For the most part, these studies claim that the CBC was cohe-
sive with few exceptions. A few studies have conducted similar analyses of the CHC
and concluded that its membership is cohesive on some issues, but display greater
1Also, by design, roll call voting presents MCs with a single choice, typically structured by party
leaders to attract a majority of votes (Hall, 1996; Cox and McCubbins, 1993).
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diversity in roll call votes relative to the CBC. This dissertation offers an assessment
of the CBC and CHC from the perspective of institutions that affect the legislative
agenda. This approach represents a departure from previous assessments that detail
the origins, evolution, operations, and organizational structure of the CBC and CHC
(Barnett 1975, 1982; Champagne and Rieselbach, 1995; Clay, 1993; Singh, 1998).
In this chapter, I review my main findings, discuss the limitations and implications
of my results, and conclude with a brief note on directions for future research.
6.1 Overview of Findings
In Chapter Two, I compare and contrast my theory of minority caucuses with the
work of Cox and McCubbins (2005) and their theory of negative agenda control. In
addition, I discuss two theories I later test in Chapters Four and Five. One concerns
the behavior of the caucus chairs in promoting their own, or the caucus’s, priorities
by virtue of their staff capacity. The other is about the caucus’s ability to block
legislative proposals generated by MCs outside of the CBC and CHC–which I refer
to as caucus influence.
Next, I will summarize Chapter Three’s findings from my qualitative interviews,
which provide important insights for the aforementioned theories. There were no-
ticeable differences in the number of interviews I obtained with the CBC verses the
CHC staff. That is, CBC staffers were more cooperative than CHC staffers, which is
primarily due to the assistance I received from a senior CBC staffer. While I would
have preferred a more representative sample of CHC staffers, I do not see this as
a problem, as I was not trying to generalize about the behavior of CBC and CHC
personal and caucus staff. Instead, I was trying to understand the relationship be-
tween caucus staff and individual member offices. Nevertheless, four topics emerged
from my qualitative interviews: legislative priorities, vote cohesion, caucus staff and
cosponsorship.
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In regards to legislative priorities, I found that the CBC is primarily interested
in education, unemployment, healthcare, civil rights, transportation, criminal justice
reform, economic inequality, social programs and African trade; while the CHC was
interested in healthcare and immigration. These caucuses have more issues in com-
mon than what is displayed here,2 but since I only interviewed a few CHC staffers,
healthcare is the only top legislative issue these caucuses had in common in my sam-
ple.3
Second, while I did find evidence that staffers viewed vote cohesion in the tradi-
tional manner, which focuses on the collection of votes within the CBC and CHC,
I also found qualitative evidence that CBC and CHC members view vote cohesion
in a strategic manner. In other words, members vote with their caucus when their
preferences are similar, but vote differently when they have preferences that differ
from their colleagues in the CBC or CHC; this sentiment bolsters my claim that
caucuses matter as legislative institutions. My interviewees also discussed how their
bosses make concerted efforts to block legislation that disadvantages racial and ethnic
minorities. This is perhaps why minority caucuses, especially the CBC, appears to
be so cohesive: the literature primarily focuses on the extent to which these members
vote alike (e.g. Giles and Jones, 1995), but ignore the circumstances that they make
concerted efforts to block legislation.
Next, interviewees revealed vital details about caucus staff and their relationships
with individual member offices. For instance, my theory of caucus leadership advan-
tage (based on evidence from interviews) posits that caucus leaders will be more pro-
ductive because the caucus staff is physically located in their office. In addition, my
2 For more information on the legislative priorities of the CHC and CBC, visit
the following websites: http://congressionalhispaniccaucus-sanchez.house.gov/ and https://cbc-
butterfield.house.gov/.
3 To clarify, I am only mentioning legislative issues in which a substantial amount of caucus
members mentioned. CHC members mentioned other issues like social justice or crime, but these
issues were not mentioned by the majority of members in my sample. For a full list of legislative
issues mentioned, please see Appendix A.
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interviewees stated the caucus staff is uniquely helpful in building their relationships
with institutions within and outside of Congress and other branches of government,
especially the executive branch. These and other claims suggest the importance of a
previously ignored aspect of minority congressional caucuses: the caucus staff. The
general sentiment was that caucus staffers help its members magnify their influence
in ways that would be hard, but not impossible, to do without them.
Finally, in their discussion of cosponsorship, interviewees reveal the diverse ap-
proaches their bosses take in signing onto bills. I use this finding later in Chapter
Five in constructing my statistical model concerning caucus influence. In general,
the qualitative evidence presented in this chapter provides affirmation that minor-
ity MCs view their caucus membership as important because of the assistance they
receive from the caucus staff.
In Chapters Four and Five, I move onto statistical tests of the hypotheses enumer-
ated in Chapter Two. In Chapter Four, I present the statistical results of the caucus
leadership advantage models. By leveraging an unique institutional by-product of the
CBC and CHC–caucus staff–I demonstrate that when caucus members serve as lead-
ers, they introduce more substantive bills. These results are robust when considering
other statistical models and majority party status, among several other institutional
and district covariates. Hence, contrary to the previous research on minority congres-
sional caucuses (e.g. Singh, 1998), the CBC and CHC are not peripheral institutions.
Instead, this dissertation provides evidence that the CBC and CHC are ancillary in-
stitutions that warrant inclusion in studies of minority agenda-setting. I argue that
this approach to studying minority agenda-setting behavior should be employed in fu-
ture studies, as it is a realistic approach to the political reality of minority legislators
in Congress; minority legislators are often working as a group via caucus membership
to improve the conditions of racial and ethnic minorities.
In Chapter Five, I present the statistical results of the caucus influence models. I
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found that the support of minority caucus leaders via cosponsorship helps to predict
the success of minority interest legislation by a White MC. Additional analyses suggest
that their ability to wield caucus influence is confined to issues relating to racial and
ethnic minorities.
An important caveat to mention regarding the statistical results presented in
Chapters Four and Five is that I did not find any statistically significant results
for the CHC. In regards to Chapter Four, I suspect that I found no statistically
significant results for the CHC because they have less staff capacity than the CBC.
This might explain why, in some analyses, I found results for the CHC that was
close to being statistically significant, but not quite. Regarding the lack of significant
results in Chapter 5, non-CBC and CHC members may view CBC cosponsorship
differently than the CHC cosponsorship. That is, legislators may see the CBC leader
cosponsorship as representative of all African American MCs, but since the CHC is
seen as more diverse in their approach to politics, MCs may not view cosponsorship
from the CHC as being representative of all Latinos in Congress. Instead, members
may try to gain support for the CHC by approaching individual members instead
of approaching the CHC as a group. Hence, part of the reason these the CBC is
effective at exerting caucus influence is largely due to how other MCs view them
as an organization. Future studies should explore how other members outside of
minority congressional caucuses view them and how their vantage point shapes how
and why that interact with the CBC and CHC.
Overall, this dissertation argues that the presence of minority congressional cau-
cuses matters in agenda-setting. The results of this dissertation support results from
Gross (2005) and Minta (2011) find statistical and qualitative support of the sub-
stantive influence of minority legislators outside of roll call voting. As mentioned in
Chapter One, minority congressional caucuses are akin to internal lobbyists (Miler,
2011). While caucuses are voluntary organizations with no formal agenda-setting
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powers, they provide members opportunities to symbolically and substantively rep-
resent the interests of their constituents in unique ways.
6.2 Limitations of Dissertation and Future Research
In this section, I will discuss ways this vein of research could be improved. First,
in Chapter Five, an index variable or legislative effectiveness score that measures
legislative success in predicting the probability of a White MC’s minority interest
legislation passing is probably preferable to my use of a dichotomous variable mea-
suring bill passage; since their is substantial differences in the number of bills that
are introduced and the number of bills that advance to further stages, my current de-
pendent variable gives too much weight to members who are more successful in later
stages of the legislative process (e.g., having a bill pass the House) than earlier stages
of the process (e.g. bill introduction or action in committee). Moreover, if I created
a legislative effectiveness score similar to Volden et. al (2009), I would be able to
observe if minority legislators are introducing more bills than their White colleagues
but are less successful at getting their bills passed into law. Also, an index variable
is important for this study because minority legislators are less likely to see the bills
that they introduce translate into law (McCormick and Mitchell, 2007). Hence, fu-
ture studies should employ an index variable or legislative effectiveness score, as it
would depict a more realistic account of the legislative process. If an index variable
was employed, I expect that minority caucuses would have more apt to exert caucus
influence at the committee level, as these members hold several ranking positions on
congressional committees.4
4Since CBC members emerge from uniformly Democratic districts, they often have weak chal-
lengers. This lends itself to outsized seniority within the chamber, meaning a larger share of the CBC
members have the benefits of seniority than could be randomly expected (Gerber, 1996). Future
studies should examine the consequences of this undue influence. Smith (1996) asserts, “as blacks
rise in the institutional power structure, they may be required to put interests of the committee,
the party or the House before the interests of their constituents” (p.110). This is also similar to
the arguments that Tate (2014) puts forth in her recent book. In particular, she provides evidence
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Next, by studying the progression of bills through Congress, I am studying spe-
cific forms of agenda-setting behavior and effectiveness of MCs. In addition to ad-
vancing their own interests and those of their constituents through their sponsorship
and cosponsorship behavior, minority MCs engage in bringing “pork” projects to
their districts (Grose, 2011, 2005), constituency service (Grose, 2011), speaking up in
oversight hearings (Minta, 2011), and much more. While studying such activities is
outside the scope of this project, understanding how minority caucuses facilitate the
effectiveness of minority MCs across a range of activities also merits study.
Another limitation of this study is that I provide no systematic empirical evidence
that staffers shape policy-making in Congress. That is, I assume that the reason that
caucus chairs are productive when their in the leadership because of the additional
staff capacity they have from the caucus staff. While I provide substantial qualitative
evidence that this occurs, I do not provide any empirical evidence that this is defini-
tively why caucus chairs are more productive. Future studies should quantitatively
test whether the composition of legislative staffs is associated with the content and
volume of legislative agendas of their bosses. I suspect that congressional and caucus
staffers influence the legislative agendas of their bosses.
Future research should also study the extent to which the racial or ethnic com-
position of staff affect the policies that their bosses pursue. It is possible that rep-
resentation of groups like African Americans and Latinos on legislative staffs brings
diverse perspectives to Congress that the institution continues to lack when it comes
to elected officials, as previous work suggests (e.g. Canon, 1999; Grose, 2011). This
is not to say that staffers can replace the well-established influence of either de-
scriptive representatives or like-minded White Democrats on policy responsiveness to
of “concordance,” which she refers to as the process by which “Black lawmakers at the national
level are more likely to vote with the Democratic majority than they ever have in the past” (p.
1). According to Tate, this is a result of the political incorporation of Blacks (especially into party
leadership roles), which causes them to become more moderate and simultaneously, the Democratic
Party is becoming more liberal on racial issues.
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racial and ethic minorities. However, minority congressional staffers may broaden the
scope of policy initiative and responsiveness by increasing the presence of Latino and
African Americans interests on policy agendas. This is important for minority MCs
and non-minority MCs alike, as not all Black and Latino constituents are represented
descriptively. In other words, African Americans and Latino staffers may help shape
responsiveness to marginalize populations in desirable ways. This or other research
that uncovers ways that we might be able to increase the representation of Blacks
and Latinos are vital, as there is a finite number of majority-minority congressional
districts that state legislatures can draw.
6.3 Implications
The relationships observed here between agenda-setting and minority congres-
sional caucuses have interesting implications for literatures on race, ethnicity and
representation, congressional caucuses, and minority organizations. In regards to mi-
nority representation, this dissertation illustrates the need of research to go beyond
the dyadic study of minority representation, and instead look at the CBC and CHC
and their influence on agenda-setting. Studying the influence of these caucuses in
agenda-setting is vital for several reasons. First, Black and Latino MCs spend a sig-
nificant amount of their finite time in caucus meeting and on other caucus-related
activities every week. As I mentioned in Chapter One, and consistent with previous
literature, MCs are misers of time; if they are spending a lot of time doing a legisla-
tive activity, it is important to examine the purpose that activity and how it serves
a member’s legislative goals.
Second, as mentioned earlier, a plethora of research suggests that the bulk of
legislative work is done by staffers. According to Rundquist, Schneider, and Pauls
(1992), “virtually nothing is done in Congress so exclusively by Members of Congress
themselves that staff have no impact on the outcome. Supporters of staff influence
126
claim that staff result in innovation and a broader range of informed perspectives
being brought to bear upon the policy decisions of Congress” (p. 93). Hence, if
congressional staffers are able to wield influence over the legislative agenda, then
one can expect the same for the CBC’s and CHC’s caucus staffers. In fact, when
questioned about the role of the caucus staffers in Congress, one of my interviewees
stated that, “[The caucus staff] do all the legwork... caucus staffers are like law
clerks working for multiple attorneys preparing all types of notes and facts so that
when they get to the courtroom, the lawyer [CBC or CHC member] is ready to go.
Now, I don’t want to make it seem like members are not involved. They’re not just
figureheads. But they just don’t have the time to do all of the research and find
the background information necessary for these meetings.” This and several other
statement by interviewees provide evidence that the caucus staff warrants examination
in future studies of legislative staff and minority agenda-setting.
The dissertation also underscores the need and importance of political organiza-
tions for Blacks and Latinos. At the mass level, there has been substantial research
on linked fate–the idea that your fate is tied to other in-group members–amongst
Blacks and Latinos. According to Dawson (1994), the political importance of group
interests is a result of at least two historical aspects of American racism: “First, until
at least the late 1960s, individual African Americans’ life chances were determined
by the ascriptive feature of race... [And] as long as African Americans continue to
believe that their lives are to a large degree determined by what happens to the
group as a whole... African Americans’ perceptions of racial group interests [will]
be an important component of the way individual Blacks go about evaluating poli-
cies, parties, and candidates” (p. 57). This linked fate construct grew increasingly
important when used to explore the group behavior of other racial and ethnic (or
pan-ethnic) collectivities representing Latinos (Sanchez and Masuoka, 2008; Sanchez
2008; Nicholson, Pantoja and Segura, 2005) and Black Caribbeans (Watt, 2009), and
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was found to be significant. And given that minority MCs are forced to deal with in-
stitutional dynamics and interpersonal relations that constitute them as subordinate
(Hawkesworth, 2003), CBC and CHC are vital institutions for Black and Latino MCs.
Hence, just as we study how linked fate affects racial and ethnic minorities at the
mass level, a simultaneous process is occurring at the elite level, as these legislators
try to represent the interest of racial and ethnic minorities while also being Black or
Latino themselves.
Lastly, this dissertation provides substantial evidence for the inclusion of congres-
sional caucuses, in general, in future studies of legislative agenda-setting. Congres-
sional caucuses formed as an effort to influence the legislative process beyond what
regular participation in Congress offers (Hammond 1998; Miler 2011). In this way,
caucuses serve as a tool for the professional development of its members. In addition,
caucuses serve the need of policy coordination of a cause or legislative issue. For these
and other reasons, caucuses warrant study in legislative agenda-setting.
6.3.1 Normative Implications for Congressional and Caucus Staff Influ-
ence
The results of this dissertation has interesting normative implications for ques-
tions about responsiveness and accountability. Some may argue that the influence
of non-elected officials on legislative agendas in Congress raise considerable issues for
congressional accountability. After all, caucus and congressional staffers have no di-
rect mandate to act on behalf of the public. If staffers influence legislative agendas,
what mechanisms exist to ensure that legislation reflects the public will? Scenarios
in which staffers influence the substance of legislation to serve special interests rather
than the public interest are easy to imagine, and tempting to entertain. There are
reasons, however, to believe that representation by caucus and congressional staffers
has more potential to improve congressional responsiveness to the public interest than
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to pervert it. Surely, anecdotal examples of powerful staffers influencing substantive
bills exist, but there is no systematic evidence that caucus and congressional staffers
significantly affect members’ policy agendas.
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APPENDIX A
Legislative Priorities for CBC and CHC
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Table A.1: Legislative Priorities for CBC and CHC Offices
Legislative Priority Frequency
Affordable Housing 2
African Trade 4
Agriculture 1
Civil Rights 7
College Affordability 2
Combat drug trafficking 1
Copyright Protection 1
Criminal Justice System Reform 5
Debt Reduction 1
Disengagement from Foreign Wars 2
Economic Inequality 3
Education 8
Federal programs should apply to territories 1
Foster Care 1
Funding for STEM Programs 1
HBCUs 1
Healthcare 11
Homeland Security 1
Immigration 3
Increase Use of Generic Drugs 1
Increasing Trauma Centers 1
International Affairs 1
Juvenile Justice 1
Minority Businesses 1
Poverty 2
Public Safety 1
Reducing the Size of Federal Government 1
Retirement Security 1
Second Amendment Rights 1
Sex Trafficking 1
Social Programs 4
Statehood for this U.S. Territory 1
Taxes 3
Teen Pregnancy 1
Trade of Firearms 1
Transportation and Infrastructure 7
Underage Drinking 1
Unemployment 10
Veterans 4
Water 2
Women’s Interests 2
Total 106
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APPENDIX B
Details on Coding Examples for Bill Sponsorship
Data
Table B.1: Example of Minority Interest Legislation by Topic
Topic Example
Macroeconomics incentives in high unemployment areas
Civil Rights extension of the Commission of Civil Rights
Health issues relating to disparities in health
Agriculture domestic food programs for the needy
Labor/Employment/Immigration earned income tax credit
Education expand programs under Higher Education Act
Environment demographic data for waste treatment sites
Energy low-income home energy assistance
Transportation public works employment for unemployed
Law/Crime/Family racially discriminatory use of the death penalty
Social Welfare establish national minimum for AFDC benefits
Community Development/Housing revitalization and construction of public housing
Banking/Finance/Commerce non-discrimination in insurance
Defense pensions for minority soldiers
Space/Science/Communication diverse ownership of local broadcasting
Foreign Trade none
International Affairs sanctions against apartheid
Government Operations King holiday and its commission
Public Lands national Latino American history museum
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APPENDIX C
Details on Coding by Category (Sources: Brenson
2009; Platt, 2014)
1. Macroeconomics bills are predominantly about unemployment and what the
government can do to provide more jobs for the poor and racial and ethnic
minorities. This includes legislation concerning full employment, jobs credits
for the poor, and incentives to develop economically distressed areas.
2. Civil rights bills grapple with instances of discrimination in a variety of areas;
voting rights issues that impact Blacks or Latinos in particular; administering
existing civil rights provisions; and remedial actions such as reparations for
slavery.
3. Racial and ethnic minority health legislation deals with expanding health care
to the poor, caring for pregnant women, and funding for sickle cell, diabetes, and
vitiligo research, which are conditions that disproportionately effect minorities
.
4. An example of minority interest agriculture legislation may use surplus products
to provide food assistance to the needy and school children.
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5. The labor and employment category may include legislation relating, but not
limited to job training programs targeted towards the poor or Blacks or Latinos.
6. Education legislation is coded as a Black or Latino issue if it provides targeted
benefits to disadvantaged students, reduces funding disparities, further Head
Start programs, and funding earmarked for historically black colleges or minor-
ity serving institutions.
7. Environmental legislation with the location of waste sites in minority commu-
nities.
8. Minority interest energy legislation may provide home energy assistance to the
poor and compensate those who lost jobs as a result of the oil crisis.
9. Minority interest in transportation issues may include extended public works
projects intended to alleviate unemployment, representation of minorities and
the poor on local transit boards, and amendments to the Urban Mass Trans-
portation act that pertains to the poor.
10. Law, Crime, and Family issues are coded as Black or Latino when they ad-
dress disparities in sentencing, prohibitions of police brutality, hate crimes, and
programs to help children or poor mothers.
11. Social welfare bills include guaranteed income, appropriations for the Office of
Economic Opportunity, and expansions of the food stamp program. Mostly
this topic is composed of changes to Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren(AFDC) that increase benefits, federalize administration, avoid work re-
quirements, and repeal punitive measures for program participants.
12. Community development and Housing legislation is coded as minority interest
legislation when it expands or improves low-income housing, especially public
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housing. The category also includes issues of fair housing, community devel-
opment block grants, enterprise zones, and economic development of depressed
areas are also included under this heading.
13. Legislation in the Banking, Finance, and Commerce category was coded as
minority interest when it referred to discrimination in the ability of minorities
to get reasonable credit and insurance rates. Also, targeted tax relief for low-
income people and inducements to invest in minority business are also included.
14. Defense bills offer remedies to Black or Latino soldiers for past racial injustices
and create special offices for equal opportunity or minority affairs were coded
as minority interest legislation.
15. Space, Science, Technology, and Communications contains issues about the di-
versity of broad- casting ownership, media portrayal of racial/ethnic groups,
and public works employment to build communication infrastructure that were
coded as minority interest legislation.
16. Foreign trade bills include some affirmative action measures and job retraining
for those displaced by foreign trade were coded as minority interest legislation.
17. International Affairs does not include many minority interest bills, given the
emphasis on domestic policies. The exception is funding for domestic micro-
loan programs.
18. Government operations relate to minority interests when they commemorate
achievements made by Black and Latino leaders, preferences for contracts in
high unemployment areas, and applying civil rights laws to government offices
such as Congress and the Supreme Court.
19. Public lands and water management is devoted entirely to monuments and
landmarks that recognize important aspects of Black or Latino history.
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APPENDIX D
Interview Instrument Legislative Staffers in CBC
and CHC Offices
I am a Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of
Michigan. I am currently in the process of conducting dissertation research on the
legislative priorities of Black and Latino members of Congress. I would like to ask you
a few questions about the legislative priorities of your boss. I am mainly interested
in issues that affect minority and low-income constituents.
Do you have any questions for me before we begin the interview?
Questions
1. Can you tell me about the last piece of legislation that your boss sponsored?
(a) If this legislation were to pass, who would be helped or hurt by it?
(b) Who did you work with on Capital Hill in advancing this legislation?
2. What role did you play in sponsoring and developing this legislation?
(a) In developing this legislation, whom did you work with? (e.g. other leg-
islative staffers)
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(b) Did you work with anyone from a caucus? If so, who?
3. Can you tell me the top five legislative priorities for your boss?
(a) How do the issues that you just mentioned affect African Americans or
Latinos in your district?
4. On any of the issues you mentioned, do you seek assistance from the Congres-
sional Black Caucus staff?
(a) If yes–In what matter did you seek assistance from the CBC?
(b) If no–Do you seek assistance from other caucuses?
5. On average, how many interactions do you have with caucus staff per week?
(a) Generally speaking, how long are these interactions?
(b) Can you walk me through a typical conversation with caucus staff?
6. Can you talk more specifically about an instance where you worked with caucus
staff? What kinds of things did you discuss?
(a) What kind of information did they provide? Did they provide any policy
reports or policy analyses? Did they communicate with other members on
your behalf? Did they communicate with interest groups on your behalf?
7. Do you have questions for me?
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APPENDIX E
Interview Instrument for CBC and CHC Staff
I am a Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of
Michigan. I am currently in the process of conducting dissertation research on the
relationship between congressional caucuses and minority members of Congress.
Questions
1. What do you see as the role of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus (CHC) (or
Congressional Black Caucus (CBC)) in working on policy issues relevant to
Latinos?
2. Do you work with individual member’s offices on legislation that they care
about? If so, what kind of assistance do you provide?
3. On average, how many interactions do you have with caucus members per week
on average?
4. Can you walk me through a typical conservation with caucus members?
(a) Which members do you talk with the most?
(b) What kind of assistance do members look to CHC (or CBC) for?
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5. Here are five headlines of press releases made by the caucus (show five press
releases for CHC chosen at random).
(a) Did the caucus staff work on these issues? What assistance did you provide
and to whom?
6. Which members were active on this issue (depends on the response to question
5)?
(a) Were there any members who had less significant roles?
7. Can you talk more about one of these issues where you worked with a caucus
member? What sort of information did you get? What kinds of things did you
discuss?
(a) Did your office provide any policy reports or policy analyses? Did your
office communicate with other members on your behalf? Did your office
communicate with interest groups on your behalf?
8. Do you have question for me?
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APPENDIX F
Interview Instrument for Members of Congress
I am a Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of
Michigan. I am currently in the process of conducting dissertation research on the
Congressional Black Caucus. Do you have any questions for me before we begin the
interview?
Questions
1. What do you see as the role of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) in working
on policy issues relevant to African Americans?
2. In recent years, the number of black members representing majority white dis-
tricts has increased. There is even members hailing from Republican districts
Has CBC evolved because of this?
3. How does the CBC handle internal conflict?
4. What factors influence the caucus agenda setting?
5. Do you feel a responsibility to representative blacks outside your personal dis-
trict?
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6. How does the CBC measure success when polarization in Congress hinders the
passage of legislation?
7. What is it like being a member of Congress with a black president?
8. What happens when black members vote against CBC interests?
9. What are the weekly CBC meetings like?
10. Do you think It is important for the CBC remains all black?
11. Do you have questions for me?
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APPENDIX G
Subject Recruitment–Email Script
Dear X:
I am a Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of
Michigan. I am currently in the process of conducting dissertation research on the
legislative priorities of Black and Latino members of Congress. I would like to ask you
a few questions about the legislative priorities of your boss. I am mainly interested
in issues that affect minority and low-income constituents.
I have learned what I can from looking at your boss’s website and his legislative ac-
tivity, but there is information that I cannot get from those resources. Hence, I would
like to conduct a short in-person interview with you. My questions will take no longer
than twenty minutes. This interview will be off the record. I will not mention you or
your boss’s name in any of my future written work.
Please contact me if you would be willing to participate or have any questions. I can
be reached via email at lbrenson@umich.edu or by phone (555) 555 5555.
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I look forward to hearing from you soon.
Thank you for considering my request.
Best,
LaShonda
LaShonda Brenson
Ph.D. Candidate
University of Michigan
Department of Political Science
lbrenson@umich.edu
(555) 555 5555
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APPENDIX H
Consent Letter
Project Title: Where’s the Caucus? A Study of Minority Agenda- Setting Behavior
Investigator: LaShonda Brenson, Ph.D. Candidate, University of Michigan
Internal Review Board (IRB) Registration Number: 00000246
Before agreeing to participate in this study, it is vital that you review this consent
form. This letter contains pertinent information regarding the benefits, purpose,
and procedures associated with this study. Most importantly, it contains informa-
tion about your confidentiality and your right to withdraw from the study at any time.
Procedures
You are being asked to participate in a research project that examines the role of race
and ethnicity in the legislative process. Specifically, I am interested in finding out
what role, if any, does race and ethnicity in caucus participation. I anticipate that an
interview will take no longer than thirty minutes of your time and can be conducted
at your legislative office. I plan to conduct one face-to-face interview, but I may need
to contact you for clarification purposes.
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Benefits
I understand that your time is valuable and that you are extremely busy, particularly
during the legislative session. There is no direct benefit or compensation to your for
participating in this study. However, the research is expected to yield fascinating
results about the role of race and ethnicity in caucus participation.
Confidentiality
This is a non-partisan academic project funded by the Rackham Graduate School
at the University of Michigan. Most questions are very general in nature, and are
not intended to elicit sensitive or confidential information. Nonetheless, please know
that the information you provide will be kept in strict confidence. Neither your name
nor your congressional district will be associated with the responses you give. Only
myself and authorized personnel (e.g. my faculty advisors, research assistants and
the Internal Review Board (IRB) at the University of Michigan) will have access to
my research materials.
Withdrawal from Study
Participation in this study is completely voluntary and refusal to participate at any
time will involve no penalty of any kind.
Contact Information
If you have questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact me. I can be
reached by telephone (555-555-5555) or by email (lbrenson@umich.edu). Further, this
study complies with strict guidelines regarding the conduct and use of interviews for
academic purposes. If you have any questions concerning the procedures used in con-
ducting this study, you may also contact the Health Sciences and Behavioral Sciences
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Institutional Review Board (IRB-HSBS) at (734) 936 0933 or irbhsbs@umich.edu
Agreement
Your signature below indicates that you agree to the terms above and to participate
in this study. In addition, your signature below indicates that you received a copy of
the letter for your records.
Signature of Subject
Date
Subject Name (print please)
Signature of Researcher
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APPENDIX I
Example of the Congressional Black Caucus
(CBC) Whip’s Weekly Email
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Figure I.1:
Example of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) Whip’s Weekly Email
[page 1 of 4]
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Figure I.2:
Example of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) Whip’s Weekly Email
[page 2 of 4]
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Figure I.3:
Example of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) Whip’s Weekly Email
[page 3 of 4]
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Figure I.4:
Example of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) Whip’s Weekly Email
[page 4 of 4]
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APPENDIX J
Leadership in the Congressional Black Caucus
(CBC) [92nd-112th Congresses]
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Table J.1: Leadership in the Congressional Black Caucus [92nd-112th Congresses]
Congress Years Chair First and Second Vice
Chairs
Secretary Treasurer
92 1971-1972 Charles Diggs, Jr. Augustus Hawkins Charles Rangel -
92 1972-1973 Louis Stokes Augustus Hawkins Charles Rangel William Lacy
Clay
93 1973-1974 Louis Stokes Parren Mitchell Charles Rangel William Lacy
Clay
93 1974-1975 Charles Rangel Yvonne Burke - Andrew Young
94 1975-1976 Charles Rangel Yvonne Burke - Andrew Young
94 1976-1977 Yvonne Burke Walter Fauntroy Cardiss Collins Andrew Young
95 1977-1979 Parren Mitchell Shirley Chisholm Ronald Dellums Cardiss Collins
96 1979-1981 Cardiss Collins Ronald Dellums William Gray, III Julian Dixon
97 1981-1983 Walter Fauntroy William Gray, III Harold
Washington
Julia Dixon
98 1983-1985 Julian Dixon William Gray, III / Mickey
Leland
Edolphus Towns Harold
Washington
99 1985-1987 Mickey Leland Edolphus Towns Alan Wheat Cardiss Collins
100 1987-1989 Mervyn Dymally Alan Wheat Cardiss Collins Kweisi Mfume
101 1989-1991 Ronald Dellums Alan Wheat / Kweisi Mfume Cardiss Collins Charles Hayes
102 1991-1993 Edolphus Towns Cardiss Collins / Kweisi Mfume William Jefferson Charles Hayes
103 1993-1995 Kweisi Mfume Cardiss Collins / Alcee
Hastings
William Jefferson Barbara-Rose
Collins
104 1995-1997 Donald Payne Barbara-Rose Collins / Earl
Hilliard
Eddie Bernice
Johnson
William
Jefferson
105 1997-1999 Maxine Waters Earl Hilliard / Eddie Bernice
Johnson
Corrine Brown -
106 1999-2001 James Clyburn Eddie Bernice Johnson /
Corrine Brown
Elijah Cummings -
107 2001- 2003 Eddie Bernice
Johnson
Elijah Cummings / Shelia
Jackson Lee
Bobby Rush -
108 2003-2005 Elijah Cummings Shelia Jackson Lee / Corrine
Brown
Danny Davis -
109 2005-2007 Melvin Watt Corrine Brown / Carolyn
Kilpatrick
Danny Davis -
110 2007-2009 Carolyn
Kilpatrick
Barbara Lee / Emanuel Cleaver
II
Danny Davis -
111 2009-2011 Barbara Lee Emanuel Cleaver II / Donna
Christensen
GK Butterfield,
Jr.
-
112 2011- 2013 Emanuel Cleaver
II
Donna Christensen / GK
Butterfield, Jr.
Yvette Clarke -
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APPENDIX K
Leadership in the Congressional Hispanic Caucus
(CHC) [92nd-112th Congresses]
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Table K.1: Leadership in the Congressional Hispanic Caucus [94th-112th Congresses]
Congress Years Chair First and Second Vice
Chairs
Secretary
94 1976-1977 Edward R. Roybal - -
95 1977-1979 Edward R. Roybal - -
96 1979-1981 Edward R. Roybal - -
97 1981-1983 Edward R. Roybal Baltasar Corrada /
Robert Garcia
Edward R.
Roybal
98 1983-1985 Robert Garcia/ Bill Richardson Baltasar Corrada Edward R.
Roybal
99 1985-1987 Bill Richardson/ Matthew Maertinez /
Esteban E. Torres
Matthew Martinez Esteban E.
Torres
100 1987-1989 Esteban E. Torres/ Albert G.
Bustamante/ Jaime B. Fuster
- -
101 1989-1991 Jaime B. Fuster / Eligio (Kika) de la
Garza II / Solomon P. Ortiz
- Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen
102 1991-1993 Solomon P. Ortiz - Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen
103 1993-1995 Jose E. Serrano Lucille Roybal- Allard Ed Pastor
104 1995-1997 Ed Pastor Carlos Romero Barcelo -
105 1997-1999 Xavier Becerra Nydia M. Velazquez /
Loretta Sanchez
-
106 1999-2001 Lucille Roybal- Allard Silvestre Reyes / Ciro
Rodriguez
-
107 2001-2003 Silvestre Reyes Ciro Rodriguez/ Grace
Napolitano
-
108 2003-2005 Ciro D. Rodriguez Grace Napolitano / Joe
Baca
-
109 2005-2007 Grace Napolitano Joe Baca /Raul Grijalva -
110 2007-2009 Joe Baca Raul M. Grijalva /
Charles A. Gonzalez
-
111 2009-2011 Nydia M. Velazquez Charles Gonzalez /
Ruben Hinojosa
-
112 2011-2013 Charles A. Gonzalez Ruben Hinojosa / Ben
Ray Lujan
-
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